THE INNATE LIMITATIONS IN EXECUTING ICET

THE CONTEXT: Despite the apparent progress made during the discussions between National Security Adviser Ajit Doval and his U.S. Counterpart Jake Sullivan in June to advance the bilateral Initiative on Critical and Emerging Technologies (iCET), challenges persist in its implementation. Local industry experts and military analysts argue that these obstacles mainly stem from the independence of U.S. Defense companies in technology transfer, stringent U.S. Export regulations, and their strong emphasis on safeguarding intellectual property rights (IPR). These concerns mirror the setbacks faced by previous initiatives, such as the 2012 Defence Technology and Trade Initiative (DTTI), raising doubts about the ambitious objectives of iCET.

THE ISSUES:

• Autonomy and Intellectual Property Rights (IPR) of U.S. Defense Companies: S. Defense firms maintain control over the technologies they create, even at considerable expense. They emphasize safeguarding their intellectual property rights, which can complicate negotiations for technology transfer. The U.S. government usually refrains from stepping in to force these firms to share their technology, posing challenges to achieving technology transfers.
• Strict U.S. Export Control Laws: The United States has laws governing exports, like the International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR) and the Export Administration Regulations (EAR), which oversee the sharing of defense and dual-use technologies. While these laws aim to safeguard U.S. Security and foreign policy objectives, they can challenge the transfer of crucial technologies to India. This regulatory framework presents obstacles to smoothly carrying out technology transfer agreements within
• Limited Scope of Technology Transfer in Key Projects: The defense aspect of iCET involves initiatives such as producing General Electrics GE F 414INS6 turbofan engines and putting together MQ 9 Reaper/Predator B UAVs. However, the transfer of technology in these projects is somewhat restricted. For example, 80% of the technology for the F 414 engines is being shared, with crucial expertise, on turbine metallurgy left out. Similarly, when it comes to the MQ 9 UAVs, technology transfer is limited to 10 15%, mainly focusing on maintenance and assembly tasks.
• Commercial Interests of U.S. Defense Vendors: S. Companies in the defense industry are influenced by business goals and are responsible to their investors. Their focus on success may restrict how much technology they share to maintain a competitive advantage and increase revenue. This factor played a role in the shortcomings of the past Defense Technology and Trade Initiative (DTTI), which encountered comparable obstacles.
• Incompatibility with India’s ‘Jugaad’ Approach: India’s defense sector has traditionally depended on jugaad, a resourceful method of customizing foreign weapons to suit local needs. Nevertheless, the intricate array of regulations and rigorous monitoring procedures involved in U.S. Defense procurements, like the Foreign Military Sales (FMS) process, prevent the application of jugaad. This constraint hinders India’s capacity to tailor and enhance U.S. Equipment for its operational needs.

THE WAY FORWARD:

• Regulatory Reforms and Streamlined Export Controls: Propose a law to simplify the procedure for selling defense equipment to India, like the proposal by U.S. Senators Mark Warner and John Cornyn. The goal is to shorten the period Congress needs to review arms sales from 30 to 15 days. Adjust ITAR and other export control rules to make it easier to share technology with India. Create mutual agreements defining precise regulations and safeguards for intellectual property rights, guaranteeing American companies’ confidence when transferring technology.
• Enhanced Public-Private Partnerships: Programs like INDUS X and Joint IMPACT aim to enhance cooperation among government educational institutions and businesses. They encourage defense firms to engage in partnerships and technology exchanges with India. This may involve offering tax incentives, subsidies, or assured contracts to companies participating in technology collaborations with India.
• Focus on Non-Sensitive Technologies and Incremental Progress: Focus on sharing and developing technologies that are not sensitive and don’t create significant security concerns. Start by transferring less critical parts of technology first, then gradually move towards more advanced ones as trust and collaboration strengthen.
• Capacity-building and Standardization Efforts: These may include training programs, collaborative research projects, and infrastructure improvement. Efforts should be made to align regulatory and operational norms between both nations to enhance seamless collaboration and the incorporation of technological advancements.

THE CONCLUSION:

The iCET initiative, though ambitious, faces significant challenges that could hinder its progress, like its predecessor, the DTTI. The reluctance of U.S. Defense companies to share crucial technologies and the strict export control regulations pose significant obstacles. However, India’s innovative ‘jugaad’ approach and the strategic need to diversify from Russian arms could propel the project forward. To prevent it from falling prey to Augustine’s Laws, it is essential to turn high-level discussions into practical results, ensuring that both countries can benefit from each other’s strengths in vital and emerging technologies.

UPSC PAST YEAR QUESTION:

Q. What introduces friction between India and the United States is that Washington can still not find a position in India’s global strategy that would satisfy India’s national self-esteem and ambitions.” Explain with suitable examples. 2019

MAINS PRACTICE QUESTION:

Q. Discuss the structural challenges faced by the India-U.S. Initiative on Critical and Emerging Technologies (iCET) in its execution. How do these challenges compare to the issues that led to the failure of the earlier Defence Technology and Trade Initiative (DTTI)?

SOURCE:

https://www.thehindu.com/opinion/op-ed/the-innate-limitations-in-executing-icet/article68386091.ece