THE CONTEXT: Brokered by the World Bank to end a post-Partition dead-lock, the treaty allocated the Eastern rivers (Ravi, Beas, Sutlej – ≈ 20 % of basin yield) to India and the Western rivers (Indus, Jhelum, Chenab – ≈ 80 %) to Pakistan; India retained limited “non-consumptive” and storage rights on the West. India placed the IWT “in abeyance” and fast-tracked storage-type hydropower on the Chenab (e.g., 1,000 MW Pakal Dul).
TECHNICAL DESIGN & CURRENT UTILISATION
| Parameter | Allowed to India on Western rivers | Actual (May 2025) | Gap / Reason |
|---|---|---|---|
| Storage (MAF) | 3.60 | ~0.80 (Salal + Baglihar + Pakal Dul nearing) | Slow project clearances, Pakistan’s litigation, fragile Himalayas |
| Irrigation (acres) | 7.01 lakh | ~3.4 lakh | J-K canal backlog, sedimentation |
| Hydropower (MW, RoR) | No numerical cap | ~3 800 (commissioned) | Design objections (Kishanganga, Ratle) |
Is the Treaty “Unfair”?
| Dimension | Win for India | Win for Pakistan | Contemporary Concern |
|---|---|---|---|
| Equity (volumetric) | Secured exclusive Eastern rivers | Access to 80 % basin flow | India’s per-capita water availability halved since 1960; J-K calls treaty “most unfair” |
| Security externalities | Prevented Pak from weaponising upstream dams | Guaranteed year-round flow even during wars | Post-1960 wars & terror undermine the ‘good-faith’ premise |
| Developmental headroom | Enabled Bhakra-Nangal, Indira-Gandhi Canal; long-term flood ramp-down | Unrestricted agriculture in Punjab-Sindh plains | India’s hydro potential on Western rivers still ≤ 25 % exploited |
| Climate resilience | — | Western-river dependence makes Pakistan extremely vulnerable to HKH cryosphere melt | Both states ignored basin-wide adaptation; 2024 ICIMOD snow-deficit was –23 % |
Verdict: The IWT delivered post-war stability and kick-started India’s Green Revolution. Sixty-five years later, demographic pressure, cryosphere retreat, new hydrological evidence and asymmetric security costs collectively make the status quo sub-optimal for India and fragile for Pakistan.
THE CHALLENGES:
| Core challenge | Evidence-based reasoning | Illustrative data/examples |
|---|---|---|
| Hydrological Obsolescence & Cryosphere Retreat | The Treaty’s flow calculations are locked to 1920-50 averages and assume perennial glacial buffering. HKH glaciers now lose mass at 0.28 m w.e. yr⁻¹; ICIMOD’s 2024 assessment warns of up to 35 % decline in late-season Indus discharge by 2050, threatening Rabi irrigation reliability. | • Bhakra reservoir’s dead storage period has lengthened by 11 days in the past decade. • ICIMOD urges “adaptive co-management clauses” in all Himalayan river treaties. |
| Weaponised Grievance Redressal (Article IX) | Pakistan employs a “forum-shopping” ladder—bilateral (Salal), Neutral Expert (Baglihar, 2005), Court of Arbitration (Kishanganga, 2010)—stretching project gestation by ≈ 13 years and freezing ₹28,000 crore in hydro assets. Current Neutral-Expert proceedings (June 2024) show parallel cases running simultaneously, contrary to the graded design. | • World Bank’s 2016 pause exposed an institutional vacuum; no equivalent fast-track window exists, unlike ICSID’s expedited rules. |
| Sediment Crisis & “Dead” Reservoirs | Concessions in the 1978 Salal agreement forced India to plug under-sluices; Chenab’s high silt (32 Mm³ yr⁻¹) filled > 95 % of Salal’s live storage within five years. Monthly flushing (2025 order) now violates the Treaty’s “constant FRL” clause and temporarily cuts Pakistan’s lean-season flow. | • NHPC data show turbine outages costing 22 % generation loss during peak melt months. |
| Institutional & Data Asymmetry | The Permanent Indus Commission (PIC) is mandated to meet annually; however, India suspended sittings after August 2024 notices, thereby leaving the treaty without a real-time basin science interface. Contrastingly, the Mekong River Commission’s public hydromet dashboard pushes 15-min data online—building trust and early-warning capacity. | • Pakistan still relies on faxed discharge sheets; no satellite-based snow-melt model is jointly funded. |
| Climate-Security Nexus | Water-stress in a terror ecosystem creates sabotage risk—e.g., Uri (2016) and Pahalgam (2025) attacks triggered calls to “turn off the tap”. International water law (UNWC 1997) is silent on non-state violence, complicating attribution and escalation control. | • MEA’s May 2025 statement frames treaty suspension as “coercive diplomacy short of kinetic action”. |
| Upstream Geopolitics & the China Variable | China, an upper-upper riparian, fast-tracks cascade dams (e.g., Gartang/Mohmand support, 2024-25) and the 60 GW “super-dam” on Yarlung Tsangpo. A Beijing-Islamabad hydropower condominium could neutralise India’s limited leverage as the sole upper riparian under the present treaty. | • Satellite imagery (May 2025) shows > 40 % progress on Mohmand, financed via CPEC Power Purchase Agreement. |
| Domestic Political-Economy Inefficiencies | Despite full eastern-river rights, command productivity stalls: 56 % of Indira-Gandhi Canal’s command now faces water-logging or salinity, and conveyance losses exceed 30 %. The opportunity cost of unlined distributaries and free-power agriculture distorts true water value. | • NITI Aayog’s 2023 composite water index ranks Rajasthan 14/17 despite its “canal revolution”. |
| Ecological & Livelihood Externalities | Below Kotri Barrage, reduced environmental flows allow 100 km seawater ingress, wiping out 1.3 million acres of cropland and accelerating mangrove loss (> 2 % yr⁻¹). The Treaty’s schedule lacks an environmental flows chapter, ignoring deltaic resilience. | • The Indus Delta is on the Ramsar “Montreux Record” of threatened wetlands; shrimp catch fell 80 % between 1990 and 2020. |
| Fiscal & Regulatory Lock-ins | Article XI bars unilateral exit without 10-year notice; bonded World-Bank guarantees complicate sovereign green-bond financing for new storage. The Comptroller & Auditor General (2024) flagged ₹3,760 crore idle due to litigation-induced cost escalation. | • Standing Committee on Water Resources (2025) seeks a Dam-Safety-Plus Act mandating adaptive operating rules for treaty dams. |
| Knowledge & Technology Gap | Unlike the Columbia Treaty’s 2024 digital twin, the IWT has no common snow-energy index, glacier mass-balance observatory or shared AI runoff model, limiting anticipatory governance. | • ISRO’s NRSC offers 10 m NICESat-II snow product, but Pak lacks processing bandwidth; data exchange stops at monthly flows. |
THE WAY FORWARD:
-
- Indus Waters Treaty 2.0 with an automatic sunset-and-review article: Embed a new Article mandating a comprehensive, science-based renegotiation every 20 years, mirroring the average 25-year review cycle found in Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) river accords. It will correct the treaty’s 1920-1950 hydrology baseline, and thereby keep the agreement contemporaneous with glacier-melt projections and evolving security realities.
- Joint Indus Climate Commission (JICC) co-hosted at Leh and Skardu: The JICC would pool Himalayan–Karakoram–Hindukush (HKH) cryosphere data, such as ICIMOD’s finding that late-season Indus discharge may shrink by 35 percent by 2050, to publish an annual “Glacier-Flow Bulletin.”
- Legally-notified Sediment-Flushing Protocol with dynamic reservoir rule curves: Retrofitting Salal and future dams with bottom-outlet gates (modelled on China’s Yarlung Tsangpo silt programme) would restore hydro-capacity lost to the Chenab’s 32 million m³ annual silt load, which has already killed 95 percent of Salal’s live storage. Unlocking this “dead” water yields extra peaking power and lean-season releases, while a treaty annex defining sediment draw-down windows prevents Pakistan from alleging treaty violation during flushing.
- Integrated Western-Rivers Storage and Hydropower Masterplan: Fast-tracking the Pakal Dul, Kiru, Bursar and Ujh cascade under the National Infrastructure Pipeline would use the full 3.6 million acre-feet storage permitted to India, add roughly 9 gigawatts of green peaking power, and provide a flood cushion downstream. Single-window Forest and defence clearances, combined with Dam Safety Act–style adaptive operating rules, tie domestic economic payoffs to treaty-compliant design, neutralizing Pakistan’s delay tactics.
- Capacity Building: Invest in water-efficient technologies (e.g., drip irrigation) in India’s Punjab and Haryana to reduce dependence on Eastern Rivers, freeing resources for hydropower development.
THE CONCLUSION:
The Indus Waters Treaty, while a testament to diplomatic resilience, faces challenges from geopolitical tensions, climate change, and evolving water needs. India’s suspension in 2025 reflects strategic intent but risks escalating tensions. By optimizing treaty provisions, modernizing dispute resolution, and fostering regional cooperation, India can renegotiate the IWT to balance national interests with regional stability.
UPSC PAST YEAR QUESTION:
Q. Present an account of the Indus Water Treaty and examine its ecological, economic and political implications in the context of changing bilateral relations. 2016
MAINS PRACTICE QUESTION:
Q. Critically analyze the fairness of the Indus Waters Treaty (IWT) for India and Pakistan, considering geopolitical, environmental, and socioeconomic factors. Suggest a comprehensive strategy for India to renegotiate the treaty, ensuring water security and regional stability.
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