HOW THE JUDICIARY MAINTAINS ACCOUNTABILITY

THE CONTEXT: In April 2025, the Supreme Court fixes a three‑month ceiling for the President to decide on Bills that Governors escalate under Article 201, striking down the Tamil Nadu Governor’s prolonged withholding of assent.  Vice‑President Jagdeep Dhankhar terms courts a “super‑Parliament” and alleges that judges work with no accountability, igniting an institutional debate.

CONSTITUTIONAL & THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK:

• • Doctrine of Separation of Powers (Article 50): Article 50 of the Indian Constitution, a Directive Principle of State Policy, mandates the separation of the judiciary from the executive in the public services of the State. This principle ensures that the three organs of the government—Legislature, Executive, and Judiciary—function independently, preventing the concentration of power and safeguarding democratic governance.
  • Judicial Independence as a Basic Structure: The Supreme Court, in Chandra Kumar v. Union of India (1997), affirmed that judicial review is an integral part of the Constitution’s basic structure. This judgment underscored that tribunals are subject to the jurisdiction of High Courts, reinforcing the judiciary’s role in upholding constitutional supremacy.
  • Popular Sovereignty and Judicial Review: While the Legislature embodies the “general will” of the people, the Judiciary acts as the sentinel of the Constitution, ensuring that all laws and executive actions conform to constitutional mandates. This balance maintains the primacy of the Constitution and prevents majoritarian overreach.
  • Rule of Law and Constitutional Morality: The Rule of Law is a foundational principle ensuring that all individuals and institutions, including the government, are accountable to laws that are publicly promulgated, equally enforced, and independently adjudicated. Constitutional morality entails adherence to the core principles and values enshrined in the Constitution, guiding the actions of government and citizens beyond mere legal compliance.

CURRENT SCENARIO – NUMBERS THAT MATTER

Tier	Pending Cases (Jan 2025)	Vacancies (approx.)
Supreme Court	≈ 81,000	2 of 34
High Courts	> 6.6 million	~30 % of sanctioned strength
District & Subordinate Courts	≈ 45 million (85 % of total)	Infrastructure gap: 22 % courts lack full time judges

NOTE: 5.2 crore pendency impacts GDP by an estimated 1.5‑2 percentage points annually through contract enforcement delays (NITI Aayog working estimate, 2024).

EXISTING ACCOUNTABILITY ARCHITECTURE IN THE INDIAN JUDICIARY:

• • Parliamentary Impeachment (Articles 124(4) & 217(1)(b)): Judges of the Supreme Court and High Courts can be removed for “proved misbehavior or incapacity” through a rigorous impeachment process requiring a special majority in both Houses of Parliament. Despite its provision, no judge has been successfully impeached in over 75 years, highlighting its limited practical utility.

• • In-House Mechanism (1999): Established by the judiciary to address allegations of misconduct internally, this mechanism involves a committee of senior judges conducting inquiries. However, the process lacks transparency, as outcomes are rarely disclosed, and there is no provision for witness examination or cross-examination, raising concerns about its effectiveness.
  • Restatement of Judicial Values (1997): Adopted by the Supreme Court, this code outlines 16 ethical principles guiding judicial conduct, emphasizing integrity, independence, and impartiality. While it serves as a moral compass, it is non-justiciable and lacks enforcement mechanisms, limiting its impact on accountability.
  • Contempt Jurisdiction: The judiciary holds the power to punish for contempt to uphold its authority. However, this power has been critiqued for potentially suppressing legitimate criticism and freedom of expression. The conviction of advocate Prashant Bhushan in 2020 exemplifies concerns over the chilling effect such actions may have on public discourse.
  • Transparency Tools

• • • National Judicial Data Grid (NJDG): A real-time portal providing data on pending and disposed cases, enhancing transparency in judicial proceedings.
    • Right to Information (RTI) Act, 2005: In a landmark 2019 judgment, the Supreme Court brought the office of the Chief Justice of India under the purview of the RTI Act, thereby promoting greater transparency. However, the Court emphasized the need to strike a balance between openness and the requirement to protect judicial independence.

• • Legislative Overrides: Parliament has the authority to enact laws that override judicial decisions. For instance, the SC/ST (Prevention of Atrocities) Amendment Act, 2018, was passed to nullify a Supreme Court judgment that had introduced safeguards perceived to dilute the Act’s provisions.

GOVERNMENT & JUDICIAL REFORM INITIATIVES:

• • e‑Courts Phase III (2023‑- 27):  ₹ 7,210 crore for end-to-end paperless & AI-assisted courts, universal e-filing, and 4,400 e‑Sewa Kendras.
  • National Mission for Justice Delivery and Legal Reforms – TeleLaw has provided over 60 lakh legal consultations via CSCs.
  • Mediation Act, 2023: statutory footing for community mediation; President urged Panchayats to harness it for rural harmony (National Mediation Conf. 2025).
  • Gram Nyayalayas & Nyaya Sanhita pilot: 14-day disposal precedents highlighted by MHA.

THE CHALLENGES:

1. Collegium Opacity & Representation Deficit

• • Lack of objective metrics: No published score‑card for merit, seniority, integrity or diversity in Collegium resolutions, fuelling perceptions of “judicial nepotism”.
  • Vacancy backlog: 216 High‑Court posts vacant out of 1,122 sanctioned as on 1 April 2025 (≈ 19 %).
  • Skewed social profile: 80 % of 540 HC judges appointed in 2018‑22 hail from “upper” castes; only 108 women among 698 HC appointments since 2018 (≈ 15 %).
  • Constitutional hooks: Third Judges case (1998) vests final say in Collegium; NJAC judgment (2015) struck down a statutory commission but flagged the need for transparency.

2. Impeachment Impracticality

• • High constitutional bar: Art 124(4) demands a two-thirds majority in each House with only three serious attempts (V. Ramaswami 1993; Soumitra Sen 2011; P.D. Dinakaran 2011) and none completed removal.
  • Political calculus- de‑facto immunity: Party whips, coalition compulsions, and judge resignations before the final vote blunt deterrence.

3. Executive & Assent Delays

• • Governor/President logjam: SC (8 Apr 2025) fixed a 3-month deadline for constitutional heads to decide on Bills, after TN Governor’s multi-year pendency was held “illegal”.
  • Collegium file hold-up: The Ministry’s delay in implementing recommendations slows down recruitment, thereby widening vacancy ratios.
  • Doctrine at stake: Articles 200‑and 201 (assent) & Art 50 (separation of powers) require neutrality; delays undermine legislative supremacy & popular sovereignty.

4. Data & Transparency Gaps

• • NJDG undercounts: TN’s district courts list only 15 commercial suits, vs. a ground estimate of ~5,000—hurts evidence-based policy.
  • Fragmented datasets: Disposal times, case‑type coding, and litigant demographics vary by State, impeding national planning.
  • RTI leverage: SC (2019) ruled the CJI’s office under RTI, yet proactive disclosures remain patchy.

5. Pendency & Economic Drag

• • Scale: > 50 million cases pending; SC alone faces ≈ 81,000, HCs ~6.6 million, lower courts ~45 million.
  • GDP hit: Confederation of Indian Industry study pegs 1.5‑2 percentage‑point annual loss from contract‑enforcement delays.
  • International index: India’s ‘Contract Enforcement’ rank in World Bank B‑READY poised to improve 20+ places with backlog cuts.

6. Infrastructure & Digital Divide

• • Digital shortfall: Over 4,000 courtrooms lack a full-stack digital interface despite the ₹ 7,210 crore e-Courts III launch (2023‑- 27).
  • Last‑mile gaps: 60 % of taluka courts off the fiber grid (Standing‑Committee 2023).
  • Climate resilience: 12 % of court buildings in flood-prone zones lack disaster-proof archives.

7. Ethical Oversight & Contempt

• • Soft-law codes: Restatement of Judicial Values (1997) and 1999 In-House Procedure lack sanction teeth.
  • Contempt vs free speech: Prashant Bhushan (2020) case flags chilling effect under Arts 129/215.

8. Human‑Capital Crunch

• • Judge density: Only 15 judges per million Indians, compared to the Law Commission’s target of 50.
  • Training lag: Lack of a dedicated administrative cadre; language barriers hinder technology adoption.

9. Emerging Tech & Cybersecurity

• • AI draft‑order risk: Accountability questions where generative text is used without human audit.
  • Cyber‑attacks: Ransomware forced Kerala HC e‑filing shutdown (2024), highlighting zero‑trust need.

GLOBAL BENCHMARKS:

Country	Accountability Instrument	2023 24 Metrics	Take away
UK	Judicial Conduct Investigations Office (JCIO)	2,089 complaints; 43 sanctions, 3 removals	An independent secretariat, combined with published outcomes, builds trust.
USA	Judicial Conduct & Disability Act; Judicial Accountability Act, 2024 (pending)	Bill seeks to keep investigations alive even if the judge retires	Prevents “escape by resignation”.
Canada	Canadian Judicial Council – public inquiry panels	Avg. 500 complaints/yr; detailed annual reports	Transparent, multi-stakeholder model.

THE WAY FORWARD:

1️. Constitutionally‑Anchored Judicial Performance & Transparency Authority (JPTA)

• • Mandate & Design: Upgrade the existing NJDG into an autonomous, RTI-compliant statutory body (Art. 246 read with Entry 11‑A, Concurrent List).
    • AI-driven Delay Diagnostics: Real-time “congestion scores” for every court and judge; dashboard modelled on Brazil’s Justiça em Números.
    • Public-facing Citizen Report Card:  Quarterly feedback (ease of e-filing, language access, cost), audited by the National Statistical Commission.

2. Judicial Standards & Accountability Act 2.0 with an Independent Ombuds Commission

• • Core Provisions: Three‑member Ombuds Commission (ex‑SC judge, CAG‑level auditor, eminent citizen) empowered to
    • Publish annual ethics audit,
    • Impose graded sanctions (censure to suspension) within 180 days,
    • Maintain inquiries even after a voluntary resignation (mirrors pending U.S. Bill, 2024).
  • Why Needed
    • Impeachment’s two-thirds hurdle has failed thrice (Ramaswami 1993, Sen 2011, Dinakaran 2011), creating de‑facto impunity.
    • Collegium opacity fuels perceptions of “judicial nepotism”.

3️. All‑India Judicial Service & Bench‑Diversification Mission

• • Blueprint: Recruit at Civil Judge‑Junior & District Judge level through UPSC‑pattern exam with AI‑aided multilingual translation tools; 20 % lateral quota for domain experts (IP, cyber, environment).
    • Annual diversity targets: ≥ 33 % women, proportional SC/ST/OBC representation (Arts 14, 15(4), 16(4)).
  • Problem Addressed
    • Judge‑to‑population ratio ≈ 15/million vs Law Commission target 50; women only 14 % of HC benches.
  • Capacity Building
    • National Judicial Academy + State academies to run 50-hour Continuous Professional Development on AI, climate jurisprudence, victimology.
  • Case Study
    • South Africa’s Judicial Service Commission (post‑1994) raised non‑white judges from 5 % to 48 % in a decade—proof of representation dividends.

4️. Digital Justice Stack & ODR Ecosystem

• • Components
    • e‑Courts Phase III (₹ 7,210 cr) upgraded with blockchain‑anchored record vaults, open APIs for start‑ups, and text‑to‑speech vernacular orders.
    • ODR Sandboxes under Sec 89 CPC & Mediation Act 2023—micro‑claims < ₹ 50k resolved in ≤ 30 days; Ministry of Law and Justice recognition notice Feb 24, 2025, gives legal cover to pilot institutions.
    • Gram Nyayalaya 2.0 embeds AI-assisted Panchayat mediation panels; sync awards to e-Shram wallets for instant compliance.
  • Pay‑off
    • Even if 15 % petty disputes move to ODR, lower‑court pendency could fall by 7 million cases annually (NITI simulation 2024).
  • Cyber‑Security Guardrails
    • Zero‑trust architecture mandated by CERT‑In after Kerala HC ransomware (2024).

5️. Time‑Bound Governance Protocols & Judicial Impact Assessment

• • Statutory Timelines
    • Codify SC’s 3-month assent rule (State of TN vs Governor, 2025) into Art 200 and 201 via 129ᵗʰ Constitutional Amendment—deterring “pocket vetoes”.
  • Pre‑Legislative Judicial Impact Assessment (JIA)
    • Every Ministry must attach a case‑load memo estimating incremental litigation & resource needs (akin to U.S. Court Impact Statements).

6️. Performance‑Linked Fiscal Incentives & Social Audit Loop

• • Fiscal Lever
    • Reserve a certain percentage of Finance‑Commission grants for States that cut pendency by ≥ 10 % YoY, mirroring the XV‑FC’s health‑sector formula that rewarded outcome, not outlay.
  • Community Oversight
    • Annual “Justice Report Card”—jointly authored by civil‑society consortium (e.g., ADR, CHRI) and tabled in State Assemblies.
    • Village‑level Nyaya Sabha hearings to track Gram Nyayalaya and mediation success, incentivised via Devolution Index scoring.

THE CONCLUSION:

India needs a judiciary that is independent yet answerable, digital yet humane, and resolutely anchored to the Constitution while remaining sensitive to popular sovereignty.

UPSC PAST YEAR QUESTION:

Q. Discuss the essential conditions for exercise of the legislative powers by the Governor. Discuss the legality of re-promulgation of ordinances by the Governor without placing them before the Legislature. 2022

MAINS PRACTICE QUESTION:

Q. Discuss the key mechanisms for ensuring judicial accountability in India, evaluate their effectiveness, and suggest reforms to strengthen the accountability framework without undermining judicial independence.

SOURCE:

https://www.thehindu.com/news/national/how-the-judiciary-maintains-accountability/article69546474.ece

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