RUSSIA DRAWS A LINE IN EUROPE

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THE CONTEXT: As the crisis over Ukraine has entered a critical phase, most middle and great powers from Europe and Asia have rushed to either prepare for any eventuality or mediate by attempts to douse the flames. With the US recently calling a UNSC meet over the threat of the Russian invasion of Ukraine and Russian President Vladimir Putin traveling to Beijing to shore up its resolute stand on Ukraine, most nations find themselves on one side or the other of the emerging battle lines in eastern Europe. India, though, has avoided the strategic ensnarement.

THE BACKGROUND: Ukraine and Russia share hundreds of years of cultural, linguistic, and familial links. For many in Russia and in the ethnically Russian parts of Ukraine, the shared heritage of the countries is an emotional issue that has been exploited for electoral and military purposes. As part of the Soviet Union, Ukraine was the second-most powerful Soviet republic after Russia, and was crucial strategically, economically, and culturally.

CAUSE OF CONFLICT

• Balance of Power: Ever since Ukraine split from the Soviet Union, both Russia and the West have vied for greater influence in the country to keep the balance of power in the region in their favour.
• Buffer Zone for Western Countries: For the US and the European Union, Ukraine is a crucial buffer between Russia and the West.
• As tensions with Russia rise, the US and the EU are increasingly determined to keep Ukraine away from Russian control.
• Russian Interest in the Black Sea: The unique geography of the Black Sea region confers several geopolitical advantages to Russia.
• Firstly, it is an important crossroads and strategic intersection for the entire region.
• Access to the Black Sea is vital for all littoral and neighboring states, and greatly enhances the projection of power into several adjacent regions.
• The region is an important transit corridor for goods and energy.
• Protests in Ukraine: Euromaidan Movement: European Square was a wave of demonstrations and civil unrest in Ukraine, which began in November 2013 with public protests in Maidan Independence Square in Kyiv, Ukraine.
• The protests were sparked by the Ukrainian government’s decision to suspend the signing of an association agreement with the European Union, instead choosing closer ties to Russia and the Eurasian Economic Union
• Separatist Movement: The Donetsk and Luhansk regions of eastern Ukraine have been facing a pro-Russian separatist movement since 2014.
• According to the various sources, the movement is actively supported by the Russian government and Russian paramilitaries make up between 15% to 80% of the separatists fighting against the Ukraine government.
• Invasion of Crimea: Russia seized Crimea from Ukraine in what was the first time a European country annexed territory from another country since world war 2
• The annexation of Crimea from Ukraine followed a Russian military intervention in Crimea that took place in the aftermath of the 2014 Ukrainian revolution and was part of wider unrest across southern and eastern Ukraine.
• The invasion and subsequent annexation of Crimea have given Russia a maritime upper hand in the region.
• Ukraine’s NATO Membership: Ukraine has urged NATO  to speed up its country’s membership in the alliance.
• Russia has declared such a move a “red line”, and is worried about the consequences of the US-led military alliances expanding right up to its doorstep.
• The Black Sea is bordered by Bulgaria, Georgia, Romania, Russia, Turkey, and Ukraine. All these countries are NATO countries.
• Due to this faceoff between NATO countries and Russia, the Balck sea is a region of strategic importance & a potential maritime flashpoint.

CURRENT SITUATION

• Russia is seeking assurances from the US that Ukraine will not be inducted into NATO. However, the US is not prepared to give any such assurance.
• This has left the countries in a standoff, with tens of thousands of Russian troops ready to invade Ukraine.
• Russia is keeping the tensions high at the Ukraine border in order to get sanctions relief and other concessions from the West.
• Any kind of military action by the US or EU against Russia would precipitate a major crisis for the whole world and has so far not been mooted by any of the parties involved.

 THE DYNAMICS

INTERNATIONAL DYNAMICS:

• The sway of Bidden over American politics is decreasing an all-time low rating of 33% was witnessed. In such a case, conflict with Russia is seen as an attempt to bolster domestic politics.
• There is no unity among NATO on the issue of Russia. Recently, the German chancellor said they had no intention to impose an economic section over Russia.
• Britain’s standing and influence in Russia are practically negligent.
• American relation with France is all-time low after the AUKUS fiasco.

INDIA’S POSITION AND STANDING

Military equations: 

• Moscow makes up about half of India’s total weapons import. India needs Russia to service its arms, and also for joint products, like the Brahmos missile.
• Hence, abandoning Russia is not an option for New Delhi. And at the same time, siding with Russia could incur American sanctions, i.e., CAATSA (The Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act).
• The Biden administration is in the process of making a decision on whether to sanction India for its purchase of the S-400 Russian missile systems or to process a waiver, considering the close India-US defense ties.
• If New Delhi openly sides with Russia, then Biden may reconsider imposing sanctions.

China factor:

• In recent years, China has become the biggest threat for India—openly acknowledged by Indian Army chief MM Naravane.
• Hence, India needs both Russia and US to counter China.
• America is China’s rival while Russia is an ally. One brings deterrence, whereas the other brings leverage.
• Russia could be effective in tempering China’s aggression and America, on the other hand, will undermine its designs.
• So, it’s a win-win for India. But that advantage disappears if India picks aside.

Economic fallout:

• The India-Russia bilateral trade is worth $8 billion, while the India-Ukraine trade is worth around only $2.7 billion.
• If a war breaks out, supply chains are going to be disruptive. And the one product that will worry India is oil, both as a fuel and cooking oil.
• Last year, India bought 1.8 million tonnes of sunflower oil and 74 percent of that came from Ukraine. So, if a war breaks out cooking oil may become more expensive.
• India is already preparing for this eventuality and new markets are being explored, like Brazil and Argentina.
• Then comes the petroleum. Brent crude has already breached the 90$-mark, which the possibility to reach even the $100-mark.
• Russia makes up around 20 percent of the global supply of natural gas. If Ukraine is attacked, the prices of natural gas are going to skyrocket
• And this could disrupt India’s energy plans. So, India has a lot at stake in this conflict.

Explaining India’s position: 

• In the UNSC meeting, India abstained, circumventing a perception of supporting the US-led coalition against Russia.
• In the same breath, India also distanced itself from the Beijing Olympics through an official boycott, which in many ways has been projected and perceived as an anti-US as well as an anti-West congregation.
• The two decisions reflect two different assessments of its interests vis-à-vis compulsions of the great power politics on New Delhi.
• While some interpreted India’s absence from the UNSC meets as depicting the limitations of its closeness to the US (alongside tacit support for Russia).
• Its boycott of the Beijing Olympics evinced a coming of age in its strategic autonomy characterized by strong, independent, and interest-based decision-making irrespective of the nature of great power politics at play and the looming risk of antagonizing big powers.
• For India, the decision to carefully weigh on the Ukraine crisis has balanced two strategic necessities:
• Expectations of a close strategic partner in the US; the need to maintain strong ties with Moscow and;
• In unison, these three compulsions also narrate the story of India’s challenges today and the implicit need for a more accommodative evolution of its traditional strategic autonomy to a positioning that straddles balancing and hedging with occasional pushing.

THE CONCLUSION: As Indian strategic engagement with the United States has grown in recent years, the Modi government has shifted its reaction to developments in Ukraine ever so slightly. In 2014, the government of then-Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh talked about Russia’s “legitimate interests” in Ukraine; today, the Modi government underlines the “legitimate security interests of all countries” in Ukraine. It is keeping in mind our own experience of the neutral or cautious positions that Russia and the US and our other partners, including our neighbours, take on our differences with China and Pakistan, on the impact on our own security of the US/Russian policies in Afghanistan, on the omission of any direct reference to Pakistan on the issue of cross border terrorism, etc. Russia openly criticizes our Indo-Pacific and Quad choices, while the US still courts Pakistan, threatens our defense ties with Russia, and has impaired our ties with Iran.