CHALLENGES BEFORE IAEA AFTER ATTACKS ON IRAN’S NUCLEAR SITES

THE CONTEXT: The United States Air Force launched “Operation Midnight Hammer” against Iran’s Fordow, Natanz and Isfahan enrichment complexes. This is the first case of deliberate kinetic destruction of nuclear installations that were under International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards. The IAEA, while confirming the absence of off-site radiation peaks, has cautioned that material accountancy and inspector access now stand “gravely compromised”.

THE BACKGROUND- From JCPOA to Kinetic Counter-Proliferation

• • Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), 2015-2018: Iran accepted strict caps (300 kg of ≤3.67 % U-235, no Fordow enrichment) in exchange for sanctions relief.
  • United States withdrawal, 2018: The Trump Administration re-imposed unilateral sanctions; Tehran incrementally breached JCPOA thresholds.
  • IAEA Reports, 2024-25: Iran’s stock of 60 % enriched uranium reached ≈ 408 kg in May 2025, cutting breakout time to <10 days.
  • Regional security dilemma: Israel’s “Begin Doctrine” (deny hostile nuclear capability) and United States’ preventive strike posture converged once diplomatic backchannels stalled.
  • Legal-normative tension: United Nations Security Council (UNSC) Resolution condemned all attacks on nuclear facilities; yet no enforcement mechanism deters repeat occurrences.

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK – “WHAT, WHY, HOW”

RADIATION MONITORING: Gamma-spectrometry stations in Kuwait City (Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization–International Monitoring System) and in Riyadh reported background-level counts, validating IAEA’s “no off-site release” statement.

THE CURRENT SCENARIO:

• • Damage assessment: Visible craters at Fordow; ventilation shafts and tunnel mouths collapsed at Natanz and Isfahan; centrifuge cascades presumed destroyed but verification pending due to access denial.
  • Material accountability challenge: Satellite imagery showed convoys exiting Fordow days before the strike, suggesting relocation of high-enriched uranium.
  • Radiological status: IAEA off-site monitors, Saudi Arabian detectors and European atmospheric sampling report no abnormal gamma signatures.

THE SIGNIFICANCE

• • NPT regime stress-test: If safeguarded material becomes untraceable, confidence in the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) verification architecture erodes.
  • Precedent for kinetic counter-proliferation: Legitimation of force against nuclear sites may encourage similar actions by other regional rivals.
  • Energy-security spill-over: Tehran’s threat to close the Strait of Hormuz jeopardises 24 % of global oil flows, amplifying geo-economic risk.

WHY THE STRIKES MATTER – MULTI-DIMENSIONAL SIGNIFICANCE

• • Erosion of the “nuclear taboo”: The attacks weaken the unwritten norm against striking safeguarded sites, inviting emulation by rival States.
  • Verification crisis: With seals destroyed and 400 kg of 60 % uranium possibly relocated, the IAEA risks its first major failure of material accountancy since the Iraqi clandestine programme of 1991.
  • Energy-security ripple: The International Energy Agency (IEA) notes that 25 % of global oil transits the Strait of Hormuz; Tehran’s threats to close the chokepoint widened Brent futures by ≈ US $10 per barrel overnight.

 DRIVERS BEHIND THE CRISIS

• • Technological confidence: Availability of GBU-57 Massive Ordnance Penetrators tilted cost-benefit in favour of kinetic action.
  • Domestic political calculus: Approaching electoral timelines in the United States and Israel incentivised decisive shows of force.
  • Perceived verification “blind spots”: Iran’s removal of 27 surveillance cameras in 2024 created strategic ambiguity which precipitated military action.

 IAEA’S POST-STRIKE CHALLENGES – GOING BEYOND RADIATION

INDIAN STAKES AND PREPAREDNESS

• • Diaspora safety: Seven million Indian citizens in Gulf Cooperation Council countries lie within potential fallout corridors.
  • Energy lifeline: India imports ≈ 85 % of its crude; two-thirds passes through Hormuz. Strategic Petroleum Reserve stands at sixty-four days; expansion to ninety-three days approved but pending funding.
  • Diplomacy: India’s statement at the IAEA Board “deplored armed attacks on safeguarded facilities” and called for “immediate re-instatement of full-scope safeguards”, reaffirming its doctrine of strategic autonomy.

 THE ISSUES:

• • Verification Vacuum: Loss of continuity in knowledge on HEU stock diminishes the IAEA’s ability to certify the “peaceful nature” of Iran’s programme; this may push European Union States to snap-back UNSC sanctions.
  • Breakout-Time Compression: Destruction of declared sites may encourage Iran to disperse centrifuges to smaller covert plants, reducing external detection probability and shortening weaponisation timelines.
  • Supply-Chain Disruption: Isfahan converts uranium hexafluoride (UF₆). UF₆ reacts with moisture producing hydrogen fluoride gas, posing chemotoxic hazards; storage cylinders displaced from containment could corrode and leak.
  • Precedent for Preventive Force: Acceptance of strikes outside a UNSC mandate undermines collective security architecture and emboldens other regional actors (e.g., Saudi Arabia, Turkey) to consider similar actions.
  • Cyber-physical Vulnerability: Damaged supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) systems may trigger uncontrolled cascades, potentiating internal criticality accidents.
  • Insurance and Liability Blind-spot: Neither the Vienna Convention on Civil Liability nor the Convention on Supplementary Compensation addresses war-related nuclear damage; victims’ compensation regime is uncertain.
  • Environmental Externalities: Sub-surface explosions may mobilise heavy-metal contaminated dust; prevailing Shamal winds could carry particulates across the Persian Gulf littoral.
  • Terrorist Acquisition Risk: Unaccounted HEU increases probability of sub-state actors constructing a crude improvised nuclear device (IND).

THE WAY FORWARD:

• • IAEA Humanitarian Surge Mission: The UNSC should mandate a temporary cessation of hostilities for seventy-two hours, enabling an IAEA–United Nations Department of Safety and Security joint team to conduct first-hand damage and inventory checks; a precedent exists in UNSC Resolution 699 (1991) for Iraq.
  • Satellite-Assisted Accountability: High-resolution synthetic-aperture radar satellites (European Space Agency Sentinel-1) can trace vehicular movements from affected sites; fused with open-source intelligence, these tracks help cross-verify Iran’s Material Balance Reports and deter diversion.
  • Fuel-for-Fuel Swap Arrangement: Russia could fabricate low-enriched fuel for Bushehr-1 reactor in exchange for Iran exporting its 60 % stock under IAEA custody to a neutral site (e.g., Kazakhstan’s Ulba Metallurgical Plant), replicating the 2014 Syria chemical weapons removal model.
  • Regional Confidence-Building Measures (CBMs): Establish a Gulf Nuclear-Risk Reduction Centre modelled on the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) Vienna Document, facilitating data exchange, hotline connectivity and joint emergency drills among Iran, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates (UAE).

THE CONCLUSION:

By marrying granular technical understanding (centrifuge cascades, UF₆ chemotoxicity) with strategic, legal and humanitarian analysis, the crisis tests every layer of the global nuclear governance regime. A UNSC-brokered 72-hour safe-passage window for IAEA teams—backed by real-time satellite tracking of Iran’s 400 kg stock of 60 % enriched uranium that now compresses breakout time to <10 days—can rapidly re-establish material accountancy and de-escalate proliferation risk.

UPSC PAST YEAR QUESTION:

Q. In what ways would the ongoing US-Iran Nuclear Pact Controversy affect the national interest of India? How should India respond to this situation? 2018

MAINS PRACTICE QUESTION: 

Q. The 2025 air-strikes on Iran’s nuclear facilities have weakened the global non-proliferation architecture and heightened regional insecurity. Examine.

SOURCE:

https://indianexpress.com/article/explained/explained-global/explained-challenges-before-iaea-after-attacks-on-irans-nuclear-sites-10084376/

https://indianexpress.com/article/explained/nehru-sonia-private-papers-declassification-10084921/