THE CONTEXT: India conducted precision strikes on nine terror hubs in Pakistan. Islamabad replied with a swarm of ≈ 300‑400 Turkish‑made Songar armed‑UAVs at 36 points from Leh to Sir Creek in the early hours of 8–9 May 2025. All were intercepted; India retaliated against four Pakistani AD sites, destroying one radar.
HISTORICAL TRAJECTORY OF THE PAK-TURKEY STRATEGIC AXIS:
| Phase | Salient Features | Collective ends |
|---|---|---|
| 1950s 70s (Cold War Alignment) | CENTO & RCD blocs; shared US security patronage | collective security, alliance politics |
| 1980s 99 (Proxy Cooperation) | Mutual backing in Cyprus & Kashmir; PNS Ghazi refits at Turkey’s Gölcük yard | extended deterrence, naval diplomacy |
| 2000s present (Erdogan Era) | Political Islam solidarity, defence industrial synergy, anti Gulf balancing | ideational convergence, third pole strategy |
Drivers of Convergence: pan‑Islamic identity, defence tech co-production, search for alternative Islamic leadership to Saudi‑UAE dominance, and mutual hedging against Western sanctions.
DEFENCE‑INDUSTRIAL MATRIX:
| Turkish System | Year | Deal Size | Transfer Status | Strategic Effect |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Bayraktar TB 2 MALE UCAV | 2021 | n/a | 3 units delivered 2022 | ISR & PGMs for LOC raids |
| Asisguard Songar swarm drones | 2024 (undisclosed) | – | First combat use May 2025 | Low cost grey zone saturation |
| MILGEM Ada class corvettes | 2018 | ≈ US $1 bn | 2 built Istanbul, 2 at Karachi; trials 2025 27 | ASW reach in IOR |
| Agosta 90B submarine MLU | 2021 | US $350 m (est.) | STM upgrades underway | Under sea deterrence |
| Kemankes cruise missile & drone R&D | 2023 | n/a | Baykar–NASTP joint lab | Indigenousisation pathway |
Arms‑trade trend: Turkey became Pakistan’s 2nd‑largest supplier by 2020; Turkish global exports up 103 % (2015‑19 from 2020‑24) per SIPRI.
THE DRONE DIMENSION — SONGAR UCAV
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- Tech Specs: quad‑rotor; MTOW ≈ 45 kg; 9 kg payload; 3–5 km radius; 25‑min endurance; 5.56 × 45 mm MG (200‑rd box, single/15‑burst); EO/IR twin‑camera; GPS/GLONASS nav; 2800 m MSL ceiling.
- Battlefield Utility: Loiter‑shoot platform ideal for grey‑zone, last‑mile targeting, and IADS‑saturation. May 2025 swarm sought to map India’s S‑400 sectors and radar gaps.
- Proliferation Red‑flag: Absence of MTCR governance over < 300‑km drones creates a “category gap” exploited by exporters like Turkey and Iran.
STRATEGIC IMPLICATIONS FOR INDIA
1. Air‑Defence Saturation Risk: Even with S‑400 & IACCS, micro‑UAV swarms can overload radar signal‑to‑noise ratios; Bathinda incident shows need for point C‑UAS lasers/microwaves.
2. Two‑front Tech Synergy: Turkey’s drone know‑how plus China’s sensor suites could accelerate Pakistan’s C4ISR edge.
3. Maritime Vector: Ada corvettes + TB‑2 maritime variant threaten sea‑lanes around Sir Creek & Gwadar.
4. Diplomatic Fallout: Turkey’s public Kashmir stance complicates India’s West Asia outreach, though Riyadh and Abu Dhabi tilt towards Delhi.
INDIA’S COUNTER‑BALANCING PLAYBOOK
External Balancing
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- Greece–Cyprus Entente: Consistent GoI backing of Republic of Cyprus; Nicosia reciprocates on Kashmir.
- Armenia Partnership: India became Yerevan’s top arms source in 2024 (Akash‑1S, Pinaka, anti‑drone jammers) — a lever against the Pak‑Turkey‑Azerbaijan triad.
Internal Balancing
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- Drone Rules 2024 & Counter‑UAS Policy 2023: empowers Centre to mandate A‑S spoofers, AI‑vision nets at strategic sites.
- ‘Project Kavach’ (DRDO): mobile high‑energy laser (HEL) tested 2024; service induction 2026.
- Swarm‑vs‑Swarm Doctrine: ALFA‑S & Air‑Launched CATS‑Warrior under IAF’s “Mosaic Warfare” concept by 2027.
Multilateral/Legal Pathways
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- Push for ‘MTCR‑Plus’ UAV annex; leverage Wassenaar Arrangement for dual‑use sensors export control.
CHALLENGES:
| Issue | Key Nuances |
|---|---|
| Escalation Ladder | Swarm use lowers cost of tit for tat, risks ‘norm erosion’ under nuclear overhang. |
| Supply chain Sanctions | U.S. CAATSA leverage is limited after Ankara diversified to indigenous platforms. |
| Attribution Ambiguity | Commercial off-the-shelf UAVs blur state responsibility → complicates jus ad bellum assessment. |
| Drone Civilian Nexus | May 8 attack allegedly targeted religious sites — raises IHL compliance concerns. |
THE WAY FORWARD
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- Layered C‑UAS Shield: Integrate BEL ‘Rajak’ passive radars, DRDO Aditya DEW & Israeli Drone‑Dome into IACCS nodes.
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- Swarm‑Killer UAVs: Fast‑track HAL CAT Interceptor (ramjet kamikaze) for airborne picket.
- Indo-Greek ‘Aegean–Aravali Defence Corridor’: Co-produce rugged micro‑UAV scramblers.
- Gulf Plus Dialogue: Institutionalise counter-drone intelligence sharing with Riyadh‑, Abu Dhabi — common threat from Houthi‑Iran UAVs.
- Export Controls Diplomacy: Champion a UNGA resolution to classify armed drone swarms as “emerging threats to international peace.”
- Counter‑Narrative Diplomacy: Use soft‑power (Cyprus settlement‑support, Armenian cultural projects) to expose Turkey’s double standards.
- DRDO–Start‑Up Drone Sandbox: Extend iDEX funding cap to ₹ 100 cr for anti‑swarm AI start‑ups.
- Legal Architecture: Table a Comprehensive Drone Security Bill — codify no-fly geofencing, deterrent penalties, & data‑sharing with civil ATC.
- Whole‑of‑Government Exercises: Annual “SWARM‑SHAKTI” tri-service drill with NDMA & civil aviation bodies to hone crisis‑management.
THE CONCLUSION:
The Pak‑Turkey nexus represents an asymmetric, technology‑driven pincer on India’s western flank. Ankara’s agile defence industry provides Islamabad with cost‑effective force multipliers, enabling grey‑zone probes like the May 2025 Songar swarm. New Delhi’s response must combine deterrence by denial (technological), deterrence by punishment (precision counterstrikes), and diplomatic counteralignment, anchored in the doctrine of strategic autonomy yet networked security.
UPSC PAST YEAR QUESTION:
Q. How is the S-400 air defence system technically superior to any other system presently available in the world? 2021
MAIN PRACTICE QUESTION:
Q. Concerning the May 2025 mass‑swarm drone incursion on India’s western front, Analyse the security issues that arise when low‑cost armed unmanned aerial systems are supplied by one sovereign state to a proxy partner for use against another sovereign state.
In your answer, discuss (a) the challenges such ‘plausible‑deniability’ warfare poses to India’s existing deterrence architecture,
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