INDIA, CHINA AT 75 — A TIME FOR STRATEGY, NOT SENTIMENT

THE CONTEXT: Marking 75 years since diplomatic recognition (April 1, 1950), India-China ties have evolved from Panchsheel-era idealism to a complex era of “competitive coexistence” shaped by the 2020 Galwan clash, with China now a structural factor influencing India’s foreign, defence, and economic policymaking. As of 2025, bilateral trade exceeds $136 billion, yet tensions persist along the militarised LAC, underscoring a paradox of strategic rivalry amid economic interdependence.

STRATEGIC SALIENCE OF CHINA FOR INDIA:

DimensionContemporary Facts & Data (2024–25)Analysis
Border Security- Over 60,000 troops of both nations remain forward-deployed along the LAC in Eastern Ladakh.
- India raising a new Mountain Infantry Division (72 Inf Div) under XIV Corps (Leh), March 2025.
• Reflects a shift from confidence-building to credible deterrence, embedded in a doctrine of assertive resilience.
• Supports the imperative of terrain-dominant capability, as emphasized in the Kargil Review Committee Report.
Economic Interdependence- FY 2024–25: Bilateral trade volume at $127.7 billion, with a trade deficit of $99.2 billion.
- Electronics, APIs, and renewable energy components constitute over 65% of Indian imports from China.
• India faces a strategic paradox: border deterrence coexists with marketplace dependence.
• Requires calibrated decoupling, as recommended in NITI Aayog’s 2023 "Geo-Economic Strategy Paper".
Water & Ecology- China's 14th Five Year Plan includes the construction of a 60 GW dam on the Yarlung Tsangpo near the Great Bend.
- India lacks a formal water-sharing treaty with China.
• Raises concerns about water weaponisation and flow manipulation, especially during monsoonal extremes.
• Echoes the need for a Brahmaputra River Treaty, akin to the Indus Waters Treaty, to institutionalise hydrological transparency.
Informational Influence- Bangladesh’s interim head Prof. Yunus’ Beijing remarks (2025) on India’s “landlocked Northeast” reflect strategic signaling.
- Chinese state media pushes narratives questioning India’s regional leadership.
• The competition for influence has shifted to the cognitive domain, where control over narratives can translate into policy alignments.
• Underscores the importance of digital diplomacy and “Act East 2.0”.
Great-Power Triangle- PM Modi’s Lex Fridman podcast (March 2025): Advocated for “healthy competition, not conflict” in Asia.
- U.S.–China tensions escalated post-Trump
• India aims to be a norm entrepreneur and regional balancer — engaging U.S. in QUAD and China in SCO/BRICS.
• Reinforces the relevance of non-alignment 2.0, adapted for a polycrisis era.

STRUCTURAL CHALLENGES IN INDIA-CHINA RELATIONS: THE ‘FOUR FAULT LINES’

1. Unsettled Boundary & Grey-Zone Tactics: Despite over two dozen rounds of border talks, the LAC (Line of Actual Control) remains undemarcated and disputed, contributing to frequent standoffs and ambiguity-fuelled crises. Post-Galwan (2020), the militarisation of friction points has accelerated.

    • Over 60,000 troops forward-deployed on each side in Eastern Ladakh (The Hindu, March 2025).
    • Rapid infrastructure push by China, dual-use airstrips in Ngari Prefecture, all-weather roads, optical fibre lines.
    • Alternating disengagement (e.g., Pangong, Gogra) and re-deployment raise risks of “crisis instability”.

 

2. Asymmetric Trade & Technology Dependence: While India aspires for strategic autonomy, its core sectors—pharmaceuticals, electronics, solar power—are critically dependent on Chinese inputs.

    • FY 2024–25: Trade deficit of $99.2 billion (Reuters).
    • Over 65% of APIs, 70% of EV battery cells, and 80% of solar wafers are China-sourced (CII, 2024).

 

3. Riparian Risks & Water Insecurity: As the upper riparian on transboundary rivers like the Brahmaputra (Yarlung Tsangpo) and Sutlej (Langqen Zangbo), China exercises disproportionate control over upstream infrastructure.

    • China’s 60 GW dam plan near the Great Bend (14th Five Year Plan).
    • Data-sharing MoU suspended post-2020 Galwan clash; tentatively resumed via Expert-Level Mechanism (Jan 2025).
    • No water-sharing treaty with China (unlike Indus Treaty with Pakistan).
    • Risk of hydro-hegemony and flow manipulation during strategic tensions or ecological crisis.

 

4. Neighbourhood Encirclement & Influence Projection: China’s strategic investments in South Asia are creating “debt-vector influence” and reshaping geopolitical alignments through dual-use infrastructure and digital corridors.

    • Sri Lanka: Hambantota port (99-year lease), Colombo Port City SEZ.
    • Nepal: Pokhara International Airport funded via EXIM China loan.
    • Bangladesh: “Landlocked Northeast” remark by interim PM Prof. Yunus in Beijing (2025).
    • Digital Infrastructure: Huawei-led fiber optics in Maldives and Pakistan.

OPPORTUNITY SPECTRUM IN INDIA-CHINA RELATIONS: “THE FIVE CONVERGENCES”

1. Climate Cooperation & Clean Energy Transition: India and China, as two of the world’s largest carbon emitters and energy consumers, hold potential for climate leadership through differentiated responsibility under the UNFCCC framework.

    • International Solar Alliance (ISA): Co-led by India; China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) has expanded solar investments across Central Asia and Africa.
    • Both nations have expressed support for the Loss and Damage Fund under COP27 to address historical climate injustice.
    • Shared leadership in South-South climate financing could realign the North-dominated global energy governance.

 

2. Global Governance Reforms & Institutional Equity: India and China have overlapping interests in reforming the global economic architecture to reflect contemporary realities.

    • IMF Quota Reforms: Joint support for recalibrating voting shares to reflect emerging market contributions.
    • WTO Revitalisation: Resistance to protectionist barriers and push for dispute resolution reform.
    • BRICS-plus & SCO: Platforms for south-led rule-making; expansion of BRICS into BRICS-11 in 2023 demonstrates growing south-south consolidation.
    • Both nations can lead on “norm entrepreneurship” for digital trade, crypto governance, and inclusive globalisation.

 

3. Health Security & Pharma-Supply Resilience: The COVID-19 pandemic revealed vulnerabilities in global pharmaceutical value chains — yet also offered lessons in synergistic interdependence.

    • India: World’s largest producer of low-cost generics.
    • China: Largest supplier of active pharmaceutical ingredients (APIs).
    • India’s Vaccine Maitri and China’s Sinopharm diplomacy in Africa reflected competing humanitarian strategies, but highlighted the scope for joint South-South health cooperation.

 

4. Artificial Intelligence & Cyber Norms: Both countries are AI powerhouses, yet are vulnerable to unregulated techno-geopolitics and cyber conflict escalation.

    • Co-lead norm-setting at the UN Open-Ended Working Group (OEWG) on responsible state behaviour in cyberspace.
    • Collaborate on AI ethics, data localisation, and algorithmic transparency, especially in facial recognition and surveillance governance.
    • India-China collaboration on cyberconfidence building measures (CCBMs) can set global templates for AI safety and military-use regulation.

 

5. Disaster Risk Reduction (DRR) & Humanitarian Collaboration: Despite tensions, India and China have conducted HADR (Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief) drills since 2018, building operational trust in times of crisis.

    • Joint DRR frameworks for Himalayan earthquake preparedness.
    • Data-sharing in glacial lake outburst flood (GLOF) forecasting and monsoonal variability.
    • Sino-Indian coordination during the Nepal Earthquake (2015) and COVID-19 evacuation diplomacy (2020) demonstrated the capacity for parallel humanitarian operations.

POLICY DOCTRINE: “COMPETITIVE COEXISTENCE”:

PillarInstrument setRecent Moves (2024 25)
Military ReadinessIntegrated Theatre Commands, Border Infrastructure Push (₹1 L cr), QUAD MDA.Verification patrols resumed at Demchok Depsang (Jan 2025).
Economic De riskingPLI, Trusted Telecom norms, India Middle East Europe Economic Corridor.Trade monitoring cell to curb low cost Chinese import surge.
Diplomatic EngagementSpecial Representatives dialogue, ELM, Kailash Mansarovar reopening.FS Misri’s “three mutuals—respect, sensitivity, interest” speech.
Narrative ControlNeighbourhood First 2.0, Project Mausam, digital public goods export (UPI BHIM).Rapid disaster aid to Maldives (cyclone “Meera”, Jan 2025) under SAGAR doctrine.

THE WAY FORWARD:

    • Border Tech Fuse: India must transition from reactive defence to predictive deterrence by deploying AI-enabled ISR, swarm drones, and fibre-optic surveillance along the LAC.This mirrors China’s civil-military fusion strategy but with safeguards rooted in democratic oversight.
      • A tech-forward posture will ensure terrain dominance and reduce reliance on manpower-intensive deployments in high-altitude zones.
    • Supply-Chain Sandboxing: India should create “Trusted Value Chain Zones” with Japan and the EU for critical sectors like semiconductors and APIs.
      • Mandating “country-of-origin plus value-addition” disclosure will expose hidden Chinese inputs without resorting to blanket bans.
      • This smart de-risking approach balances strategic autonomy with economic pragmatism and global competitiveness.
    • Blue-Economy Corridors: Upgrading SAGAR-Mala 2.0 by linking Andaman-Nicobar to Sabang and Chabahar will strengthen India’s Indo-Pacific maritime grid.
      • This geodesic maritime advantage offsets China’s continental thrust via BRI and enhances logistics interoperability.
      • It positions India as a strategic first responder and infrastructure provider in the Indian Ocean Region (IOR).
    • Riparian Confidence-Matrix: India must propose a Brahmaputra Basin Commission involving China, Bhutan, and Bangladesh for joint ecological audits and flood forecasting.
      • Leveraging satellite-based systems and data transparency will mitigate hydro-political risks and build environmental trust.
      • A treaty-like institutional framework modeled on the ISA grid initiative ensures sustainability and accountability.
    • Digital Norm Entrepreneurship: India should table an Indo-Pacific Data Freeway Code at the G20 focusing on digital sovereignty, openness, and privacy-by-design.
      • This counters both U.S. surveillance overreach (CLOUD Act) and China’s authoritarian data governance (PIPL).
      • Positioning as a cyber-norm leader, India can shape a middle-path digital order reflecting democratic values.
    • Neighbourhood Social Capital: Institutionalising Quad-Plus Development Finance with rupee-credit lines for MSMEs and local enterprises will generate inclusive regional growth.
      • This people-centric model offers South Asian nations an “India Dividend” beyond elite infrastructure optics.
      • It redefines neighbourhood-first diplomacy through trust-building, livelihood security, and tangible grassroots benefits.

THE CONCLUSION:

At 75, Sino‑Indian engagement is neither a zero‑sum duel nor a romantic relic; it is a calibrated exercise in power management. Strategic autonomy demands India deter without over‑stretch, trade without over‑dependence, and narrate without over‑reacting. The China mirror ultimately prods New Delhi to accelerate internal capacity‑building—transforming constraint into catalyst for India’s rise as a secure, prosperous and rule‑crafting stakeholder in the Asian century.

UPSC PAST YEAR QUESTION:

Q. The West is fostering India as an alternative to reduce dependence on China’s supply chain and as a strategic ally to counter China’s political and economic dominance.’ Explain this statement with examples. 2024

MAINS PRACTICE QUESTION:

Q. India’s China policy has evolved from idealistic engagement to strategic hedging, underpinned by competitive coexistence. In this context, evaluate the structural challenges and strategic opportunities in India-China relations, and propose an innovative way forward to convert rivalry into managed asymmetry.

SOURCE:

https://www.thehindu.com/opinion/lead/india-china-at-75-a-time-for-strategy-not-sentiment/article69474362.ece

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