THE CONTEXT: On 12 June 2025 the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Board, for the first time since 2005, adopted a resolution that found the Islamic Republic of Iran in “persistent and aggravated non-compliance” with its safeguards obligations under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). Barely 24 hours later, Israel mounted “Operation Rising Lion”, flying roughly 200 combat aircraft in five waves against more than 100 nuclear-linked and military targets across Iran.
THE BACKGROUND:
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- Historic Precedents: From the 1981 Osirak strike (Iraq) to the 2007 al-Kibar raid (Syria), Israel’s counter-proliferation doctrine blends clandestine sabotage and overt kinetic action. The June 2025 operation is its first multi-front, multi-wave strike on Iran itself.
- Axis of Resistance “hollowed-out”: The fall of President Bashar al-Assad in December 2024 removed a pivotal land bridge between Tehran and Hezbollah, sharply diluting Iran’s forward deterrence.
- Diplomatic Window:S. President Donald Trump’s Oman-based talks had stalled; his public post of 13 June stated Iran had been given “chance after chance” and warned of “next, more brutal” attacks if Tehran spurned the draft deal.
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK:
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- Preventive vs. Pre-emptive Strike: Israel justifies the action as preventive, arguing Iran had not yet acquired a nuclear weapon but was on the cusp (“point of no return”).
- Security Dilemma & Extended Deterrence: Tel-Aviv’s calculus rests on eroding Iran’s second-strike potential while banking on explicit U.S. extended deterrence—underscoring asymmetric alliance structures in West Asia.
- Norm Contestation: The strikes pit the NPT’s custodial logic (IAEA supervision) against the self-help realism of states fearing existential threats.
“WHAT” – OPERATIONAL & TECHNICAL DETAILS
| Site / Asset | Pre-strike Capability (IAEA May 2025 report*) | Reported Damage** | Strategic Effect |
|---|---|---|---|
| Natanz Fuel Enrichment Plant (Isfahan) | ~8,000 IR-1; 1,200 IR-2m; 550 IR-4 & IR-6 cascades; surge capacity: 60 kg UF₆ @ 60 % U-235 per month* | Surface power grid & cascade halls severely hit; underground A1000 hall intact | Estimated 6-12-month setback to 60 % enrichment throughput |
| Fordow Fuel Enrichment Plant (Qom) | 1,044 IR-1 + 350 IR-6 (20→60 % enrichment)* | No confirmed breach (mountain-hardened) | Core breakout capability survives |
| Khondab Heavy-Water Reactor, Kermanshah missile base, Tabriz R&D centre | R&D on plutonium route; solid-fuel MRBM assembly | Precision penetrators destroyed test stands & fuel depots | Curb on missile-warhead mating |
| Leadership Decapitation | IRGC commanders Hossein Salami & Mohammad Bagheri; chief negotiator Ali Shamkhani; ex-AEOI head Fereydoun Abbasi | Killed | Vacuum in strategic planning, disrupts diplomacy |
“WHY” – STRATEGIC DRIVERS
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- Existential Threat Perception: Israeli intelligence assessed that Iran’s stockpile (~154 kg of 60 % enriched UF₆) could reach weapons-grade within 3–4 weeks if cascades remained unmolested.
- Shifting Regional Balance: Post-Assad collapse and degraded Hezbollah rocket matrix created a fleeting window to degrade Iran before it regenerated forward proxies.
- U.S. Signalling: Classified briefings to U.S. congressional leaders days in advance, plus muted State Department language, amounted to a tacit green light.
- Leverage in Diplomacy: The Trump administration is wielding Israeli kinetic pressure to coerce Tehran into an expanded “JCPOA-Plus” that bans enrichment altogether.
“HOW” – TACTICS, INTELLIGENCE & WEAPON SYSTEMS
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- Air Superiority: Stand-off precision strikes using F-35I Adir stealth fighters and F-15I Ra’am carrying bunker-penetrating BLU-118/B thermobaric munitions for surface assets.
- Cyber-Kinetic Synergy: Reports of Mossad-run micro-drone blinding of Iranian S-300 batteries provided penetration corridors.
- Command-and-Control Disruption: Simultaneous decapitation strikes in Tehran to delay retaliation loops, illustrated by the poor interception rate of Iran’s retaliatory drones (all >100 downed outside Israeli airspace).
CURRENT SCENARIO & IMMEDIATE FALLOUT
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- IAEA Monitoring Suspended: Inspectors withdrawn due to security risks, freezing verification and amplifying opacity.
- Oil Price Spike: Brent crude briefly breached USD 112/bbl, roiling import-dependent economies.
- UNSC Emergency Session: Tehran’s letter termed the strikes a “declaration of war” and invoked Article 51 right of self-defence.
INDIAN CONTEXT:
| Dimension | Impact / Opportunity |
|---|---|
| Energy Security | 83 % of India’s crude is imported; West Asia contributes >60 %. A $10/bbl spike inflates India’s import bill by ≈ USD 16 billion. Strategic Petroleum Reserve (SPR) of 5.33 mt offers only 9-day cover—underscoring vulnerability. |
| Diaspora & Maritime Lines of Communication | ≈8.5 million Indians in Gulf; any escalation threatens safety & remittance flow (USD 50 bn FY 2024-25). The Navy’s Operation Sankalp-II has redeployed destroyers to the Strait of Hormuz for convoy escort. |
| Diplomatic Balancing | India’s strategic autonomy approach entails calibrated statements (“deep concern”, call for “maximum restraint”). Simultaneously, oil diversification (Vladivostok-Chennai, Guyana) and initiative under the India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC) gain urgency. |
THE ISSUES:
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- Legality under International Law: Absent UNSC authorisation, Israel relies on an expansive reading of anticipatory self-defence.
- Proliferation-Resistance vs. Sovereign Rights: Article IV NPT guarantees peaceful enrichment; strikes blunt that right, creating precedent.
- Humanitarian & Environmental Fallout: Potential release of fluorine gas at Natanz poses trans-boundary health risks.
- Erosion of JCPOA Negotiating Space: Killing Iran’s chief negotiator (Ali Shamkhani) weakens moderates in Tehran.
- Great-Power Tussle: Divergent reactions—United States tacit support, Russia & China condemn—risk UNSC paralysis.
- Escalation Ladder Ambiguity: Proxy warfare (Iraq militias, Houthi missiles) could spill into busy maritime choke-points.
- Energy Market Volatility: Insurance premiums for tankers in Hormuz surge, squeezing developing economies.
- IAEA Verification Gap: Loss of “eyes on the ground” may allow covert diversion of 60 % stockpile.
- Technology Diffusion: Cyber-kinetic methods used may proliferate to non-state actors.
- Regional Nuclear Domino Effect: Saudi Arabia and Türkiye hint at pursuing indigenous nuclear options if Iran weaponises.
THE WAY FORWARD:
| Solution | Proposal |
|---|---|
| Revive JCPOA-Plus with Sunset Extensions | P5+1 (now P5+2, including India as facilitator) should draft a phased rollback tied to calibrated sanctions relief, extending breakout restrictions to 20 years. Verification can be strengthened through continuous online enrichment monitors. |
| Establish a Middle East Nuclear Fuel Bank (MENFB) | Modelled on the IAEA-Kazakhstan fuel bank, MENFB would supply low-enriched uranium at cost, obviating regional enrichment needs and addressing Article IV rights. Funding could pool Gulf sovereign-wealth and EU Green-Deal grants. |
| Create a Regional Crisis Communication Mechanism | A Gulf-Levant Hotline under UN auspices connecting Tel-Aviv, Tehran, Riyadh and Ankara can dampen miscalculation; India’s Information Fusion Centre-IOR offers technical templates. |
| Expand UNSC 1540 Implementation Assistance | Targeted capacity-building for export-control and border-management in West Asia hinders illicit cargo of dual-use materials; India can share Customs EDI (Electronic Data Interchange) expertise. |
| Bolster IAEA Rapid-Deployment Teams | Equip inspectors with mobile gamma-spectrometry vans and drone-based radiological mapping so verification resumes within 48 hours post-hostilities. |
| Energy Security Diversification for Importers | India and ASEAN+3 should operationalise joint oil-buying clubs and accelerate strategic reserves to minimum 30-day coverage, cushioning against Hormuz disruptions. |
| Maritime Security Coalition Patrols | Build on Combined Maritime Force; include QUAD-plus navies to convoy commercial shipping through Bab-el-Mandeb and Hormuz, enhancing freedom of navigation. |
| Cyber Non-Proliferation Norms | GGE on Information Security must urgently codify norms against cyber-enabled sabotage of nuclear safety systems; an India-chaired working group can draft a consensus paper. |
| Regional Ballistic-Missile Moratorium | A Confidence-Building Measure limiting testing ranges to ≤2,000 km, verified via space-based sensors, can freeze missile escalation while broader security talks proceed. |
THE CONCLUSION:
Israel’s Operation Rising Lion is a watershed in West Asian security, epitomising the limits of multilateral non-proliferation regimes when confronted by hard-security threat perceptions. Its ripple effects—strategic, economic, and normative—demand agile, multilevel diplomacy, robust verification innovations, and an inclusive regional security architecture in which middle powers, such as India, have a proactive mediating role.
UPSC PAST YEAR QUESTION:
Q. In what ways would the ongoing U.S.–Iran nuclear-pact controversy affect India’s national interest? How should India respond? 2018
MAINS PRACTICE QUESTION:
Q. Examine the implications of Israel’s June 2025 attacks on Iran for regional security and the international nuclear order. Suggest a pragmatic roadmap for India to safeguard its interests amid escalating West Asian volatility.
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