SHOULD WATER BE USED AS A WEAPON?

THE CONTEXT: The IWT, signed between India and Pakistan, with the World Bank as a mediator, emerged from the geopolitical upheaval of the 1947 Partition. The partition bifurcated the Indus River system, leaving India as the upper riparian state, controlling the headworks, and Pakistan as the downstream state, reliant on river flows.

THE BACKGROUND:

• • Partition Legacy (1947-60): The headworks of the Sutlej and Ravi canals fell in India, leaving downstream Pakistan anxious about irrigation security. A brief halt in water flow by India in April 1948 triggered World Bank–brokered negotiations, culminating in the 1960 Treaty.
  • Treaty Architecture: Eastern rivers — Ravi, Beas, Sutlej — allocated for India’s unrestricted use; Western rivers — Indus, Jhelum, Chenab — for Pakistan, with India allowed non-consumptive uses (run-of-river hydropower, navigation, fisheries) under tight design constraints (e.g., zero gated spillways).
  • Resilience so far: The Permanent Indus Commission met even during the wars of 1965, 1971 and 1999, earning IWT a reputation as a “climate-proofed peace clause”.

WHY THE TREATY IS UNDER STRAIN IN 2025

Technical & Legal Nuances

• • Hydro-hegemony vs. Equitable & Reasonable Utilisation (ERU): Hydro-hegemony theory explains India’s bargaining power as an upstream state. But ERU, codified in the 1997 UN Convention, restrains weaponisation by obliging “no significant harm”.
  • Design Parameters: Minimum Environmental Flow (Q-min) of 9 m³/s for Kishanganga and  Dead Storage <1.5 m at Ratle. The Neutral Expert’s January 2025 decision reaffirmed these limits. The Q-min ensures ecological sustainability, while dead storage limits prevent strategic flow manipulation.
  • No Exit Clause: Vienna Convention (Art 56) allows withdrawal only if a treaty is “inherently temporary” — not the case here. Unilateral exit risks label of material breach (Art 60) with sanctions.

CURRENT SCENARIO (MAY 2025)

• • Eastern-rivers Utilisation Gap: Of 33 BCM allotted, ~31 BCM is tapped; completion of Shahpur Kandi (Ravi) and Ujh multipurpose project will harvest the last 2 BCM, redirecting flows to Rajasthan & Jammu.
  • Reservoir Remodelling: Following the suspension, India began raising live storage at Dulhasti and Sawalkote to enhance valley flood moderation.
  • Geopolitical Ripple: China fast-tracks Diamer-Bhasha & Bunji dams in Pakistan-occupied Gilgit-Baltistan, signalling potential two-front hydro pressure.

THE ISSUES:

• • Climate Volatility: Indus glaciers losing 0.8 ± 0.3 m w.e./yr; snow-melt peak shifting 20 days earlier, complicating historical discharge schedules.
  • Siltation and Storage Loss: Live storage in Bhakra–Nangal has decreased by more than 20% in 60 years, undermining the buffer against droughts.
  • Data Opacity: Real-time telemetry on Western rivers remains absent, deepening the trust deficit during flood forecasting.
  • Federal Coordination: The Punjab-Haryana Ravi-Beas tangle reveals domestic fissures that blunt India’s external leverage.
  • Reputational Risk: Weaponizing water clashes with India’s aspiration to be “Vishwaguru,” championing SDG-6.

• • Procedural Delays: Pakistan’s frequent recourse to arbitration and India’s resistance to CoA proceedings create procedural gridlock.
  • Regional Spillovers: China’s control over the Indus’s Tibetan headwaters and its potential to manipulate flows adds complexity. India’s downstream position on the Brahmaputra vis-à-vis China raises reciprocal concerns.
  • Ethical Dilemmas: Weaponizing water risks violating human rights, as downstream communities in Pakistan depend on the Indus for survival.

GOVERNMENT POLICY MATRIX

COMPARATIVE GLOBAL INSIGHTS:

• • Danube (Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros): The 1997 ICJ ruling forced Hungary and Slovakia to cooperate, demonstrating that litigation can halt projects for decades yet fail to resolve underlying political issues.
  • Mekong River Commission: Negotiated Prior Consultation procedure; illustrates value of transparent data portals and joint environmental assessments.
  • Colorado Compact: U.S.–Mexico Minute 323 (2017) incorporates drought-contingency plans, indicating that flexible, climate-indexed allocations supersede rigid volumetric quotas.
    Lesson: Adaptive management beats unilateral adventurism.

ETHICAL & ECOLOGICAL LENS: Water is not fungible ordnance; it is a human right under General Comment 15 (UN-CESCR). The collective punishment of downstream riparians would violate the “No Significant Harm” principle and damage India’s green diplomacy narrative heading into COP 31.

THE WAY FORWARD:

• • Maximise, Do Not Militarise: Fully tap eastern rivers through Shahpur Kandi & Ujh, while retaining treaty-compliant run-of-river projects on Western rivers to meet India’s 500 GW non-fossil target by 2030.
  • Add a Climate Adaptation Annex: Negotiate provisions for glacier monitoring, sediment management, and flood early warning to future-proof IWT.
  • Establish an Indus Basin Council: Include state governments and civil society to reduce Centre-state friction and enhance domestic consensus.
  • Leverage Water for Peace Dividends: Offer downstream flood-warning data as a confidence-building measure, contingent upon verifiable counter-terror commitments, thereby transforming water from a weapon into a lever for cooperation.
  • Champion a South Asian Water Cooperation Forum: Align with UN Watercourses Convention, signalling normative leadership and diluting China’s upper-riparian leverage.

THE CONCLUSION:

Weaponising water may yield short-term tactical gratification but at the cost of strategic myopia—loss of legal high ground, erosion of climate credibility and potential multi-front hydro vulnerabilities. India’s enduring advantage lies in demonstrating norm-entrepreneurship: maximising treaty-permitted usage, advocating adaptive amendments, and championing rule-based hydro-diplomacy.

UPSC PAST YEAR QUESTION:

Q. Present an account of the Indus Water Treaty and examine its ecological, economic and political implications in the context of changing bilateral relations. 2016

MAIN PRACTICE QUESTION:

Q. India’s decision to keep the Indus Waters Treaty in abeyance reopens the debate on hydro-hegemony, treaty law, and climate justice. Evaluate.

SOURCE:

https://www.thehindu.com/news/national/should-water-be-used-as-a-weapon-explained/article69601411.ece#:~:text=Cutting%20off%20or%20even%20reducing,to%20a%20rules%2Dbased%20order.