WHAT IS NETANYAHU’S ENDGAME IN IRAN

THE CONTEXT: On 13 June 2025 Israel opened the most intense overt strikes ever conducted against the Islamic Republic of Iran, hitting the Natanz and Isfahan nuclear complexes and assassinating senior Iranian commanders. Tehran responded with roughly 400 drones and ballistic missiles that reached targets as far north as Haifa. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has confirmed “severe” damage to above-ground halls at Natanz, yet no direct breach of the underground cascade where enrichment occurs.

STRATEGIC SETTING

• • Israeli Rationale: From the perspective of Tel Aviv’s security doctrine—codified since the 1981 Begin Doctrine—any hostile state that approaches a nuclear weapon “break-out” capability is viewed as posing an existential threat.
    • Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s stated objectives are (a) physical rollback of enrichment capacity, (b) psychological shock to dissuade further nuclear work, and (c) fracturing of Iran’s politico-military command chain through precision decapitation.
    • In practice, Israel’s decision calculus is reinforced by domestic politics (a fragile coalition facing judicial protests) and the perceived permissive stance of the United States, whose President acknowledged prior knowledge of the strike plan even while denying direct operational involvement.
  • Iranian Mission Imperatives: For Tehran, the nuclear programme is simultaneously a regime-survival insurance policy, a tool of strategic bargaining, and a point of national pride that transcends factional divides.
    • The clerical establishment therefore sees any large-scale military assault as validating its long-held narrative of external encirclement, pushing moderates on the defensive and allowing hard-liners in the Majles to rally domestic support for retaliation. Iran’s response—launching roughly 400 drones and ballistic missiles at Israeli targets—demonstrates both resolve and residual capacity despite the initial attrition of launch sites.

MILITARY-TECHNICAL BALANCE

• • Israel’s Strike Assets and Constraints: Israel’s F-35I Adir stealth fleet offers radar-avoiding ingress routes via Jordanian and Saudi air corridors. However, its heaviest bunker-penetrating weapon in declared service is the 5,000-lb GBU-72, deliverable by F-15I Raʿam aircraft; this munition is insufficient against Iran’s most fortified facility—Fordow, buried nearly 80 metres under Kolang-Gaz La Mountain. Absent U.S. B-21 Raider strategic bombers equipped with the 30,000-lb Massive Ordnance Penetrator, total destruction of deeply buried cascades remains technically improbable.
  • Iran’s Nuclear Geography after 16 June
  • Natanz Pilot Fuel Enrichment Plant: Above-ground halls flattened; IAEA reports “severe” equipment loss but underground centrifuge gallery retains structural integrity.
  • Isfahan Nuclear Technology Centre: Laboratories for UF₆-to-U-metal conversion and fuel fabrication destroyed, setting back weaponisation-adjacent chemistry.
  • Fordow Fuel Enrichment Plant: No confirmed breach; power cuts of uncertain duration may have centrifuge refurbishment implications, but the cascade hall is intact.
  • Khondab (Arak) heavy-water complex: Minor shrapnel damage; reactor vessel unharmed.
  • Iranian Offensive and Defensive Order of Battle: Iran fielded an estimated 2,000 medium-to-long-range missiles prior to hostilities—Shahab-3, Emad, Khorramshahr, Sejjil solid-fuel vehicles—and thousands of Shahed-136 uncrewed aerial vehicles. Roughly one-third of launchers were knocked out in the opening Israeli salvo, yet the residual stockpile remains capable of saturating Israel’s multi-layered defence architecture—Iron Dome, David’s Sling, Arrow-3, and Patriot PAC-3. Financial attrition is mounting: USD 285 million per night in interceptor expenditure, according to Washington Post estimates.

ESCALATION DYNAMICS AND ENDGAME SCENARIOS

• • Regime-Change Gambit: Continuing high-tempo strikes aimed at command bunkers, Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) bases, and state television nodes seek to trigger elite fragmentation or popular revolt.
    • Historical precedent—Operation Allied Force (1999)—shows that coercive bombing can degrade, but rarely topples, resilient authoritarian regimes absent ground manoeuvre or internal coup catalysts. Moreover, civilian casualties risk solidifying nationalist sentiment behind the Supreme Leader.
  • Coercive Diplomacy 2.0: Washington hints at an “enhanced JCPOA” that demands zero enrichment, perpetual IAEA access, and missile curbs in exchange for phased sanctions relief.
    • Tehran’s counter-offer—freeze at 20 percent enrichment, cap IR-6 centrifuges, and accept real-time monitoring—remains contingent on an immediate cessation of bombing. Netanyahu’s sequencing (bomb first, negotiate later) therefore undercuts diplomatic traction.
  • S. Entrapment Path: Israel’s strategic logic ultimately banks on forcing a coalition cascade—if Iran’s retaliation intensifies or a stray missile hits U.S. forces in the Gulf, domestic pressure on the President to intervene kinetically could rise.
    • However, opinion polling in the United States after two protracted wars indicates limited appetite for large-scale deployment. Absent S. strategic bombers and aerial refuelling, Israel’s ability to neutralise Fordow remains circumscribed, postponing any decisive endgame.

GLOBAL ECONOMIC AND LEGAL IMPLICATIONS

• • Energy Security: The Strait of Hormuz still carries ≈20 million barrels per day, one-fifth of world consumption. Brent crude jumped from USD 69 to USD 74 per barrel in 24 hours after the first Israeli raid, even without a physical blockade.
  • Maritime Risk: Insurance premiums for tankers transiting both Hormuz and Bab-el-Mandeb have doubled; the Baltic Dry Index reflects extended Cape-of-Good-Hope diversions.
  • Non-Proliferation Stress: An attack on a safeguarded enrichment plant, even if “defensive”, chips away at the IAEA’s foundational bargain: intrusive inspections in return for safety from force.
  • International Law: Israel claims anticipatory self-defence under Article 51; Iran frames the bombing as an act of aggression warranting reprisal. The Security Council remains paralysed, mirroring Cold-War-era crises.

INDIA’S STRATEGIC CALCULUS

• • Energy and Macroeconomic Exposure: India imports ≈85 percent of its crude requirement; a sustained USD 10 increase in oil prices adds roughly 0.4 percent of GDP to the current-account deficit. The Strategic Petroleum Reserve (SPR)—5.33 million tonnes stored in rock caverns at Visakhapatnam, Mangaluru, and Padur—covers only 11–12 days of net imports, though the 2025-26 Union Budget allocates USD 647 million for expansion, including a new 4 MMT facility in Odisha.
  • Diaspora and Maritime Chokepoints: Eight million Indian expatriates reside in the Gulf Cooperation Council states, and 60 percent of India’s seaborne trade transits West Asian chokepoints. The Ministry of External Affairs has issued Level 2 travel advisories and placed the Navy’s Mission Samudra Setu-II evacuation plans on standby.
  • Diplomatic Posture: New Delhi has adopted principled strategic autonomy: public calls for “maximum restraint and immediate de-escalation” while privately activating back-channels via Muscat and Doha. Prime Minister Modi’s conversation with Netanyahu underscored India’s interest in early cessation, reflecting both civilisational ties with Israel and historic goodwill with Iran.

POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS FOR INDIA (EXECUTABLE, REALISTIC)

• • Fast-Track SPR Phase II: Conclude public-private partnership agreements within six months, raising cover to at least 22 days; synchronise release protocols with the International Energy Agency.
  • Diversified Energy Contracts: Lock in 10-year LNG supply from the United States and Mozambique; expedite bilateral currency invoicing to buffer against dollar volatility.
  • Hormuz Maritime Task Group: Propose an Indian Ocean Rim Coalition under SAGAR to provide convoy escort and medical assistance in coordination with CMF-153; deploy an additional P-8I squadron to INS Dega for persistent ISR.
  • Diplomatic Bridging: Re-energise the India-Iran-U.S. trilateral Track 1.5 (shelved since 2013) to explore incremental confidence-building measures—real-time IAEA sensor data sharing, regional nuclear-safety hotlines.
  • Domestic Price Stabilisation Fund – Parachute INR 30,000 crore from windfall oil taxation into a dedicated buffer to avoid automatic pass-through of international crude spikes to retail prices, containing CPI inflation.
  • Legal Preparedness – Review mercantile marine insurance clauses and issue an Advisory to Indian Flag Vessels mandating AIS transponder activation and naval contact points in case of drone harassment.
  • Diaspora Contingency Toolkit – Update e-Migrate database with geofenced SMS alert capability; pre-position Air Force C-17s at Muscat and Abu-Dhabi for non-combatant evacuation operations (NEO).

THE CONCLUSION:

Israel has demonstrated that it can inflict grievous damage on Iran’s above-ground nuclear infrastructure and key leadership nodes, yet escalation domination eludes it if deeply buried facilities such as Fordow remain beyond reach. Iran, in turn, can impose steady costs through drone-missile salvos while avoiding actions that would automatically trigger U.S. entry. The resulting mutual vulnerability points to a protracted stalemate unless a credible diplomatic off-ramp emerges.

UPSC PAST YEAR QUESTION:

Q. How will I2U2 (India, Israel, UAE and USA) grouping transform India’s position in global politics? 2022

MAINS PRACTICE QUESTION:

Q. Assess how the 2025 Israel-Iran conflict has altered the regional balance of power in West Asia and evaluate the strategic options available to India for safeguarding its energy, security and diaspora interests while upholding global non-proliferation norms.

SOURCE:

https://www.thehindu.com/news/international/what-is-netanyahus-endgame-in-iran/article69705310.ece