THE CONTEXT: The Dalai Lama turned 90 on 6 July 2025 and publicly reiterated that his next incarnation would be found outside the People’s Republic of China, most likely in India; Beijing immediately counter-claimed sole legal authority over the recognition process through its 2007 “Measures on the Management of the Reincarnation of Living Buddhas” and a March 2025 white paper that records 93 state-approved tulkus as of 2024.
Simultaneously, India hosted a 500-delegate global conference in New Delhi marking the birthday and projecting “Buddhist solidarity for peace”, while the International Buddhist Confederation (IBC) announced a second Global Buddhist Summit for 2026.
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND — HIMALAYAN BUDDHISM & SINO-INDIAN ENGAGEMENT
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- 19th century: British Younghusband Expedition (1903-04) first internationalised Tibet; Qing dynasty strengthened frontier garrisons.
- 1950-59: PRC annexation of Tibet and flight of the 14th Dalai Lama to Tawang, followed by India’s asylum offer and creation of the Central Tibetan Administration in Dharamshala.
- 1962 war: Cartographic dispute overlays civilisational contest; monasteries in Ladakh and NEFA (now Arunachal Pradesh) become border sentinels.
- 1970-2010: India emphasises secular foreign policy; China institutionalises “patriotic education” in monasteries and introduces the Golden Urn lottery for tulku recognition.
CURRENT SCENARIO (2020-25): COMPETING BUDDHIST STATECRAFT—EXPLAINED IN PLAIN, GS-FRIENDLY PROSE
CHINA’S FOUR MAIN INSTRUMENTS:
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- Legal Control: Since 2007, Beijing’s “Measures on the Management of the Reincarnation of Living Buddhas” make the state the final referee in recognising any reincarnated lama. In 2025 a new white paper restated this veto. The rule lets civil officials overrule monks in spiritual matters, binding faith to the Communist Party.
- Digital Registry: China built an online “Living Buddha Database” that now lists about 870 approved tulkus. Monks must show a QR-coded certificate to prove authenticity. The database gives Beijing a modern tool to police monasteries and sideline lamas loyal to India or the exile community.
- Economic Leverage: Beijing finances large projects tied to Buddhist sites—a US $3 billion “Cultural Zone” in Lumbini (Nepal), new roads toward Tawang, and a railway to Nyingchi close to the Indian border. Big money links spiritual centres to Chinese markets and logistics, nudging border economies eastward.
- Narrative Warfare: Chinese state media and Douyin push videos that brand Tibetan Buddhism as “Socialist Buddhism”. Posts attack the Dalai Lama’s “separatist lies”, shaping public opinion at home and in nearby Himalayan villages that pick up Chinese cellphone signals.
INDIA’S FOUR MAIN INSTRUMENTS:
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- Moral Capital: India has sheltered the Dalai Lama and the Central Tibetan Administration since 1959. A “New Delhi Declaration” in 2023 promised to turn Buddhist ideals into practical action. This long-standing hospitality earns India goodwill among global Buddhist communities.
- Pilgrimage Infrastructure: Under the Swadesh Darshan scheme, the Ministry of Tourism earmarked ₹5,288 crore and notified 57 destinations—15 of them on the Buddhist Circuit—for upgraded roads, signage, and amenities. Better facilities aim to keep pilgrims in India rather than routing them through China.
- Cultural Diplomacy: A 2022 Parliamentary report urged a ₹500 crore rise in the Indian Council for Cultural Relations budget to fund more cultural centres and scholarships. The Ministry of External Affairs has since launched a Global Buddhist Scholars’ Fellowship to invite monks and researchers to Indian universities.
- People-to-People Outreach: India waived e-Visa fees in 2024 for visitors from many Associations of Southeast Asian Nations states, starting with Thailand. It also set up Maitri Research Chairs at Nalanda University and loaned sacred relics to Myanmar and Sri Lanka. Such gestures deepen personal ties that legal measures alone cannot forge.
SUCCESSION POLITICS OF THE 15TH DALAI LAMA — SCENARIOS & STRATEGIC IMPLICATIONS
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- Dharamshala Lineage: Search committee nominated by Gelug-pa, recognition likely in Himachal or Ladakh; enhances India’s “civilisational custodian” image, draws pilgrimage traffic and goodwill, but risks PLA pressure along LAC.
- Lhasa Lineage: Beijing invokes Golden Urn at Jokhang, mobilises United Front Work Department to secure endorsements; could split Himalayan Sangha, sow confusion and justify deeper cultural integration of TAR and South Tibet.
- Diplomatic spill-over: Mongolia’s precedent of installing the 10th Jebtsundamba Khutuktu (2024) despite Chinese warnings shows middle powers’ role.
BORDERLAND IDENTITY DYNAMICS:
| REGION | BUDDHIST POPULATION | STRATEGIC SENSITIVITY | RECENT INDIAN OR REGIONAL ACTION |
|---|---|---|---|
| Leh district, Ladakh (India) | About two-thirds of residents are Buddhists. | People’s Liberation Army (PLA) patrols have entered areas such as Depsang Plains and Pangong Tso, making local loyalties a national-security concern. | The Central Institute of Buddhist Studies is receiving an ₹85-crore upgrade to strengthen cultural roots, and the Ladakh Autonomous Hill Development Council has drafted a “Spiritual Tourism Policy 2025”. |
| Tawang, Arunachal Pradesh (India) | Roughly 41 percent of the Monpa population practises Buddhism; Tawang is also the birthplace of the Sixth Dalai Lama. | China labels Tawang part of “South Tibet” and has built dual-use frontier villages near the Bum La Pass. | India opened the Sela Tunnel in 2024, cutting travel time to Tawang, and the Ministry of External Affairs has funded modern lighting for Tawang Monastery. |
| Sikkim (India) | Around 27 percent of citizens follow Buddhism. | Rumtek Monastery hosts one claimant to the Karmapa title, and the state lies close to the 2017 Doklam stand-off site. | The Government has approved a new Pakyong-to-Rumtek cultural road (2025) to ease pilgrim access and signal administrative support. |
| Mustang District (Nepal) | Approximately 70 percent of inhabitants are Tibetan Buddhists. | The district sits on the Kailash–Mansarovar route, and China is funding the Korala road that links Mustang to Tibet. | The International Buddhist Confederation organised a cross-border conservation workshop in 2024 to preserve shared heritage. |
| Haa Valley (Bhutan) | About 28 percent of the local population are monastic residents. | Ongoing China–Bhutan boundary talks include nearby areas, and Beijing has offered to restore local monasteries. | India has extended an additional ₹400-crore line of credit to Bhutan for heritage-site restoration and related infrastructure. |
GEO-ECONOMIC & INFRASTRUCTURE DIMENSION:
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- Buddhist heritage tourism is projected to reach US $18 billion in Asia by 2030; India lags with <2 % share of Buddhist tourist arrivals, primarily due to last-mile deficits.
- SD 2.0 assigns “Experience-Based Destinations” status to Bodh Gaya, Kushinagar and Sarnath with combined sanctioned cost of ₹377 crore.
- China’s Qinghai-Tibet Railway extension to Nyingchi (2021) and Sichuan-Tibet high-speed link (under construction) shorten pilgrimage time to Lhasa by 50 hours, tilting economic gravity eastward.
INTERNATIONAL RESPONSE & BEST PRACTICES:
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- Mongolia balanced Beijing and Dharamshala in 2024 by holding a discreet enthronement of the 10th Khutuktu while quietly assuring China of “non-politicisation”.
- Sri Lanka’s Buddhist-Belt Railway Heritage leverages Japanese ODA without ceding narrative control, demonstrating how small states tap multiple partners.
- Thailand’s Sangha Act (2017) insulates monastic councils from ministerial interference with a legislative model India could study for Leh’s Ladakh Gompa Administration Bill (draft).
THE ISSUES:
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- Fragmented Institutional Ecosystem: MEA, Ministry of Culture, ICCR and Tourism work in silos; Standing Committee on External Affairs highlighted “lack of coordination and manpower” (2022).
- Resource Asymmetry: China commits >$3 billion to Lumbini alone, dwarfing India’s entire Buddhist-circuit outlay of ₹3,190 crore since 2015.
- Legal Vacuum on Tulku Recognition in India: No domestic law defines government’s role if the Dalai Lama reincarnates in Himachal; uncertainty could invite litigation.
- Borderland Socio-economic Gaps: 34 % of habitations in Tawang lack 4G coverage; monasteries rely on Chinese sat TV for spiritual content, skewing influence.
- Misinformation & Propaganda: Rival Karmapa and Dorje Shugden disputes exploited by external actors to erode CTA legitimacy.
- Environmental Fragility: Mass tourism to high-altitude Gompas strains water and waste systems; Tso-Pema pilgrimage site generates 12 tonnes of trash during Saga Dawa festival.
- Security Externalities: PLA border village programme (628 villages by 2023) anchors civilian presence behind monasteries, enabling dual-use mobilisation.
THE WAY FORWARD:
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- Create an Inter-Ministerial “Himalayan Cultural Diplomacy Taskforce” chaired by the National Security Advisor to synchronise MEA, Culture, Tourism and ICCR budgets and messaging.
- Upgrade Digital Outreach by funding multilingual virtual-reality tours of Bodh Gaya and Sarnath, hosted on NIC servers, to counterbalance Chinese metaverse-style temple apps.
- Fast-track Last-Mile Connectivity through “Border Monastery Roads” under PM-Gati Shakti, ensuring all district HQ-to-monastery routes are all-weather within five years.
- Launch “Guru Padmasambhava Scholarship” offering 1,000 fully funded seats annually to Himalayan novices for study at Central Institute of Higher Tibetan Studies, Sarnath, fostering India-centric ecclesiastical networks.
- Institutionalise Annual “Indo-Himalayan Sangha Dialogue” involving abbots from India, Nepal, Bhutan and Mongolia to build consensus on tulku protocols and ecological stewardship.
- Leverage Neighbourhood First Aid Lines by extending concessional credit for monastic restoration in Bhutan and Nepal tied to joint management boards with Indian ASI experts.
- Deploy Doordarshan DD-Bharati’s 24×7 “Bodhichitta Channel” in Tibetan, Ladakhi and Dzongkha to transmit teachings, debates and heritage documentaries to border villages.
- Integrate Monastic Health & Disaster Cells under Ayushman Bharat PM-JAY, training monks as first responders for altitude emergencies, embedding Indian systems of care.
THE CONCLUSION:
In the Himalayas, soft power is hard power. Securing the goodwill of monks and lay Buddhists can tip the strategic balance more quietly than brigades and battalions. By investing in sincere, community-led, technologically savvy Buddhist diplomacy, India can transform a potential fault-line into a bridge of shared heritage and sustainable peace.
UPSC PAST YEAR QUESTION:
Q. Project `Mausam’ is considered a unique foreign policy initiative of the Indian Government to improve relationship with its neighbors. Does the project have a strategic dimension? Discuss. 2015
MAINS PRACTICE QUESTION:
Q. China’s ‘Buddhist statecraft’ and India’s ‘Buddhist diplomacy’ are redefining power equations in the Himalayas. Analyse the nuances of this contest.
SOURCE:
https://www.thehindu.com/opinion/lead/china-india-and-the-conflict-over-buddhism/article69843709.ece
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