INDUS WATERS TREATY

THE CONTEXT: On 24 April 2025, India formally notified Pakistan that the 1960 IWT is being “held in abeyance with immediate effect” until Islamabad “credibly and irrevocably” ends cross-border terrorism. The decision came 48 hours after the Pahalgam massacre and is part of a wider coercive-diplomacy package (visa freeze, Attari-ICP closure, mission downsizing).

HISTORICAL EVOLUTION:

Phase	Key Events	Hydropolitical Significance
1947-60	Partition canal dispute → World Bank-brokered treaty signed (Sept 19, 1960)	No exit-clause; exclusive eastern (India, 33.8 MAF) vs western (Pakistan, 135.6 MAF) allocations.
1965-71	Mangla Dam, wars of 1965 & 1971	Treaty survived kinetic conflicts, proving “water-resilience”.
2013-18	PCA (The Hague) on Kishanganga; India inaugurates 330 MW plant; Ratle 850 MW cleared (2021).
2016-23	Post-Uri & Pulwama: data-sharing slowdowns; India’s 2023 notice seeking bilateral modification under Art XII(3).
2025	Abeyance declared after Pahalgam attack.

CORE TREATY ARCHITECTURE AND LEGAL HOOKS: INDUS WATERS TREATY (1960) IN STRATEGIC AND LEGAL PERSPECTIVE

1. Permanent Indus Commission (PIC): Anchor of Routine Coordination

• • Institutional Mechanism:
    • Article VIII of the Indus Waters Treaty mandates the constitution of the Permanent Indus Commission (PIC) with commissioners from both India and Pakistan.
  • Roles and Responsibilities:
    • Regular exchange of hydrological data (river flows, infrastructure updates).
    • Facilitate dispute avoidance through technical dialogue.
    • Annual meeting (mandatory) and site inspections.
  • Significance:
    • Regarded as a ‘hydro-diplomatic backchannel’ even during wars (1965, 1971, 1999).
    • Recognised by UNESCAP (2018) as a global model for conflict-resilient water cooperation.

2. Dispute Resolution Mechanism: Structured Three-Tier Chain

Stage	Mechanism	Trigger
1	PIC Bilateral Negotiations	First resort for clarification of differences.
2	Neutral Expert (NE)	Appointed by World Bank for technical disputes (e.g., project design compliance).
3	Court of Arbitration (COA)	Convened for complex legal disagreements not resolved by NE; requires mutual consent or default appointment by WB President.

• • Kishanganga Hydropower Dispute (India v. Pakistan, 2013) — The Hague-based PCA upheld India’s right to divert waters but restricted ‘drawdown flushing’.
  • Parallel proceedings (Neutral Expert and COA simultaneously, 2022) questioned by India for procedural impropriety.

3. No Unilateral Exit Clause: Treaty Rigidity Explained

• • Article XII (3) and (4) of the IWT:
    • Treaty can be modified or terminated only through a “duly ratified” new agreement between both States.
    • No unilateral abrogation allowed, contrasting with modern treaties which may contain denunciation clauses (e.g., US exit from Paris Agreement).
  • Strategic Implication for India:
    • India uses “suspension” or “abeyance” tactically instead of full withdrawal, maintaining technical legality under international law norms.

4. Customary International Law Hooks: Legal Innovation

(a) Fundamental Change of Circumstances Doctrine (VCLT Article 62)

• • Conditions:
    • Change must be fundamental.
    • Unforeseeable at the time of treaty conclusion.
    • Radically alters obligations.
  • Application:
    • India’s argument:
      • Demographic surge (population quadrupled since 1960).
      • Climate Variability impacting flow regimes.
      • State-sponsored terrorism altering foundational trust assumptions.
  • Relevant Case Law:
    • Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project Case (Hungary v. Slovakia, ICJ 1997):
      • Set a high threshold for invoking fundamental change, requiring direct relevance to treaty objectives.

 

(b) Countermeasures Against State-Sponsored Terror

• • UNSC Resolution 1373 (2001): Mandates all States to prevent financing, recruitment, safe havens to terrorists.
  • India’s Position: Pakistan’s continued use of cross-border proxies (e.g., Lashkar-e-Taiba, TRF) constitutes “material breach” enabling countermeasures under customary international law.

5. Novel Diplomatic Usage: “Suspension” vs “Termination”

• • Technical Note:
    • “Suspension” (under VCLT Art 60) temporarily halts obligations but preserves treaty framework.
    • “Termination” (under VCLT Art 54/56) completely extinguishes the treaty — which India has avoided for now.
  • Smart Diplomacy: India maintains moral high ground by keeping humanitarian river flows untouched so far, while pressuring Pakistan to act against terrorism.

PRE-2025 VS POST-2025 INDUS WATERS TREATY SCENARIOS

Dimension	Pre-2025 Scenario	Post-2025 Scenario
Treaty Status	Fully operational under 1960 IWT framework.	Unilaterally placed "in abeyance" by India (April 23, 2025) after Pahalgam terror attack.
Legal Framework	No scope for unilateral withdrawal; modification only via mutual ratified treaty (Art XII).	India invokes fundamental change of circumstances (VCLT Art 62) + Countermeasures doctrine (UNSC 1373).
Operational Mechanism	Regular meetings of Permanent Indus Commission (PIC); technical coordination ongoing.	All PIC meetings suspended since 2024; formal notification of abeyance served in 2025.
Diplomatic Posture	Treaty seen as a pillar of South Asia’s rules-based order despite political tensions.	Treaty leveraged as a strategic instrument to escalate diplomatic costs for Pakistan’s support to terrorism.
Infrastructure Projects	India restricted to "run-of-the-river" projects with strict treaty compliance (e.g., Kishanganga).	India signals redesign of hydropower projects (e.g., Ujh, Ratle) to maximise permissible storage (3.6 MAF).
World Bank Role	Active in appointing Neutral Experts and Courts of Arbitration under treaty mandate.	Diminished relevance as India contests parallel proceedings; potential downgrading of World Bank engagement.
Regional Stability Impact	IWT seen internationally as a rare success of Indo-Pak diplomacy post-Partition.	Heightened risk of hydro-political instability; water diplomacy now entwined with cross-border terrorism issue.
International Law Narrative	Strict adherence to treaty obligations despite provocations (e.g., Kargil conflict, Mumbai attacks).	Framing Pakistan’s state-sponsored terror as “material breach” justifying suspension; normative battle begins.

PAKISTAN’S EXPOSURE AND RESPONSE POST-IWT ABEYANCE:

1. AGRARIAN VULNERABILITY: STRUCTURAL EXPOSURE

• • Critical Water Dependency: Over 80% of Pakistan’s irrigated agriculture is fed by Indus basin waters (World Bank, Pakistan: Getting More from Water, 2019).
  • Hydropower Risk: About 30% of Pakistan’s hydropower generation relies on western rivers (Indus, Jhelum, Chenab) (WAPDA Annual Report, 2023).
  • Impact Amplifiers:
    • Pakistan’s agriculture contributes ≈19% to its GDP and employs ≈38% of its labour force (Pakistan Economic Survey 2023-24).
    • Summer crop cycles (kharif season) most vulnerable to river flow regulation.

2. COUNTER-LEVERAGE CONSTRAINTS

Counter-Lever Attempted	Effectiveness Analysis
Airspace Closure Threat	Limited strategic shock; India has alternate international aviation corridors via Iran and Gulf.
Simla Agreement Suspension Threat	Lacks real bite: Simla’s Line of Control and dispute resolution principles already weakened by past violations.
Labeling IWT Suspension as “Act of War”	Highly provocative rhetoric, but lacking credible international support post-terror incidents.

3. STRUCTURAL LIMITATIONS: PHYSICAL INFRASTRUCTURE GAPS

• • Storage Deficit:
    • Live storage is only ≈13% of Pakistan’s annual flows (IRSA Annual Report, 2023).  India stores about 33% of its usable river waters; China stores 55%.
  • Canal Inefficiencies:
    • Irrigation system efficiency is under 40%, leading to massive water losses en route from headworks to farms (ADB Pakistan Water Assessment, 2022).
  • Climate Change Compounding Factor:
  • Accelerated glacial melt and erratic monsoon patterns could trigger acute water stress irrespective of IWT status (UNEP, Climate Risks in South Asia, 2024).

4. DIPLOMATIC ISOLATION RISKS

• • World Bank’s Reluctance: Despite being a guarantor, the World Bank avoided taking coercive measures even in 2017–2022 arbitration cases (Kishanganga & Ratle Dispute).
  • China’s Lukewarm Support: While Pakistan is a BRI ally, China’s own massive dam projects on the upper Indus (e.g., Yarlung Tsangpo cascade) make it hesitant to back Pakistan’s anti-India hydro-politics aggressively (Brookings Report, 2024).

5. INTERNAL POLITICAL FRAGILITY

• • Intra-Provincial Water Conflicts: Sindh accuses Punjab of “water theft,” a flashpoint intensified under water scarcity (IRSA Data, 2023).
  • Societal Stress: Potential urban water riots in Karachi, Lahore during summer scarcity (precedents: Karachi Water Protests, 2022).

THE WAY FORWARD:

1. Treaty-Plus Conditionality: A New Architecture for Engagement

• • Develop a Treaty-Plus Protocol, offering conditional reinstatement of the IWT based on Pakistan’s verifiable dismantling of terror infrastructure (monitored through FATF compliance metrics and UNSC Resolution 1373 obligations).
  • It will preserve global perception of India as a rules-abiding actor while maintaining coercive leverage.

2. Smart Hydro-Infrastructure: Resilient Storage within Treaty Limits

• • Redesign projects like Ratle and Bursar hydro projects to incorporate pump-storage technology, fish ladders, and automated silt flushing without breaching 3.6 MAF cap.
  • Enhance India’s water-use efficiency while showcasing environmental stewardship (aligns with SDG-6: Clean Water and Sanitation).

3. Transparent Flow Data: Credibility Through Technology

• • Launch an ISRO-NRSC–backed live dashboard for near real-time satellite monitoring of river discharge and dam operations across Indus tributaries.
  • Counter Pakistani propaganda of “water weaponisation” and reinforces India’s soft power narrative of transparency.

4. Minilateral Water Diplomacy: Expanding the Security Umbrella

• • Engage World Bank, UAE, and Saudi Arabia to create an Indus Basin Climate Adaptation Fund incentivising Pakistan’s irrigation efficiency (e.g., drip irrigation, canal lining projects).
  • Shift the narrative from punitive action to developmental assistance with counter-terror conditions.

5. Domestic Basin-Security Integration: Border & Water Governance Synergy

• • Deploy BSF Riverine Battalions equipped with AI-powered drone swarms and sensor arrays along with village-level water stewardship councils for holistic basin management.
  • Synchronise water security with territorial security, enhancing grassroots resilience.

THE CONCLUSION:

Suspending the IWT transforms water from a passive confidence-building measure into a calibrated instrument of statecraft. Whether South Asia regresses into a cycle of “hydro-hostility” or innovates a “coercion-to-cooperation” compact now hinges on Islamabad’s willingness to dismantle terror networks and on New Delhi’s sagacity in wielding its new-found hydro-leverage within ecological and legal constraints.

UPSC PAST YEAR QUESTION:

Q. Dam failures are always catastrophic, especially on the downstream side, resulting in a colossal loss of life and property. Analyze the various causes of dam failures. Give two examples of large dam failures. 2023

MAINS PRACTICE QUESTION:

Q. The Indus Waters Treaty (1960) stood as a pillar of resilience amidst Indo-Pak hostilities. Evaluate how the recent suspension move by India redefines water security, treaty law, and strategic doctrine in South Asia.

SOURCE:

https://www.thehindu.com/news/national/the-hindu-profiles-indus-waters-treaty-april-27-2025/article69495432.ece

https://www.thehindu.com/news/national/suspension-of-the-indus-waters-treaty-what-are-the-implications-for-india-and-pakistan/article69486740.ece

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