THE CONTEXT: On 13 June 2025 Israeli Air Force struck Iran’s Fordow and Natanz Pilot Fuel Enrichment Facility; a follow-up raid on 23 June cratered Natanz’s surface facilities and destroyed most International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) surveillance cameras. Iran’s leadership has warned that a formal notice of withdrawal from the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of nuclear weapons (1968 NPT) “is on the table” if strikes continue, citing Article X’s clause on “extraordinary events.”
THE BACKGROUND-THE FOUR PHASES OF IRAN’S NUCLEAR STORY
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- Model signatory (1968-79): Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi ratified the NPT in 1970, commissioned the Bushehr-1 light-water reactor from Siemens, and hosted IAEA training missions.
- Strategic ambiguity (1979-2002): The Islamic Revolution halted construction, but Iraq’s chemical attacks (1980-88) convinced Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khomeini to keep a latent option alive, importing centrifuge blueprints from the Abdul Qadeer Khan network.
- Sanctions spiral (2002-15): Revelations by the National Council of Resistance about undeclared enrichment at Natanz and heavy-water production at Arak triggered IAEA censure and six rounds of United Nations Security Council sanctions (2006-14) that shrank Iran’s real gross domestic product by roughly 35 percent over the decade, according to the World Bank’s Iran Economic Monitor 2024.
- JCPOA, compliance, relapse (2015-2025): The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action froze Iran’s programme under unprecedented verification until the United States’ unilateral exit in 2018. Since February 2021 Iran has suspended the Additional Protocol and unplugged 38 IAEA cameras; by 17 May 2025 it had stockpiled 408.6 kg of uranium enriched to 60 percent U-235— “the only non-nuclear-weapon State producing such material,” the IAEA notes.
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK:
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- Security-dilemma logic: Each Israeli or United States threat increases Tehran’s incentive to shorten “break-out time.”
- Regime-legitimacy theory: The Islamic Republic’s revolutionary identity equates nuclear autonomy with sovereignty, making external coercion counter productive.
- Regime-complex perspective: Overlap among NPT, United Nations sanctions, and the Missile Technology Control Regime generates compliance “forum shopping,” weakening overall effectiveness.
TECHNICAL STATUS AND VERIFICATION GAPS
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- Centrifuge cascade: Iran has installed more than 1 300 IR-6 machines—six times quicker than first-generation IR-1s—and announced prototype IR-9 production lines at Natanz.
- Enriched uranium inventory (17 May 2025): Total: 9 247.6 kg (of which 408.6 kg at 60 %, 274.5 kg at 20 %, and 5 508.8 kg at 5 %).
- IAEA loss of “continuity of knowledge”: With cameras destroyed, inspectors now audit only removed cylinders, leaving “unknown quantity in process,” GOV/2025/24 acknowledges.
- Emerging verification technology: The IAEA’s Top-Priority Capabilities 2024-25 roadmap seeks artificial-intelligence change detection in satellite imagery and blockchain-secured seals to restore confidence without intrusive presence.
CURRENT SCENARIO:
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- Diplomacy: IAEA Board Resolution declared Iran in “non-compliance” and urged full cooperation. Russia and China supported censure but condemned Israeli strikes; European Union states warned that further kinetic action could trigger Iranian Article X withdrawal.
- Regional cascade risk: Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman reiterated that “if Iran gets the bomb, we will get one too,” linking Riyadh’s civil-nuclear deal with Washington to guaranteed enrichment rights.
SIGNIFICANCE FOR THE GLOBAL ORDER:
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- Stress-test of Article X: Only the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea has withdrawn (2003) and its ambiguous status haunts the regime. Iran’s exit under armed attack would legitimise withdrawal as a wartime counterstrategy.
- Norm of non-use of force against safeguarded facilities: Israel’s 1981 Osirak precedent was condemned by United Nations Security Council Resolution 487. Repetition in 2025 without Council authorisation erodes that norm permanently.
- Energy security shock: Rising war-risk premiums for shipping through the Strait of Hormuz threaten 20 percent of global oil flows.
DRIVERS BEHIND IRAN’S NUCLEAR HEDGING:
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- External threat matrix: Israeli undeclared nuclear arsenal (~90 warheads) and United States forces in the Gulf.
- Sanctions fatigue: World Bank tracks five consecutive years of consumer-price inflation above 40 percent and real income losses; nuclear capability is leveraged for economic relief.
- Domestic politics: Hard-line coalition around the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps uses nuclear nationalism to delegitimise moderates.
- Great-power rivalry: Russia and China view Iran as a bargaining chip in wider strategic competition with the United States.
INDIAN CONTEXT
India, though a non-NPT nuclear-armed state, faces triple stakes:
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- Energy and logistics: Chabahar Port and the International North-South Transport Corridor reduce freight costs by 30 percent to Central Asia; escalation jeopardises these projects.
- Diaspora safety: Over 480 000 Indians work in Iran and Israel; Ministry of External Affairs advisories urge caution.
- Strategic autonomy: India buys Israeli defence technology (Barak-8, Heron-TP) even as it maintains a rupee-rial trade mechanism with Iran; crisis management tests Delhi’s “multi-alignment.”
THE ISSUES:
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- Verification Blindness: Removal of IAEA cameras creates an information gap that satellite imagery cannot fully bridge, impairing early-warning confidence.
- Article X Loophole: The 90-day notice period gives a state time to weaponize clandestinely while remaining formally within the treaty.
- Asymmetric Enforcement: Sanctions bite civilian populations yet impose no cost on Israel’s opaque arsenal, fuelling accusations of “nuclear apartheid.”
- Cyber-physical risks: Stuxnet-style malware and AI-driven autonomous cyber-weapons could trigger uncontrolled escalation by compromising nuclear facility safety systems.
- Humanitarian and Environmental Fallout: Natanz stores hundreds of tonnes of uranium hexafluoride; bomb damage risks toxic fluoride release even if radiological dose is low.
THE WAY FORWARD:
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- Re-Sequenced JCPOA 2.0: Freeze Iran’s 60 % stockpile in an IAEA-run LEU Bank; grant phased sanctions relief for each verified ton removed; restore cameras before centrifuge dismantlement.
- Middle-East Nuclear-Weapon-Free-Zone Process: Revive the 1995 NPT Review Conference mandate via a Helsinki-II conference, offering Israel interim “non-introduction” guarantees and Iran interim enrichment caps.
- Article X Amendment Initiative: At the 2026 Review Conference, India and Brazil should table a resolution extending withdrawal notice to 24 months and mandating automatic Security Council review.
- Next-Generation Verification: Deploy blockchain-sealed tamper-indicating devices and AI satellite change-detection algorithms (already piloted by the IAEA) to restore continuity of knowledge without intrusive boots on the ground.
- Regional Security Dialogue (RSD-West Asia): India, Japan and the European Union act as “bridge guarantors” offering cyber-resilience and disaster-response training, reducing security dilemma pressure.
- “Atoms for Development” Credits: Tie concessional finance for Small Modular Reactors or isotope production to demonstrable compliance—rewarding good faith rather than merely punishing breaches.
- Strengthening Domestic Oversight in Iran. Empower the Majlis National Security Committee to audit the Atomic Energy Organization’s budget and publish redacted annual reports, aligning with global transparency norms.
THE CONCLUSION:
Whether the world witnesses a nuclear-armed Iran, an expanded conventional war, or a renewed diplomatic compact will depend on how deftly the international community reconciles two imperatives; Iran’s legitimate right to peaceful nuclear technology and the collective interest in preventing proliferation. The deepest lesson of 2025 is not technological but political—sustainable non-proliferation rests on equitable security assurances, credible verification, and the readiness to address regional threat perceptions rather than merely manage them.
UPSC PAST YEAR QUESTION:
Q. In what ways would the ongoing US-Iran Nuclear Pact Controversy affect the national interest of India? How should India respond to this situation? 2018
MAINS PRACTICE QUESTION:
Q. Iran’s threatened withdrawal from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty after the June 2025 Israeli strikes challenges the core of the global non-proliferation regime. Examine the consequences for West Asian stability and the credibility of multilateral arms-control mechanisms.
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