INDIA’S MULTI‑LAYERED RESPONSE TO CHINA’S MEDOG MEGADAM

THE CONTEXT: On 19 July 2025 Premier Li Qiang presided over the ground‑breaking of the Medog cascade on the Yarlung Zangbo, authorising an investment that Beijing’s National Development and Reform Commission values at 1 trillion yuan (167.8 billion US dollars). The scheme features five sequential hydropower stations that will together supply 60GWh of clean electricity to China’s eastern grid by 2033, aligning with the Fourteenth Five‑Year Plan’s carbon‑peaking pledge. New Delhi, Dhaka and downstream communities fear the strategic and ecological consequences of such a large storage structure in seismically active terrain.

TECHNICAL PROFILE OF THE MEDOG MEGADAM:

Location: Within the Great Bend, barely 30 km upstream of Gelling in Arunachal Pradesh.
Design:Concrete‑gravity main wall 265 metres high, four nineteen‑kilometre head‑race tunnels, reservoir area 78 square kilometres.
Capacity: 60 000 megawatts, annual generation 300 terawatt‑hours, overtaking Three Gorges by a factor of three.

HYDRO‑GEOGRAPHIC SIGNIFICANCE OF THE BRAHMAPUTRA BASIN

• • The Brahmaputra drains a 5,80,000 square‑kilometre catchment and discharges 165.4 billion cubic metres of water from Tibet into India each year.
  • Once inside India the river gains nearly twice that volume from monsoon rainfall and Himalayan tributaries, explaining why Assam experiences the highest specific runoff in the country.
  • The basin also carries about eight hundred million tonnes of sediment annually, building the Bengal delta and sustaining flood‑plain fertility.

HYDRO‑POLITICS AND THE DOWNSTREAM SECURITY DILEMMA

• • An upstream power possessing control over physical flow, technical data and financial capacity can shape trans‑boundary bargaining to its advantage.
  • China’s cascade exemplifies the first two pillars of “resource capture” and “knowledge capture”. India’s strategic calculus therefore shifts from classical deterrence to resilience‑building, combining cooperative diplomacy with counter‑balancing storage projects such as Upper Siang.

STAKEHOLDER CONCERNS:

• • Arunachal Pradesh: Chief Minister Pema Khandu describes the dam as a potential “water‑bomb” that could unleash catastrophic floods if sluice gates are opened suddenly.
  • Assam: While Chief Minister Himanta Sarma notes that only about one‑third of peak discharge originates in Tibet, he also concedes that lean‑season flows and sediment supply could suffer.
  • Bangladesh: The Centre for Environmental and Geographic Information Services warns of salinity intrusion into the Jamuna delta if dry‑season discharge drops below 3000 cubic metres per second.

ENVIRONMENTAL AND SEISMIC RISK AUDIT:

• • The Great Bend lies on the Eastern Himalayan syntaxis where the Indian and Eurasian plates converge at forty‑six millimetres per year.
  • The 1950 Assam‑Tibet earthquake (moment magnitude 8.6) generated massive landslides and natural dam bursts, illustrating worst‑case cascading failures.
  • Reservoir induced seismicity, glacial‑lake outburst floods and sediment starvation pose compounded risks to both dam integrity and downstream livelihoods.

INDIAN POLICY TOOLKIT:

COMPARATIVE GLOBAL PRACTICE:

• • Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD): Binding fill‑curve negotiated under African Union facilitation shows the utility of stage‑wise filling plus joint technical committee.
  • Itaipú on the Paraná: Revenue‑sharing formula compensates Paraguay, indicating how benefit‑sharing can mitigate asymmetry.
  • Hoover Dam Minute 319: Adaptive operations tied to climate triggers offer a template for flexibility under variability.

THE ISSUES:

• • Legal vacuum: China is not party to the 1997 UN Watercourses Convention; India lacks a binding mechanism beyond political persuasion.
  • Data opacity & verification asymmetry: Data opacity prevents real‑time flood forecasting beyond eight hours in the Siang reach.
  • Ecological externalities: Sediment entrapment threatens Majuli‑island stability and Bengal delta agronomy.
  • Disaster‑response readiness: Current flood‑forecast lead time on Siang is ≤ 8 hours—insufficient for large‑scale evacuation.
  • Domestic consent deficit: Anti‑dam movements in Upper Siang & Dibang reflect rights‑vs‑risk trade‑off.

THE WAY FORWARD:

• • Institutionalise a Brahmaputra River Commission under BIMSTEC: Mandate joint hydrology stations, transparent release schedules and dispute‑resolution panels. Funding can align with the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank’s green mandate.
  • Deploy radar‑based telemetry on the Siang and Lohit: Reduce data latency to fifteen minutes, integrate with the National Hydrology Project’s digital twin for predictive analytics.
  • Fast‑track Upper Siang reservoir with benefit‑sharing: Provide equity stakes and livelihood transition funds to affected tribes, making the project a social licence model.
  • Create a Hydro‑Science and Technology Operations Corps: Pool expertise from Indian Institutes of Technology, Indian National Centre for Ocean Information Services and Defence Research and Development Organisation for dam‑break modelling.
  • Negotiate a no‑surprise clause with China: Link it to existing Working Mechanism for Consultation and Coordination meetings and use satellite surveillance to verify compliance.
  • Integrate wetland restoration as a buffer: Rejuvenate Dibru‑Saikhowa floodplain and promote beaver analogue structures to slow flood peaks naturally.
  • Expand crop insurance into river‑risk coverage: Index payouts to Central Water Commission gauge thresholds to cushion farmers against managed or accidental releases.
  • Launch Siang‑Sentinel micro‑satellites: Provide twelve‑hourly synthetic aperture radar readings of Medog reservoir levels to improve lead times.
  • Mandate cumulative impact assessments: Avoid project‑by‑project clearance myopia and require Himalayan cluster‑wide environmental impact statements.
  • Operationalise climate resilient canal links: Prioritise the Jogighopa‑Tista link that diverts excess Brahmaputra monsoon flows toward water‑stressed West Bengal during flood peaks.
  • Establish a Brahmaputra Knowledge Corridor: Link IIT‑Guwahati, Tezpur University and new frontier research institutes to provide evidence briefs for the Ministry of External Affairs and the National Security Council Secretariat.

THE CONCLUSION:

India’s strategic objective should be to convert hydro‑vulnerability into hydro‑credibility by fusing hard infrastructure, soft‑law diplomacy and community resilience. A science‑led, people‑centric response can transform a perceived threat at the Great Bend into an opportunity for cooperative security and sustainable development.

UPSC PAST YEAR QUESTION:

Q. Dam failures are always catastrophic, especially on the downstream side, resulting in a colossal loss of life and property. Analyze the various causes of dam failures. Give two examples of large dam failures. 2023

MAINS PRACTICE QUESTION:

Q. China’s Medog megadam epitomises the dilemmas of Asian hydro‑politics. Discuss the strategic, ecological and federal challenges it poses for India.

SOURCE:

https://indianexpress.com/article/explained/chinas-mega-dam-on-brahmaputra-concerns-in-india-10151594/