PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION

UPSC 2026 PAPER I: FIRST DRAFT (TENTATIVE ANSWER)

SECTION A

Q1. Answer the following questions in about 150 words each: 10×5=50

(a) "There is an urgent need to incorporate the contribution of other disciplines into debates and analyses about governance, not the prevalence of disciplinary silos." Comment. [5+5=10]

ANS.

STRUCTURE
1. INTRODUCTION: Start with the interdisciplinary character of governance
2. BODY: Explain why Public Administration developed disciplinary silos; then establish the case for interdisciplinarity with examples; add analytical point
3. CONCLUSION: End with the idea of PA as an "intersecting" discipline

INTRODUCTION

Governance, per the World Bank, is "the manner in which power is exercised in the management of a country's economic and social resources for development." Because it spans the state, market and civil society, no single discipline can fully explain it — a truth **Nicholas Henry** captured by calling Public Administration a "paradigm without a discipline, or a discipline without a paradigm." The statement in the question is a direct echo of Henry's own diagnosis and of the **Governance paradigm (Paradigm 6)**, which explicitly widened PA's locus beyond the departmental "steel frame."

BODY

Why silos emerged historically

- The Wilsonian **politics-administration dichotomy** (1887) and Gulick-Urwick's **POSDCORB** sought a "science" of administration insulated from politics, law, economics and sociology, giving PA an early, narrow, self-contained identity.
- Post-independence, disciplinary and departmental boundaries hardened into "**vertical silos**" — a bureaucratic pathology R.A.W. Rhodes termed the **hollow/fragmented state**, where agencies optimised their own mandate while ignoring cross-cutting problems.
- **Herbert Simon's** logical-positivist turn (Paradigm 4) further insulated PA methodologically, treating it as a value-free decision science divorced from normative disciplines like ethics and political theory.

Why interdisciplinarity is now urgent

Discipline	Contribution to governance analysis
Economics	Cost-benefit analysis; Public Choice theory (Niskanen's budget-maximising bureaucrat, Buchanan-Tullock) explains bureaucratic behaviour structural theory alone cannot
Political Science	Legitimacy, representation, power (Rhodes' six meanings of governance) frame accountability

Sociology & Psychology	Hawthorne studies, Maslow, Herzberg explain motivation and organisational behaviour; behavioural economics (Thaler-Sunstein's "Nudge") informs policy design
Law	Constitutionalism, judicial review and administrative law discipline discretion
Management & Data Science	AI, GovTech, evidence-based policy demand technical/analytical literacy
Ecology/Environmental Science	Climate governance requires scientific inputs beyond administrative theory (e.g., Mission LiFE)

Illustrative examples: India's **Whole-of-Government/Joined-Up Government** initiatives — PM GatiShakti (fusing engineering, logistics, economics), the Aspirational Districts Programme (fusing sociology, statistics, public health) — succeed precisely by dissolving disciplinary borders rather than reinforcing them. Internationally, the OECD's "**behavioural insights**" units embed psychology directly into regulatory design.

Analytical point: The danger is not disciplinary knowledge itself but its **institutional silo-isation** into separate departments/cadres that fail to talk to each other; interdisciplinarity is therefore an intellectual, not merely academic, imperative for coordinated governance.

CONCLUSION

As **Frederickson** argued in New Public Administration, governance is inherently a "public interest" enterprise that cannot be captured by any one lens; the future, as Governance-paradigm scholarship suggests, lies in Public Administration functioning as a **synthesising, boundary-spanning discipline**, not a sequestered one.

(b) The ideas of Frederick Taylor remain highly relevant in today's business world, in both the public and private sectors, including the 'gig economy'. Comment. [5+5=10]

ANS.

STRUCTURE

1. INTRODUCTION: Start with Taylor's Scientific Management
2. BODY: Explain core principles, then trace continuing relevance with gig-economy, private and public-sector examples; give the Human Relations counter-critique
3. CONCLUSION: End with "Digital Taylorism" as the modern avatar

INTRODUCTION

F.W. Taylor's *Principles of Scientific Management* (1911) sought the **"one best way"** of performing a task through time-and-motion study, standardisation, differential piece-wage and functional foremanship, aiming at maximum efficiency for both employer and worker — a project he called replacing "rule of thumb" with science.

BODY

Core Taylorist principles: (i) scientific study to replace rule-of-thumb methods; (ii) scientific selection and progressive training of workers; (iii) close cooperation between management and labour; (iv) division of mental (planning) and manual (execution) work; (v) differential piece-rate wages tied to output. **Frank and Lillian Gilbreth** supplemented this with motion study (identifying "therbligs" — elemental hand motions).

Continuing relevance today

- **Gig economy**: Platforms like Uber, Zomato, Swiggy and Amazon warehouses use **algorithmic management** — GPS tracking, per-task ratings, real-time performance scoring and automated payment — a direct descendant of Taylor's time-study and piece-rate logic. Scholars like **Phoebe Moore** term this **"Digital/Algorithmic Taylorism,"** where the app, not the foreman, performs functional supervision.
- **Private manufacturing**: Lean production, Six Sigma, and Toyota's Kaizen (continuous improvement) retain Taylor's scientific-measurement core, even while softening its rigidity with worker participation (Quality Circles).
- **Public sector**: India's **Staff Inspection Unit (SIU)** under the Department of Expenditure conducts systematic work-study to fix optimum staff strength; **Citizen Charters** and Service Level Agreements mirror Taylor's principle of a "standard task and time" for service delivery; Sevottam model in Indian administration similarly standardises service benchmarks.
- **Global example**: Amazon's use of algorithmic "rate" tracking in fulfilment centres, and ride-hailing apps' driver-scoring systems, are widely cited case studies of neo-Taylorist control in the platform economy.

Criticisms and the Human Relations counter-view

- Treats workers mechanistically as "**economic man**," motivated by money alone.
- **Elton Mayo's Hawthorne studies (1924-32)** showed informal group norms and social recognition, not just monetary incentive, drive productivity — directly contradicting Taylor's assumptions.
- **Maslow and Herzberg** later showed higher-order needs (esteem, growth) go unaddressed by piece-rate systems alone.
- In the gig context, critics (and ILO reports on "algorithmic management") flag **surveillance, work intensification and precarity** — workers lack the collective bargaining power Taylor's factory workers at least nominally had.

CONCLUSION

Taylor's obsession with **measurable efficiency** has outlived his factory-floor origins; tempered by the Human Relations and behavioural correctives, it survives today — reincarnated as "Digital Taylorism" — as the analytical backbone of performance management across both public and private, traditional and platform-based, sectors.

(c) A transparent organisation keeps the staff in the loop. Describe. [10]

ANS.

STRUCTURE
1. INTRODUCTION: Define organisational transparency
2. BODY: Explain mechanisms of keeping staff "in the loop" with theoretical support, examples and a NOTE on limits
3. CONCLUSION: End with transparency as a trust-building tool

INTRODUCTION

Organisational transparency refers to the free, timely and two-way flow of information — on decisions, rationale, performance and future plans — between management and staff, reducing the information asymmetry that classical hierarchy tends to create.

BODY

Mechanisms of an "in-the-loop" organisation

- **Open communication channels**: town-halls, intranets, suggestion boxes, open-door policies — echoing **Mary Parker Follett's** principle of "integration" through free exchange rather than domination or compromise.
- **Participative decision-making**: Rensis **Likert's "System 4"** (participative-group) management and **McGregor's Theory Y** both assume employees are self-directed and creative when adequately informed and involved in goal-setting.
- **Access to performance data**: dashboards on KPIs/KRAs let staff see how their individual work contributes to organisational goals — fulfilling **Chester Barnard's** requirement of "**communication**" as one of the three essential elements of a cooperative system (alongside willingness to cooperate and common purpose).
- **Grievance redressal and feedback loops**: formal mechanisms (CPGRAMS in the Indian government, internal ombudspersons) that close the information loop upward as well as downward.
- **Government/corporate examples**: e-Office and internal dashboards under Digital India let civil servants track file movement and policy status transparently; in the private sector, Google's internal "TGIF" all-hands sessions and OKR (Objectives and Key Results) dashboards operationalise the same principle.
- **Shared strategic information**: sharing the "why" behind decisions (not just the "what") builds what Barnard called the **"zone of indifference"** into a **zone of active buy-in**.

NOTE: Transparency must be distinguished from **surveillance** — keeping staff "in the loop" is about informing and involving them, whereas excessive monitoring (as critiqued under Digital Taylorism) can erode trust rather than build it.

Value addition: Transparency lowers Herzberg's "hygiene" dissatisfaction (poor company policy/communication) and strengthens the **psychological contract**, directly aiding retention, morale and discretionary effort ("organisational citizenship behaviour").

CONCLUSION

A transparent organisation converts the staff from passive subordinates into informed stakeholders — this is foundational to both **efficiency and trust**, and increasingly a competitive necessity in both public administration and modern enterprise.

(d) Have governments under governance become more transparent and accountable? Elucidate. [3+7=10]

ANS.

STRUCTURE

1. INTRODUCTION: Start with governance as a shift from government to "governing with"
2. BODY: Explain accountability/transparency gains under governance with Rhodes' meanings, then note persisting limitations
3. CONCLUSION: End with a balanced "yes, but conditionally" verdict

INTRODUCTION

The shift from **government** (hierarchical, state-centric, "rowing") to **governance** (networked, multi-stakeholder, "steering") was premised on the promise of greater openness, since decisions are now co-produced with markets and civil society rather than made behind closed bureaucratic doors. **Rhodes** identified six overlapping meanings of governance — from minimal state to self-organising networks — each carrying its own accountability logic.

BODY

Gains in transparency and accountability

- **Legal instruments**: the Right to Information Act, 2005 in India institutionalised citizen access to official records, converting a previously closed "official secrets" culture into a rights-based transparency regime.

- **Financial and social audit**: CAG audits, Social Audits under MGNREGA (a globally cited best-practice), and Citizen/Sevottam Charters have created multiple accountability points beyond traditional ministerial responsibility.
- **Digital governance**: e-procurement (GeM), PFMS (real-time fund tracking), and open-data portals (data.gov.in) make transactions traceable in real time, reducing discretion-based leakage.
- **Global governance indices**: the World Bank's Worldwide Governance Indicators and the Open Budget Survey now benchmark states publicly, creating reputational accountability pressure.
- **Participatory mechanisms**: participatory budgeting experiments (e.g., in Kerala's decentralised planning) and citizen feedback apps deepen bottom-up accountability.

Persisting limitations

- **Regulatory capture and PPP opacity**: contracts with private/network partners often escape RTI-type scrutiny (as flagged in the 2G spectrum and coal-block allocation cases), since commercial confidentiality clauses can shield information.
- **Diffused accountability**: Rhodes' "hollow state" problem — when multiple actors (state, market, NGOs) jointly deliver a service, accountability blurs into the "**many hands**" problem (Christopher Hood; Dennis Thompson) — "success has many fathers, but failure is an orphan."
- **Democratic deficit** in technocratic and international governance bodies (WTO, IMF conditionalities, credit-rating agencies) that influence domestic policy without electoral accountability.
- **Algorithmic opacity**: AI-driven administrative decisions (welfare eligibility scoring, predictive policing) introduce a new, poorly-regulated accountability gap.

CONCLUSION

Governance has undeniably **widened the architecture of transparency and accountability** through law, digital tools and global benchmarking, but its network form simultaneously creates new accountability voids — making the gain real, but conditional on continuously updating oversight mechanisms to match evolving governance structures.

(e) "Dicey's three principles of the 'Rule of Law' have been further developed to meet the immense needs of a democratic society." Discuss. [5+5=10]

ANS.

STRUCTURE
1. INTRODUCTION: Start with Dicey's formulation of Rule of Law
2. BODY: Explain the three principles, then trace their modern/Indian evolution with a timeline; note criticisms of Dicey
3. CONCLUSION: End with Rule of Law as a "living", not static, principle

INTRODUCTION

A.V. Dicey, in *Introduction to the Study of the Law of the Constitution* (1885), formulated the Rule of Law around three principles: **supremacy of law** (absence of arbitrary power), **equality before law**, and **predominance of legal spirit** (rights flow from ordinary law/court decisions, not from a written constitutional guarantee). Dicey developed this against the backdrop of Britain's uncodified constitution and distrust of unchecked executive discretion.

BODY

Dicey's three principles explained

1. **No person is punishable except for a distinct breach of law** proved in an ordinary court — no arbitrary power, no wide discretionary authority.

2. **Equal subjection of all classes to the ordinary law**, administered by ordinary courts — no special privileges or separate administrative tribunals for officials (a position India departs from via administrative tribunals under Article 323-A).

3. **The constitution is the result**, not the source, of the ordinary rights of individuals as defined and enforced by courts through case law.

Evolution timeline — from Dicey to a democratic Rule of Law

Period	**Development**
1885	Dicey's classical, formal/negative conception
1932	Donoughmore Committee (UK) accepts limited administrative discretion as inevitable in the welfare state, qualifying Dicey's rejection of administrative law
1959	**International Commission of Jurists' Delhi Declaration** extends Rule of Law to include the state's *positive* duty to create socio-economic conditions for dignity
1973	**Kesavananda Bharati** entrenches Rule of Law as part of the Constitution's **Basic Structure**, going beyond Dicey's "ordinary law" premise
1978	**Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India** reads "procedure established by law" (Article 21) as requiring fair, just and reasonable procedure — substantive, not merely formal, due process
1987 onward	Legal Services Authorities Act operationalises **access to justice** as integral to Rule of Law for the poor

Why further development was necessary for a democratic society

- **Substantive vs. formal legality**: Dicey's formal conception could tolerate an unjust law if procedurally enacted; democratic societies needed courts to test laws for **substantive fairness**, not mere procedural compliance.
- **Positive/welfare dimension**: modern Rule of Law now includes socio-economic rights, environmental protection, and administrative accountability (through ombudsman-type bodies) — not merely negative liberty from arbitrary state power.
- **Administrative law accommodation**: unlike Dicey's rejection of separate administrative law (droit administratif), modern democracies (including India, through tribunals and judicial review of executive action) have built robust administrative law without abandoning legal supremacy.
- **Criticism of Dicey**: scholars like **Ivor Jennings** and **W. Friedmann** noted Dicey's framework was too narrowly tied to British constitutional practice and underestimated the legitimate role of administrative discretion in a complex welfare state.

CONCLUSION

Dicey's classical, negative conception has thus been reinterpreted into a **dynamic, substantive and welfare-oriented Rule of Law** — as the Supreme Court observed, Rule of Law today is not merely "rule by law" but "rule of good law," indispensable for a democratic society that demands both liberty and substantive justice.

Q2. (a) Different paradigms of public administration deal with the questions of 'How' and 'Why', but do not negate the centrality of the discipline. Discuss. [10+10=20]

ANS.

STRUCTURE

1. INTRODUCTION: Start with Nicholas Henry's paradigmatic evolution
2. BODY: Trace the six paradigms mapping 'locus' (Why/where) vs 'focus' (How/what) in a table; then establish continued disciplinary centrality with theoretical support
3. CONCLUSION: End with the identity of PA as a "field of fields"

INTRODUCTION

Defining "How" and "Why"

- **The "How" (Methodology & Process):** Focuses on the mechanisms, tools, organizational structures, and managerial techniques used to carry out public tasks. It asks: *By what means do we execute policy efficiently?* (e.g., rigid bureaucracies, POSDCORB principles, market contracting, or digital platforms).
- **The "Why" (Values, Rationale, & Legitimacy):** Focuses on the core purpose, ethics, political theory, and socio-economic justification behind administrative actions. It asks: *What is the ultimate purpose of this administration, and whom does it serve?* (e.g., protecting individual liberty, advancing social equity, maintaining democratic accountability, or maximizing public value).

Nicholas Henry, in *Public Administration and Public Affairs*, traced the discipline's evolution through six overlapping paradigms, organised around two recurring questions: the **"Why"** (locus — where the discipline belongs) and the **"How"** (focus — its distinctive methodology/technique). **HERE, why is about goals, not institutional location.**

BODY

The Six Paradigms of Public Administration

Era / Paradigm Stage	Dominant Focus	Key Question Addressed	Paradigm Philosophy
Traditional & Principles Era*(1887–1930s)*	**Primary HOW**	*How can we run government with maximum efficiency and zero political waste?*	Focused on mechanical execution (POSDCORB, scientific management, hierarchy).
Identity Crisis & Politics Phase*(1940s–1960s)*	**Emerging WHY**	*Why should administration pretend to be value-neutral when policies affect real humans?*	Challenged early principles, asserting that administration is inherently value-laden and political.
New Public Administration (NPA) *(1970s)*	**Strong WHY**	*Why are we efficient if we are not equitable? Who benefits from government actions?*	Elevated values—social equity, ethics, responsiveness, and human welfare—over raw efficiency.

Era / Paradigm Stage	Dominant Focus	Key Question Addressed	Paradigm Philosophy
New Public Management (NPM) *(1980s–1990s)*	**Revised HOW**	*How can we adopt private-sector practices to make government leaner and cost-effective?*	Replaced bureaucratic processes with market mechanisms, privatization, and performance metrics.
New Public Governance & Service *(2000s–Present)*	**Synthesized HOW & WHY**	*How do network tools enable administration to fulfill its "Why" of creating democratic Public Value?*	Integrates market/digital tools (**How**) with citizen collaboration, public interest, and democratic legitimacy (**Why**).

Why the discipline's centrality is never negated

- Even when Focus was borrowed from management (Paradigm 4) or Locus from political science (Paradigm 3), scholars kept returning to synthesise both — proving PA's **irreducible normative core**: the pursuit of the public interest through organised collective action.
- **Dwight Waldo** argued PA's identity lies not in a single method but in its **enduring commitment to "the public"** — a constant beneath shifting paradigms; he termed PA a "**profession in search of itself**," not a discipline without substance.
- The Governance paradigm, rather than dissolving PA, has **repositioned it as the coordinating hub** of multi-actor service delivery (network governance, PPPs, Joined-Up Government), reaffirming centrality in a new, networked form.
- **Analytical point**: The paradigms can be read as PA's own version of Thomas Kuhn's "scientific revolutions" — each crisis (identity, methodological) triggers not dissolution but a **paradigm shift toward greater synthesis**, a sign of disciplinary maturity rather than weakness.

CONCLUSION

The paradigms show PA continuously interrogating "how" it should function and "why" it exists, but as **Robert Golembiewski** noted, this reflexivity is itself proof of a **mature, self-renewing discipline** — a "field of fields" whose very willingness to question its boundaries is what has kept it alive and relevant for over a century.

(b) Douglas McGregor's 'Professional Manager' is a rational, emotive individual whose primary role is to work through the differences and build a managerial team. Explain how his idea of the 'Professional Manager' is distinct from Theory 'Y'. [7+8=15]

ANS.

STRUCTURE

1. INTRODUCTION: Start with McGregor's contribution to management thought
2. BODY: Explain Theory X (for contrast), Theory Y assumptions, then the 'Professional Manager' concept, then distinguish all three in a table
3. CONCLUSION: End with both as complementary facets of humanistic management

INTRODUCTION

Douglas McGregor, in *The Human Side of Enterprise* (1960), is best known for the contrasting **Theory X and Theory Y** assumptions about human nature at work, but in his later, less-cited work he refined this into the concept of the "**Professional Manager**" — addressing not just employee motivation but the manager's own competence in handling organisational complexity and conflict.

BODY

Theory X (for contrast): assumes the average worker is inherently lazy, dislikes responsibility, and must be coerced, controlled and closely directed with threat of punishment — the assumption underlying classical, authoritarian management.

Theory Y (the assumption about employees)

- Work is as natural as rest/play; people exercise **self-direction and self-control** toward objectives they are committed to.
- The average person, under right conditions, seeks and accepts responsibility, and possesses imagination, ingenuity and creativity that is under-utilised in most organisations.
- Management's task is to create conditions — **"integration"** of individual and organisational goals — that allow this potential to flourish, rather than to control and coerce.

The 'Professional Manager' (a role-based construct)

- Described by McGregor as a **rational, yet emotive** individual — combining analytical judgment with emotional intelligence and self-awareness.
- Primary role: to **work through differences** (conflict among individuals, sub-units or departments) and **build a cohesive managerial team**, rather than simply trusting subordinates to self-direct in isolation.
- Emphasises **managerial competence** — skills of negotiation, integration, active listening and leadership — as distinct from merely holding optimistic assumptions about human nature; a manager can believe in Theory Y and still lack the skill to build a functioning team.
- Reflects McGregor's growing recognition (echoed later by **Chris Argyris's** maturity theory) that releasing human potential is necessary but not sufficient — organisational effectiveness also requires deliberate skill in managing interpersonal and inter-group dynamics.

Points of distinction

Basis	**Theory X**	**Theory Y**	**Professional Manager**
Focus	Pessimistic assumption about employees	Assumption about **employee nature** (optimistic)	Competency profile of the **manager**
Orientation	Control/coercion	Motivational/attitudinal	Behavioural/skill-based (conflict resolution, team-building)
Locus of Action	Centralised in supervisor	Diffused — self-directed employees	Centred on the manager as an active integrator
Emotion	Ignored/suppressed	Not emphasised	Explicitly "rational, emotive" — blends logic and empathy
Underlying risk	Demotivation, resistance	Assumes potential is automatically released	Recognises potential needs active facilitation

CONCLUSION

While **Theory Y** supplies the optimistic premise about human potential (in contrast to Theory X's pessimism), the **Professional Manager** operationalises it — showing that releasing employee potential still requires a skilled, emotionally intelligent manager to reconcile differences and weld a team, making Theory Y and the Professional Manager **complementary rather than identical** facets of McGregor's humanistic management philosophy.

(c) Individuals' perception of fairness and equity at the workplace motivates them to give their best. How can fairness and equity be reinforced to improve productivity in an entity? Discuss. [10+5=15]

ANS.

STRUCTURE
1. INTRODUCTION: Start with Adams' Equity Theory
2. BODY: Explain the theory, related motivation theories and justice types, then suggest measures to reinforce fairness with examples
3. CONCLUSION: End with equity as a precondition, not a bonus, for productivity

INTRODUCTION

J. Stacy Adams' Equity Theory (1963) holds that employees compare their **input-output ratio** (effort, skill, time vs. pay, recognition, growth) with that of relevant others (co-workers, industry peers); perceived inequity — whether under-reward or over-reward — creates psychological tension that drives corrective behaviour, positively or negatively affecting performance.

BODY

Link between fairness and motivation

- **Distributive justice** (fairness of outcomes — pay, promotion) and **procedural justice** (fairness of the *process* used to decide outcomes) together shape organisational trust (Greenberg); **interactional justice** (Bies & Moag) — the fairness of interpersonal treatment during implementation — is a third, often-overlooked dimension.
- Perceived unfairness leads to reduced effort, absenteeism, "quiet quitting" or exit — validated by **Herzberg's** identification of "company policy and administration" and "interpersonal relations" as key **hygiene factors** whose absence causes dissatisfaction.
- **Vroom's Expectancy Theory** complements this: motivation = Expectancy × Instrumentality × Valence — if employees don't believe effort will be *fairly* rewarded (low instrumentality), motivation collapses regardless of effort-outcome linkage.
- Conversely, perceived equity strengthens the **psychological contract**, feeding into intrinsic motivation (McGregor's Theory Y; Maslow's esteem needs).

Measures to reinforce fairness and equity

- **Transparent appraisal systems**: objective KPIs, 360-degree feedback, publicly known promotion criteria — reduces the ambiguity that breeds perceived favouritism.
- **Grievance redressal mechanisms**: accessible, impartial channels (e.g., CPGRAMS, internal ombudsperson, works committees) to correct perceived injustice quickly and visibly.
- **Pay parity and transparency**: clear, rule-based pay scales (as in government Pay Commissions, or published pay-bands in some private firms) reduce ambiguity-driven resentment; India's push for gender pay-parity audits is illustrative.
- **Participative decision-making**: involving staff in setting standards (Likert's System 4 management) enhances perceived procedural fairness even when outcomes are unfavourable.
- **Diversity and inclusion policies**: ensuring equal opportunity regardless of gender, caste, disability or background reinforces distributive justice and legal compliance (reservation policy in Indian public employment).
- **Reward-linked-to-performance systems**: merit-based incentives (e.g., outcome-linked increments, project-based recognition) rather than seniority alone, balanced with safeguards against manager bias.
- **Consistent rule enforcement**: applying disciplinary and reward rules uniformly across ranks builds the perception that "no one is above the rules" — critical to the legitimacy of any bureaucratic hierarchy.

CONCLUSION

Since perceived equity directly regulates effort, commitment and retention, institutionalising **transparent, participative and rule-based HR practices** is not a soft add-on but a **core productivity lever** — as Adams' theory shows, an organisation cannot out-manage the demotivating effect of perceived unfairness through pay alone.

Q3. (a) Bureaucratic features have remained constant in organisations despite the development of different forms under NPM and Public Governance approaches. Give reasons for the persistence of these bureaucratic features. [10+10=20]

ANS.

STRUCTURE
1. INTRODUCTION: Start with Weber's ideal-type bureaucracy
2. BODY: List core bureaucratic features; explain reasons for persistence despite NPM/Governance reforms; add critique and Merton's dysfunction angle
3. CONCLUSION: End with bureaucracy as the enduring "steel frame" beneath evolving forms

INTRODUCTION

Max Weber's ideal-type bureaucracy — characterised by hierarchy, rule-boundedness, division of labour, impersonality, career-based merit recruitment, written records and full-time salaried officialdom — was expected to be dismantled by **New Public Management's (NPM)** agencification/marketisation and **New Public Governance's (NPG)** networked, collaborative model. Yet, as **Robert Merton** and later reformers themselves discovered, its core features have proven remarkably persistent.

BODY

Persisting bureaucratic features

- **Hierarchy of authority**, even within flattened, agencified or "arm's-length" units.
- **Rule-based, impersonal decision-making** — retained for legal certainty despite NPM's push for managerial discretion.
- **Merit-based recruitment** (UPSC-type competitive exams) as the entry gate for career civil servants worldwide.
- **Written records and accountability trails**, essential even in digital-era e-governance (file-based decision-making persists inside e-Office systems).
- **Specialisation and division of labour**, retained even in matrix or mission-mode structures through defined role-charters.

Reasons for persistence

- **Legal-constitutional necessity**: Rule of Law and due process require rule-based, impersonal administration — markets/networks cannot substitute for statutory authority (e.g., regulatory and law-enforcement functions cannot simply be "contracted out").
- **Accountability requirement**: Ministerial responsibility and public audit (CAG, PAC) demand a **traceable hierarchical chain** — Christopher Hood's NPM disaggregation itself created the "**many hands**" accountability problem, driving a partial re-hierarchisation and the rise of "meta-regulators" to oversee agencified units.
- **Path dependency**: Institutions evolve incrementally (historical institutionalism, Paul Pierson); deeply embedded bureaucratic norms — e.g., India's colonial "**steel frame**" legacy inherited from the ICS — resist wholesale replacement.
- **Functional efficiency of rules**: Weber himself justified bureaucracy as the most "technically superior" form for large-scale, complex administration, comparable to "a machine compared with non-mechanical modes of production" — no networked alternative has matched its capacity for scale, predictability and mass service delivery.
- **Political control needs**: Elected governments require a controllable, hierarchical apparatus to implement policy; fully networked/marketised delivery dilutes political accountability and makes democratic control harder.
- **Governance as addition, not replacement**: NPG (Stephen Osborne) and Joined-Up Government emerged specifically to **correct** NPM's fragmentation — meaning bureaucratic coordination logic was reinstated, not

abandoned, within new institutional wrappers (e.g., regulatory agencies like SEBI/IRDA/TRAI still run on strictly Weberian lines internally, with hierarchical chains of command and file-based decision trails).

- **Merton's "trained incapacity"**: even where reforms attempted to dismantle bureaucratic rigidity, Merton showed how bureaucratic socialisation creates deeply ingrained habits of rule-following that persist regardless of the surrounding organisational form.

CONCLUSION

NPM and Governance changed the **outer architecture** of the state — from monolith to network — but the **inner grammar of bureaucracy** (hierarchy, rules, records, merit) persists because it remains functionally indispensable to legality, accountability and scale, validating Weber's prediction that modern rational-legal administration would become an inescapable "**iron cage**" of modern organisational life.

(b) There is no single best way to manage an organisation. Instead, it is about the optimal structure and strategic fit between the organisation's internal sub-systems and its dynamic external environment. Elucidate. [5+10=15]

ANS.

STRUCTURE

1. INTRODUCTION: Start with the Contingency Theory of organisation
2. BODY: Explain the contingency approach with Mintzberg's configurations, internal sub-systems, and environmental fit with examples
3. CONCLUSION: End with contingency as the mature successor to classical universalism

INTRODUCTION

Contingency Theory (Burns & Stalker, Lawrence & Lorsch, Joan Woodward) rejects the classical search for **"one best way"** (Taylor's scientific management, Fayol's universal principles) and holds instead that the ideal organisational structure is **contingent** upon the fit between its internal sub-systems and the demands of its external environment.

BODY

Rejection of universalism

- **Burns and Stalker (1961)**: distinguished **mechanistic structures** (rigid, hierarchical, rule-bound — suited to stable environments) from **organic structures** (flexible, networked, adaptive — suited to turbulent, innovation-driven environments).
- **Joan Woodward's** studies of British manufacturing firms showed **technology** (unit/small-batch, mass, or continuous-process production) systematically determines the appropriate span of control, number of hierarchical levels, and degree of formalisation.
- **Lawrence and Lorsch** introduced **differentiation** (sub-units developing distinct structures/orientations to cope with their specific environmental segment — e.g., R&D vs. sales) and **integration** (mechanisms — liaison roles, cross-functional teams — to coordinate these differentiated units) as the key balancing act for effectiveness.

Mintzberg's Five Structural Configurations (a complementary contingency framework)

Configuration	Coordinating mechanism	Best-fit environment
Simple structure	Direct supervision	Small, simple, dynamic (e.g., start-up)
Machine bureaucracy	Standardisation of work	Stable, simple (e.g., postal department)

Professional bureaucracy	Standardisation of skills	Stable but complex (e.g., hospitals, universities)
Divisionalised form	Standardisation of outputs	Diverse markets (e.g., large conglomerates, multi-state PSUs)
Adhocracy	Mutual adjustment	Dynamic and complex (e.g., R&D labs, ISRO mission teams)

Organisation as an open system

- **Katz and Kahn's Open Systems Theory**: organisations import inputs, transform them, and export outputs while continuously interacting with the environment — internal sub-systems (production, HR, finance, R&D) must each adapt to their relevant environmental sector, requiring differentiated internal design rather than uniform structure.
- **Strategic fit** requires aligning structure (centralised/decentralised), culture and processes with variables like market volatility, technology intensity and the regulatory environment — a dynamic, ongoing exercise rather than a one-time design choice.

Illustrative examples

- A **stable-environment** organisation (e.g., a postal department, land-records office) benefits from a **mechanistic, Weberian/machine-bureaucratic** structure.
- A **turbulent-environment** organisation (e.g., a fintech start-up, or India's National Payments Corporation building UPI) thrives with an **organic, flat, matrix/adhocratic** structure enabling rapid adaptation.
- Government's shift toward **mission-mode, outcome-based structures** (e.g., National Health Mission, Digital India Mission, PM GatiShakti's integrated command) reflects contingency logic — adapting structure to programme complexity rather than applying a uniform bureaucratic template across all sectors.

CONCLUSION

As **Fred Riggs'** ecological approach similarly argued for public administration more broadly, structure cannot be divorced from environment; true organisational effectiveness lies in **continuous, context-sensitive strategic fit** between internal design and external conditions, not a fixed organisational blueprint applied indiscriminately.

(c) The fine demarcation between judicial control and judicial overreach disappears when judicial prudence is replaced by activism. Critically examine. [5+10=15]

ANS.

STRUCTURE

1. INTRODUCTION: Start with judicial review as a constitutional safeguard
2. BODY: Distinguish judicial control/activism/overreach with case-law timeline; examine causes and critique with a restraint-activism-overreach spectrum
3. CONCLUSION: End with the need for "judicial restraint with responsiveness"

INTRODUCTION

Judicial review, rooted in Articles 13, 32 and 226 and entrenched as part of the **basic structure** (*Kesavananda Bharati*, 1973; *L. Chandra Kumar*, 1997), empowers courts to control administrative and legislative action — but the line between legitimate **judicial control**, welcome **judicial activism**, and impermissible **judicial overreach** has become increasingly contested in India's constitutional discourse.

BODY

Judicial control (legitimate): Ensuring administrative action is *intra vires* the enabling statute, follows principles of natural justice, and meets tests of proportionality and reasonableness (the Wednesbury principle) — e.g., quashing arbitrary executive orders or malafide transfers.

Judicial activism — a timeline of expansion

Case/Development	Contribution
Golaknath (1967)	Parliament cannot abridge Fundamental Rights via ordinary amendment
Kesavananda Bharati (1973)	Basic Structure doctrine limits even constitutional amending power
Maneka Gandhi (1978)	Expanded Article 21 to substantive due process
S.P. Gupta ("Judges' case") (1981)	Broadened locus standi, birthing **Public Interest Litigation (PIL)**
Vishaka v. State of Rajasthan (1997)	Laid down binding workplace sexual-harassment guidelines in a legislative vacuum
M.C. Mehta line of cases	Extensive environmental jurisprudence (closure of polluting industries, vehicular emission norms)
Vineet Narain (1997)	Directions for CBI/CVC autonomy in the Hawala case

Where it tips into overreach

- **Policy-making by courts**: directions on issues of resource allocation, administrative appointments or governance mechanics (e.g., detailed judicial monitoring in the *2G spectrum* and *coal-block allocation* cases, or court-mandated timelines for infrastructure) risk violating the spirit of **separation of powers** (Article 50).
- **Absence of accountability/expertise**: unlike the executive, courts are not answerable to the electorate nor equipped with implementation machinery or fiscal expertise — leading at times to unimplementable or resource-blind directions.
- Several Law Commission reports and jurists have cautioned against courts becoming a "**parallel administration**" or engaging in "**judicial legislation**."

A restraint-activism-overreach spectrum

- **Restraint**: courts defer entirely to executive/legislative wisdom, intervening only on clear illegality.
- **Activism**: courts fill genuine legislative/executive vacuums, staying within constitutional bounds, to protect rights (e.g., Vishaka guidelines, later codified into the POSH Act, 2013).
- **Overreach**: courts substitute their own policy preference for administrative discretion absent any illegality — micromanaging implementation, fixing timelines/technical parameters, or effectively legislating.

Critical examination

- Activism was often a **response to executive/legislative failure** (e.g., environmental degradation, custodial violence, absence of workplace-harassment law) — hence partly justified as filling a genuine governance vacuum, and often later ratified by Parliament through legislation (POSH Act following Vishaka).
- However, when courts substitute their own policy preference for administrative discretion absent any illegality (the *mala fide* or *ultra vires* test failing), it violates the **doctrine of separation of powers** and risks eroding institutional legitimacy and public confidence in an unelected body making resource-allocation choices.
- Distinguishing feature: activism fills gaps **within** constitutional bounds; overreach breaches those bounds by encroaching on functions constitutionally reserved for the legislature or executive.

CONCLUSION

The demarcation survives only through **judicial self-restraint** — courts intervening to correct illegality, arbitrariness or unconstitutionality, while leaving policy choice to elected, accountable institutions; as the judiciary itself has repeatedly cautioned, it must remain the "**sentinel on the qui vive**" guarding rights, not a substitute administrator running the government.

Q4. (a) Abraham Maslow propounded the theory of needs, which identified the basic needs that human beings have in order of their importance. McClelland believes that we all have three motivators, and individuals with different motivators exhibit distinct characteristics. Critically examine. [10+10=20]

ANS.

STRUCTURE

1. INTRODUCTION: Start with the content theories of motivation
2. BODY: Explain Maslow's hierarchy and McClelland's need theory in detail with a comparison table including Herzberg; critically examine both
3. CONCLUSION: End with their complementary, not competing, contribution

INTRODUCTION

Motivation theory shifted from mechanistic (Taylor's "economic man") to humanistic explanations of behaviour through influential **content theories** of motivation, most notably **Abraham Maslow's Hierarchy of Needs (1943)** and **David McClelland's Need/Acquired-Needs Theory (1961)**, both seeking to explain what internally drives individuals at work, in contrast to process theories like Vroom's Expectancy Theory.

BODY

Maslow's Hierarchy of Needs

- Five needs in ascending order: **Physiological → Safety → Social (Belongingness) → Esteem → Self-actualisation** (later editions added Cognitive and Aesthetic needs, and Self-transcendence at the apex).
- Premised on **prepotency**: a lower need must be substantially (not necessarily fully) satisfied before the next level becomes the dominant motivator.
- Widely applied in HR design — e.g., salary/job security (lower needs), teamwork/inclusion (social), recognition/promotion schemes (esteem), and creative autonomy/challenging assignments (self-actualisation).

McClelland's Need Theory (Three Motivators)

- **Need for Achievement (nAch)**: drive to excel, set challenging but realistically attainable goals, seek concrete feedback and take personal responsibility for outcomes — associated with entrepreneurial and high-performing individuals.
- **Need for Power (nPow)**: desire to influence/control others — subdivided into **personalised power** (self-serving, coercive) and **institutionalised/socialised power** (organisation- or society-serving), the latter generally more effective and ethical in senior administrators.
- **Need for Affiliation (nAff)**: desire for friendly, close relationships and social acceptance — prioritises harmony over performance, sometimes compromising objective decision-making (e.g., reluctance to give critical feedback).
- Unlike Maslow, McClelland held these needs are **learned through socialisation, culture and early experience** (measured via the projective **Thematic Apperception Test, TAT**), not innate/universally hierarchical — individuals carry a **unique blend** typically dominated by one motivator.

Comparative table with Herzberg (for added rigour)

Theory	Basis	Key insight	Administrative application
Maslow (Hierarchy)	Innate, universal, sequential needs	Lower needs must be met before higher ones motivate	Design benefits/career progression as a ladder

McClelland (Acquired Needs)	Learned, culturally variable, non-sequential	Individual differs by dominant motivator (nAch/nPow/nAff)	Role-fit: match officers to task type
Herzberg (Two-Factor)	Hygiene (dissatisfiers) vs. Motivators (satisfiers)	Pay/policy prevent dissatisfaction but don't motivate; growth/recognition do	Job enrichment over mere pay hikes

Critical examination

- **Maslow's limitations**: lacks robust empirical validation (needs don't always follow the strict sequence — a starving artist may still pursue self-actualisation); culturally biased toward Western individualism, as **Hofstede's** cross-cultural research showed collectivist societies often prioritise social/belongingness needs over individual esteem; the model is largely static and doesn't well explain regression to lower needs under stress or simultaneous multiple-need pursuit.
- **McClelland's limitations**: measurement via projective tests (TAT) is subjective and difficult to standardise; findings are harder to generalise across contexts and cultures; the power motive, if personalised rather than institutionalised, can have destructive administrative consequences (empire-building, resistance to delegation).
- **Complementarity, not rivalry**: McClelland's *nAch/nPow/nAff* can be read as a more dynamic, adult-workplace-specific refinement of Maslow's **higher-order needs** (esteem and self-actualisation), rather than a rival framework — both decisively moved organisational theory away from Taylor's purely economic view of human motivation.
- **Administrative relevance**: Understanding whether an officer is achievement-, power-, or affiliation-driven helps in **role allocation** — placing high-nAch officers in mission-mode, target-driven programmes (e.g., Swachh Bharat implementation), high-nPow (institutionalised) officers in coordinating/leadership roles, and high-nAff officers in stakeholder-liaison or grievance-redressal functions.

CONCLUSION

Both theories mark the decisive transition from mechanistic to **humanistic administration**; despite their respective empirical limitations, they remain foundational — read together with Herzberg — for designing motivation and HR systems that recognise the **plurality, hierarchy and individual variability of human needs** in organisational life.

(b) Examine the tension between the functional efficiency of delegated legislation and the risks it poses to accountability and the rule of law. [5+10=15]

ANS.

STRUCTURE

1. INTRODUCTION: Define delegated legislation
2. BODY: Explain efficiency rationale, forms of delegation, then accountability/rule-of-law risks, with detailed safeguards
3. CONCLUSION: End with "controlled delegation" as the balance

INTRODUCTION

Delegated (subordinate) legislation refers to rules, regulations, bye-laws and notifications made by the executive under authority conferred by a parent statute — a practice validated in India by *In re Delhi Laws Act case (1951)*, which permitted delegation short of "**essential legislative functions**" (i.e., the legislature must lay down policy; the executive may only fill in details).

BODY

Functional efficiency rationale

- **Technical complexity**: modern governance (environmental standards, financial regulation, technology) needs expert, adaptable rule-making beyond the generalist legislature's capacity or time.
- **Speed and flexibility**: rules can be amended faster than statutes, aiding responsive governance (e.g., pandemic-era health regulations, rapidly evolving GST rate notifications).
- **Legislative time constraints**: Parliament cannot legislate on every technical detail — the **Donoughmore Committee (UK, 1932)** itself endorsed delegation as "inevitable" in the modern administrative/welfare state, while cautioning against its abuse.
- **Local/contextual adaptability**: rules can be tailored to state or sectoral specificities more easily than a rigid central statute.

Forms of delegated legislation (illustrative typology): "**Henry VIII clauses**" (executive empowered to amend the parent Act itself), skeleton legislation (statute lays only broad framework, details left entirely to rules), conditional legislation (executive merely triggers an already-complete law), and sub-delegation (further delegation to lower authorities) — each carrying progressively greater accountability risk.

Risks to accountability and Rule of Law

- **Excessive delegation / "Henry VIII clauses"**: provisions allowing the executive to even amend or repeal the parent Act itself, undermining legislative supremacy and, in India, potentially violating the *Delhi Laws Act* limit on non-delegable "essential legislative functions."
- **Reduced parliamentary scrutiny**: while Rules are required to be "laid" before Parliament (laying procedure — simple, affirmative or negative resolution), in practice scrutiny by the **Parliamentary Committee on Subordinate Legislation** is often cursory given the sheer volume of rules issued annually.
- **Risk of arbitrariness**: rule-making outside the transparent, debated legislative process risks bypassing due-process protections central to Dicey's Rule of Law, since affected stakeholders have less opportunity for public deliberation.
- **Ultra vires risk**: rules exceeding statutory mandate can distort legislative intent, requiring judicial correction — courts have repeatedly struck down rules going beyond the "policy and guidelines" laid down in the parent Act.
- **Cumulative sub-delegation**: delegation to delegate further (sub-delegation) can create long, opaque chains of executive rule-making far removed from any legislative accountability.

Safeguards/balance

- **Judicial review** for *ultra vires* action, testing rules against the parent Act's policy.
- **Mandatory laying procedures** (affirmative/negative resolution) before Parliament/State legislatures.
- **Parliamentary Committee on Subordinate Legislation** (in both Lok Sabha and Rajya Sabha) scrutinising rules for consistency with legislative intent.
- **Pre-legislative consultation policy (2014)**, requiring draft rules to be published for public comments before finalisation.
- **Sunset clauses and periodic review** to prevent indefinite, unreviewed delegated power.

CONCLUSION

Delegated legislation is a **functional necessity** of the modern administrative state, but without robust laying, consultation and judicial safeguards, it risks becoming an unaccountable, quasi-legislative executive power — the constitutional goal, as *Delhi Laws Act* itself signalled, must be **"controlled delegation,"** not its wholesale abandonment.

(c) Hierarchical structures do not align with the modern business world. Discuss the different forms of structuring modern organisations. [5+10=15]

ANS.

STRUCTURE

1. INTRODUCTION: Start with the limits of classical hierarchy
2. BODY: Discuss modern structural forms with features, examples and Handy's culture typology
3. CONCLUSION: End with hybrid structures as the emerging norm

INTRODUCTION

Classical **Weberian/bureaucratic hierarchy**, suited to stable, repetitive-task environments, increasingly strains against the **speed, innovation and cross-functional demands** of the modern, technology-driven, VUCA (volatile, uncertain, complex, ambiguous) business world, prompting a decades-long search for flatter, more adaptive organisational structures.

BODY

Why hierarchy struggles today: slow, multi-layered decision-making; information distortion and delay across vertical layers; poor responsiveness to volatile markets; and stifled innovation due to rigid, top-down chains of command that discourage front-line initiative.

Modern organisational forms

- **Matrix structure**: dual reporting (functional + project/product) enabling resource-sharing and cross-functional collaboration — used in project-heavy environments like consulting, IT firms and space/defence organisations (ISRO's project-mode matrix teams).
- **Network/Virtual organisation**: a small core coordinates a web of outsourced/partner units (e.g., Nike's design-core with manufacturing entirely outsourced) — enables agility with minimal fixed structure.
- **Flat/Horizontal structures**: minimal middle-management layers, empowering front-line decision-making (common in start-ups and tech firms such as early-stage unicorns).
- **Adhocracy** (Henry Mintzberg): highly organic, project-based teams assembled and disbanded around specific innovation tasks, coordinated through mutual adjustment rather than formal rules — typical of R&D-intensive organisations and advertising agencies.
- **Team-based/Holacratic structures**: self-managing teams replace formal hierarchy with distributed, role-based authority (Zappos' well-documented holacracy experiment; Valve Corporation's "boss-less" model).
- **Boundaryless organisation** (Jack Welch, GE): dismantles internal (vertical, horizontal) and external (supplier/customer) boundaries to enable free information flow and rapid cross-unit collaboration.
- **Platform organisations**: coordinate value creation through digital platforms rather than internal hierarchy, connecting external producers and consumers directly (Uber, Amazon Marketplace, India's ONDC — Open Network for Digital Commerce).

Charles Handy's Four Culture Types (a complementary lens on structural form)

Culture	Structural analogue	Feature
Power culture	Web, single centre	Fast decisions, dependent on the central figure
Role culture	Classical bureaucracy	Rules, logic, predictability
Task culture	Matrix/project teams	Expertise-driven, flexible grouping around tasks
Person culture	Loose cluster	Individual expertise valued over structure (law firms, consultancies)

Public-sector parallels: India's move toward **mission-mode, outcome-based structures** (e.g., National Health Mission, Digital India Mission, PM GatiShakti) and **regulatory agencification** (SEBI, TRAI, IRDAI) reflects a similar shift away from monolithic hierarchy toward specialised, semi-autonomous, task-oriented units — while still retaining a hierarchical accountability spine to Parliament.

CONCLUSION

Rather than a wholesale rejection of hierarchy, modern organisations — public and private alike — are converging toward **hybrid structures**: retaining minimal hierarchy for legal accountability and control, while layering matrix, network, platform and team-based elements for agility, precisely echoing the Contingency Theory principle of **structure-environment fit** discussed elsewhere in this paper.

SECTION B

Q5. Answer the following questions in about 150 words each: 10×5=50

(a) The objective of policy sciences is to develop policy knowledge for better policy-making. Comment. [10]

ANS.

STRUCTURE

1. INTRODUCTION: Start with Lasswell's definition of policy sciences
2. BODY: Explain features of policy sciences, the policy cycle, and how they generate policy knowledge; give examples
3. CONCLUSION: End with policy sciences as the bridge between knowledge and action

INTRODUCTION

Harold Lasswell, in *The Policy Orientation* (1951) and later *A Pre-View of Policy Sciences* (1971), coined "**policy sciences**" as a **contextual, problem-oriented and multi-disciplinary** field aimed at producing "knowledge of and in the policy process" — moving policy studies from ad hoc description toward systematic science.

BODY

Twin knowledge streams (Lasswell): "**knowledge of** the policy process" (how decisions are actually made — the politics, institutions and actors involved) and "**knowledge in** the policy process" (substantive, technical inputs — data, models, evaluations — to improve the quality of decisions).

Lasswell's seven stages of the policy process (a foundational analytical map): Intelligence → Promotion → Prescription → Invocation → Application → Termination → Appraisal — providing policy scientists a structured lens to study where knowledge gaps occur.

Key features enabling better policy-making

- **Interdisciplinarity**: draws on economics, sociology, statistics, and political science simultaneously.
- **Problem-orientation**: **Yehezkel Dror's "optimal model"** stresses using both rational-analytical and extra-rational (judgment/intuition) elements, especially for "mega-policy" decisions under high uncertainty.
- **Contextuality**: policies are studied within their socio-political ecology (the Riggsian ecological approach), recognising that identical policies can succeed or fail depending on context.
- **Evidence-based tools**: cost-benefit analysis, social audit, randomised control trials and evaluation studies (e.g., NITI Aayog's outcome evaluations, Development Monitoring and Evaluation Office) generate usable policy knowledge.
- **Indian examples**: the annual **Economic Survey**, **NITI Aayog's SDG India Index**, and sector-specific "**dashboards**" (Aspirational Districts) exemplify policy science feeding directly into budget-making and course-correction.

NOTE: Policy science is distinct from mere policy *analysis* — the former builds generalisable theory about the policy process itself, while the latter applies existing tools to a specific problem.

CONCLUSION

By systematising evidence and process-understanding, policy sciences convert **raw information into actionable policy knowledge** — as Lasswell envisaged, making them indispensable to a modern, democratic, evidence-based governance system.

(b) Administrative ethics is an abstract concept, and in practice, is an unresolved dilemma between 'what is' and 'what ought to be'. Comment. [10]

ANS.

STRUCTURE

1. INTRODUCTION: Start with the fact-value dichotomy in administration
2. BODY: Explain the abstractness of ethics, the 'is-ought' gap with examples, institutional responses in a table
3. CONCLUSION: End by resolving the dilemma through values-based governance

INTRODUCTION

Terry Cooper defines administrative ethics as "doing the right thing when no one is watching" — yet what is "right" often collides with what administrative reality permits, reflecting the classical **fact ("is") - value ("ought") dichotomy** that **Herbert Simon** sought to separate methodologically, and that **Dwight Waldo** later argued could never truly be separated in practice.

BODY

Why ethics is "abstract": Concepts like integrity, public interest and neutrality lack precise operational metrics, unlike efficiency or output targets — making ethical breaches harder to define, measure and prosecute than, say, a missed deadline or budget overrun.

The 'is-ought' dilemma in practice

- Bureaucrats face conflicts between **political loyalty ("is" — the expectation of compliance)** and **constitutional conscience ("ought" — fidelity to law and public interest)** — e.g., dilemmas around implementing questionable executive orders.
- **Discretion vs. rule-following**: what "is" procedurally correct (a technically valid but substantively unjust order) may conflict with what "ought" to be done ethically — Weber himself recognised this as the tension between "ethic of responsibility" and "ethic of ultimate ends."
- **Corruption vs. survival pressures**: petty corruption "is" often locally normalised or even socially tolerated, while probity "ought" to prevail as a constitutional value.
- **Kohlberg's stages of moral development** suggest most administrators operate at a "conventional" level (rule/social-approval driven) rather than a "post-conventional" level of autonomous ethical reasoning — explaining why codified rules matter more than appeals to abstract conscience alone.

Institutional responses

Mechanism	**Purpose**
Nolan Committee's Seven Principles of Public Life (UK, 1995)	Codifies selflessness, integrity, objectivity, accountability, openness, honesty, leadership
2nd ARC's 4th Report "Ethics in Governance" (2007)	India-specific recommendations: codify values, whistle-blower protection, asset disclosure
Central Civil Services (Conduct) Rules	Legally binding behavioural code for civil servants
Proposed Public Services Bill	Aims to statutorily codify a Civil Services Code of Ethics
Whistle Blowers Protection Act, 2014	Legal shield for those exposing corruption

CONCLUSION

While the is-ought gap can never be fully closed, embedding **ethical infrastructure** — codes, conscience clauses, training, and institutional protection for probity — keeps the abstract closer to the actionable, moving administrative ethics from aspiration toward enforceable practice.

(c) Is state-led development an artificial distortion of market forces? Analyse. [10]

ANS.

STRUCTURE

1. INTRODUCTION: Start with the state vs market debate
2. BODY: Present the case for and against with a market-failure taxonomy, then balance with developmental-state examples
3. CONCLUSION: End with the case for a calibrated, not binary, role

INTRODUCTION

The tension between **state-led development** and the free operation of **market forces** has anchored development economics since Adam Smith's "invisible hand" versus Keynesian and structuralist critiques of market failure, and remains central to India's post-1991 reform debate.

BODY

Case that state-led development is a distortion

- **Public Choice theorists** (Niskanen's budget-maximising bureaucrat, Buchanan-Tullock's rent-seeking model) argue state intervention creates inefficiency, capture by interest groups, and misallocation of resources.
- Classical/neo-classical economists hold that price signals, not planners, best allocate resources; excessive state control historically bred inefficiency — India's pre-1991 **License-Permit-Quota Raj** is the textbook illustration of state distortion crowding out productive private investment.

Case that it corrects, not distorts, markets

Type of market failure	Why the state must act (Musgrave)
Public goods	Non-excludable/non-rivalrous goods (defence, street-lighting) are under-supplied by private markets
Externalities	Pollution, congestion — private costs diverge from social costs
Information asymmetry	Consumers/investors cannot verify quality (financial regulation, food safety)
Natural monopoly	High fixed-cost sectors (utilities, railways) need regulation or public provision

- **Developmental State model**: **Chalmers Johnson** (on Japan's MITI) and **Alice Amsden** (on Korea) showed state-guided industrial policy — not laissez-faire — drove East Asian "miracle" growth through selective credit allocation and export-promotion.
- **India**: state-led infrastructure (railways, PSUs, Green Revolution's public irrigation/research investment) built foundational capacity that markets alone would not have provided at that stage of development. Even post-1991, the state remains an active "**market-shaping**" (Mariana Mazzucato's "Entrepreneurial State") agent via PLI (Production-Linked Incentive) schemes and Digital Public Infrastructure (UPI, Aadhaar, ONDC).

- **Gunnar Myrdal's "soft state"** critique clarifies that the real risk lies not in state-led development per se, but in **weak implementation capacity** — corruption, lax enforcement — that allows both market and state failures to coexist.
- **Dani Rodrik's** "one economics, many recipes" thesis similarly argues there is no single universal formula; successful development has always combined market signals with strategic state intervention.

CONCLUSION

State-led development is not inherently a distortion; it becomes one only when it **substitutes rather than complements** market efficiency, or when weak state capacity turns intervention into rent-seeking — the sustainable ideal, as Osborne & Gaebler put it, is a **"steering, not rowing"** developmental state that corrects rather than replaces markets.

(d) "No tax shall be levied or collected except by authority of law." Analyse. [10]

ANS.

STRUCTURE
1. INTRODUCTION: Start with Article 265 of the Constitution
2. BODY: Explain the constitutional/legal significance, historical roots, and contemporary issues with examples
3. CONCLUSION: End with fiscal constitutionalism as a democratic safeguard

INTRODUCTION

Article 265 of the Constitution of India enshrines: "No tax shall be levied or collected except by authority of law," rooting India's fiscal system in **legislative supremacy** over taxation — a principle traceable to the Magna Carta (1215), and crystallised in England's 1689 Bill of Rights maxim of "**no taxation without representation**."

BODY

Historical and constitutional roots: The Constituent Assembly deliberately used the word "law" (not merely "Act") to ensure that both primary legislation and validly authorised delegated legislation could impose tax, while still requiring a clear statutory chain of authority — Article 265 must be read with Article 266 (Consolidated Fund) and Article 246 (distribution of taxing powers via the Union, State and Concurrent Lists, now substantially altered by the 101st Amendment for GST).

Significance

- Embodies **Dicey's Rule of Law** — taxation cannot be an executive/arbitrary act; it requires a **validly enacted statute**, not mere administrative fiat.
- Ensures **legislative accountability**: Parliament/State legislatures, being directly elected, must sanction every tax through the Money Bill route (Article 110), preserving the democratic principle that only representatives of taxpayers can impose taxes on them.
- **Judicial enforcement**: courts have repeatedly struck down levies lacking clear statutory backing — illustrated by decades of sales-tax, octroi and cess litigation, and prominently by the **Vodafone case (2012)**, which triggered a retrospective-taxation controversy later resolved by the **Taxation Laws (Amendment) Act, 2021**, withdrawing the retrospective provision — itself a case study in balancing legislative power against fairness/certainty.

Contemporary dimensions

- **GST regime**: the **GST Council** (Article 279A), a cooperative-federal body of Union and State representatives, now recommends tax law and rates; the Supreme Court in ***Mohit Minerals* (2022)** held GST Council recommendations to be **persuasive, not binding**, on Parliament/State legislatures — reaffirming that ultimate taxing authority still vests in the legislature, consistent with Article 265.

- **Delegated taxation**: rate notifications and cess impositions by the executive under enabling statutes (e.g., customs/excise notifications) must stay within the "policy and guideline" limits set by the parent legislation, else risk being struck down as **ultra vires**.
- Ensures fiscal discipline complementing the **FRBM Act, 2003**, which requires transparent, legislatively-sanctioned deficit and borrowing limits.

CONCLUSION

Article 265 thus operationalises **fiscal constitutionalism** — anchoring every citizen's economic obligation to the state in democratic, legislative legitimacy rather than executive discretion, a principle as old as constitutional government itself yet freshly tested by each new fiscal instrument, from GST to digital-economy taxation.

(e) Work study and Work measurement are techniques for improving administrative efficiency. Comment. [10]

ANS.

STRUCTURE

1. INTRODUCTION: Define work study and its two components
2. BODY: Explain method study and work measurement techniques in detail, with applications and limitations
3. CONCLUSION: End with their continuing relevance in modern O&M

INTRODUCTION

Work study, rooted in Taylor's scientific management and refined by **Frank and Lillian Gilbreth's** motion studies (which broke tasks into elemental "**therbligs**"), is a systematic technique combining **method study** and **work measurement** to determine the most efficient way of performing a task and the standard time it should take — institutionalised in Indian administration through the **Organisation and Methods (O&M) Division**, established in 1954.

BODY

Method study: Analyses existing work processes (via process charts, flow-process diagrams, string diagrams) to identify and eliminate wasteful motion, unnecessary steps and bottlenecks, ultimately designing the "**one best method**" of performing a task.

Work measurement: Determines the **standard time** for a task using techniques such as direct time study (stopwatch-based), **work sampling** (statistical observation of activity/idle ratios over time), and **predetermined motion-time systems (PMTS)** such as Methods-Time Measurement (MTM), enabling realistic staffing norms and workload assessment without relying on subjective managerial judgment.

Applications in administration

- India's **Staff Inspection Unit (SIU)**, under the Department of Expenditure, conducts formal work study to rationalise staff strength across central government ministries and departments — a direct, institutionalised O&M application still in use.
- Used extensively in postal, railway workshop, and large public-sector operations to fix output norms, standardise procedures, and reduce idle time and duplication of effort.
- Modern digital equivalents include **Business Process Re-engineering (BPR)** exercises accompanying e-governance rollouts, which apply method-study logic to redesign citizen-service workflows before digitisation.

Limitations

- Can reduce jobs to mechanistic, repetitive tasks, ignoring the Hawthorne-effect social/psychological factors (informal group norms, morale) that also drive productivity.
- Less suited to knowledge-based, creative or highly variable administrative work (e.g., policy analysis) where "standard time" is difficult to meaningfully define.
- Risks demotivation and resistance if imposed top-down without staff participation — validating **Likert's** insistence on participative goal-setting even in efficiency exercises.
- Should be distinguished from **job evaluation** (which assesses relative worth/pay of a job) — work study specifically targets *how* a task is performed and *how long* it should take.

CONCLUSION

Despite behavioural critiques, work study and work measurement remain essential, **evidence-based tools of administrative efficiency**, provided they are tempered with participative, humane implementation rather than applied as a purely mechanistic control device.

Q6. (a) "Liberalization, Privatization and Globalization (LPG) successfully resolved the structural crisis of the welfare state with emphasis on market efficiency, undermining the social equity goals essential to public service." Explain. [5+15=20]

ANS.

STRUCTURE

1. INTRODUCTION: Start with the welfare state crisis of the 1970s-80s
2. BODY: Explain LPG's resolution of the fiscal/structural crisis, then examine the social equity trade-off in detail with data/critique
3. CONCLUSION: End with the need to re-embed equity within market efficiency (New Public Governance)

INTRODUCTION

By the late 1970s, the **welfare state** faced a **structural/fiscal crisis** — ballooning subsidies, bureaucratic inefficiency, stagflation, and in India's case a 1991 Balance-of-Payments crisis — which the **neo-liberal Washington Consensus** (a ten-point policy package prescribed by the IMF/World Bank) answered with **Liberalization, Privatization and Globalization (LPG)**, adopted in India from 1991 onward under Finance Minister Manmohan Singh's reforms.

BODY

How LPG addressed the structural crisis

- **Liberalization**: dismantling the License-Permit-Quota Raj freed enterprise, boosted competitiveness and growth (India's GDP growth accelerated from a "Hindu rate of growth" of ~3.5% to 6-8% in subsequent decades).
- **Privatization**: disinvestment of loss-making PSUs reduced fiscal burden and improved allocative efficiency, echoing **Osborne & Gaebler's "steering not rowing"** logic of entrepreneurial government.
- **Globalization**: integration with world markets attracted FDI, technology transfer and export growth, directly addressing the 1991 balance-of-payments crisis (when India had reserves for barely two weeks of imports).
- This shift mirrored global **New Public Management (NPM)** reforms — emphasis on markets, competition, and output-based efficiency (**Christopher Hood's** seven NPM doctrines: hands-on professional management, explicit standards, output controls, disaggregation, competition, private-sector styles, and resource discipline).

Undermining of social equity

- **Jobless growth and informalisation**: market efficiency prioritised capital productivity over employment generation, deepening the informal-sector burden — India's formal-sector job creation persistently lagged GDP growth ("jobless growth" debate).
- **Regional and social disparities**: capital gravitated to already-developed regions/sectors (western and southern states, urban centres), widening inter-state and rural-urban inequality, contrary to the "trickle-down" assumption.
- **Subsidy rationalisation**: cuts and targeting reforms in food, fertiliser and social-sector subsidies affected the poor disproportionately, evident in **Amartya Sen's** critique of growth without adequate attention to capability expansion.
- **Erosion of public-service ethos**: privatization/commercialisation of essential services (health, education) reduced universal access in practice, converting citizens into "customers" (the Osborne-Gaebler entrepreneurial-government critique) rather than rights-bearing citizens entitled to a social floor.
- **Jean Drèze and Amartya Sen**, in *An Uncertain Glory: India and Its Contradictions*, document how India's growth outpaced improvement in social indicators like child nutrition, sanitation and literacy through much of the LPG decades — a growth-development mismatch.
- **Karl Polanyi's "double movement"** thesis is instructive here: unregulated market expansion historically triggers a societal counter-movement demanding social protection — precisely what India's post-2000s welfare legislations represent.

Corrective/counter-movement responses: MGNREGA (2005, world's largest employment guarantee scheme), Right to Education Act (2009), National Food Security Act (2013), and Direct Benefit Transfers (leveraging JAM trinity — Jan Dhan, Aadhaar, Mobile) represent post-LPG attempts to re-embed social equity into a market-oriented economy without reversing liberalisation itself.

CONCLUSION

LPG successfully resolved the **fiscal-structural** crisis of the welfare state but at real cost to its **distributive** promise; the way forward, as New Public Governance scholarship suggests, is a **"third way"** — neither the old command economy nor unfettered markets — synthesising market efficiency with an inclusive, rights-based social floor.

(b) Critically analyse the differences between Ferrel Heady's focus on administrative structures and Fred Riggs's ecological 'Prismatic' model. Which one of these frameworks provides a more effective tool for the study of developing nations? Examine. [7+8=15]

ANS.

STRUCTURE
1. INTRODUCTION: Start with Comparative Public Administration (CPA) and its two approaches
2. BODY: Explain Heady's structural approach and Riggs's ecological/prismatic model in full detail with Sala-model features; compare and evaluate for developing nations
3. CONCLUSION: End with a synthesis verdict favouring Riggs for developing-country context

INTRODUCTION

Comparative Public Administration (CPA), spurred by post-WWII decolonisation, the Cold War's technical-assistance imperatives, and the Comparative Administration Group (CAG, 1960s) of the American Society for Public Administration, produced two influential and contrasting approaches: **Ferrel Heady's** structural-institutional comparison and **Fred Riggs's** ecological "**Prismatic-Sala**" model.

BODY

Ferrel Heady's approach

- Set out in *Public Administration and Comparative Government/Public Administration: A Comparative Perspective* — focuses on **comparing administrative structures** (bureaucracy, civil service systems, centre-local relations, political-administrative interface) across political systems using categories like "modern bureaucratic polities," "developing polities" and "transitional" systems.
- Retains a **structural-functional** orientation, closer to classical PA, examining bureaucratic power, degree of political control, and accountability mechanisms across regime types (democratic vs. authoritarian, developed vs. developing).
- Strength: provides an **empirically groundable typology** allowing cross-national classification of bureaucracies by observable institutional features.

Fred Riggs's ecological 'Prismatic' model

- Set out in *Administration in Developing Countries: The Theory of Prismatic Society* (1964) — uses the physics metaphor of light passing through a prism: **fused society (traditional/agraria) → prismatic society (transitional) → diffracted society (modern/industria)**.
- Prismatic societies exhibit three defining features: **heterogeneity** (traditional and modern practices coexisting), **formalism** (a wide gap between prescribed/legal norms and actual behaviour), and **overlapping** (traditional structures like family/kinship continuing to perform functions formally assigned to modern

bureaucratic structures) — administration in such a society is termed the "**Sala model**" (Sala being the Spanish term for a government office where administrative, political and even market/social functions overlap).

- Sala-model administrative pathologies include **nepotism, poly-normativism** (multiple competing norm-systems operating simultaneously), and **price indeterminacy** (bureaucratic decisions influenced by bribery/informal exchange rather than fixed rules) — explaining dysfunctions as products of the socio-cultural "ecology," not mere individual administrative failure.

Critical comparison

Basis	Heady	Riggs
Approach	Structural-institutional	Ecological (society-environment)
Explains	Formal bureaucratic organisation and typology	Why formal structures malfunction in developing contexts
Methodology	Empirical, classificatory	Abstract, model-building, sociologically inflected
Applicability	Better for cross-national structural comparison	Better for explaining developing-nation administrative *behaviour*
Criticism	Static, descriptive, under-theorises socio-cultural context	Overly abstract/jargon-heavy; deterministic; understates local agency and reform capacity (critiqued by Fainsod, Sigelman, and later by Peter Self as excessively pessimistic)

Which is more effective for developing nations?

- Developing nations exhibit precisely the **formalism, overlapping and heterogeneity** Riggs described — e.g., laws on paper diverging from actual administrative practice, patronage/kinship networks coexisting with a formally Weberian civil service (India's mix of a constitutionally merit-based bureaucracy with informal caste/kinship/political influence in practice).
- However, Riggs has been criticised for being **overly deterministic and pessimistic** about developing-country reform prospects, for a Western-centric evolutionary bias that implicitly treats "diffracted" (Western) society as the normative endpoint, and for excessive jargon reducing practical usability.
- Heady's structural approach, though thinner in explanatory depth about *why* dysfunctions occur, is more **empirically usable** for classifying and comparing actual bureaucratic capacity across countries, and has aged better as a comparative tool precisely because it avoids Riggs's deterministic sociological claims.

CONCLUSION

For understanding **why** administrative dysfunctions persist and manifest distinctively in developing nations, **Riggs's ecological-Sala model offers deeper explanatory power**, while Heady's structural framework remains more useful for **descriptive, empirical cross-national comparison** — the two frameworks are, in the final analysis, best used **complementarily** rather than as substitutes.

(c) New communication technology has not only enabled more robust public engagement with the government, but also serves as a new means of internal organizational teamwork. Discuss. [5+10=15]

ANS.

STRUCTURE

1. INTRODUCTION: Start with ICT's dual role in governance
2. BODY: Discuss external citizen-engagement dimension, then internal organisational-teamwork dimension, with detailed examples and a risks/NOTE section
3. CONCLUSION: End with ICT as the connective tissue of networked governance

INTRODUCTION

The proliferation of **Information and Communication Technology (ICT)** has transformed governance along two axes simultaneously: strengthening the **external interface** between government and citizens, and reshaping **internal organisational collaboration** — a shift central to the **Digital/Governance Paradigm 6** and to what scholars term "**Digital Era Governance**" (Patrick Dunleavy).

BODY

External: robust public engagement

- **e-Participation platforms**: MyGov.in crowdsources policy ideas directly from citizens; RTI Online enables digital information access without physical visits to government offices.
- **Grievance redressal**: CPGRAMS (Centralised Public Grievance Redress and Monitoring System) provides real-time citizen-government interaction and tracking, closing the feedback loop.
- **Social media governance**: ministries use platforms for instant feedback and crisis communication (e.g., real-time disaster response coordination during floods/cyclones).
- **Transparency tools**: open-data portals (data.gov.in) and state-level Jan Soochna-type portals enhance accountability and trust — strengthening the "**good governance**" pillar of transparency identified by the World Bank's 1989/1992 governance frameworks.
- **One-stop citizen portals**: UMANG (Unified Mobile Application for New-age Governance) integrates over 1,500 government services onto a single mobile platform, exemplifying "**Joined-Up Digital Government**" from the citizen's vantage point.

Internal: new means of organisational teamwork

- **e-Office and workflow automation**: enables real-time file movement and digital note-sheets, reducing hierarchical delay and improving inter-departmental coordination without physical file transfer.
- **Video-conferencing and collaboration platforms**: the **PRAGATI** (Pro-Active Governance and Timely Implementation) platform allows the Prime Minister to review project status directly with state/district officials via video-link, collapsing multiple hierarchical layers — a clear example of **network/flat coordination** enabled by technology.
- **Shared digital dashboards**: PM GatiShakti's National Master Plan integrates geospatial data from over 16 ministries onto a single portal, enabling **Joined-Up Government** (Perri 6) and breaking departmental silos in infrastructure planning.
- **Knowledge management systems**: intranets, shared document repositories and internal wikis support institutional memory and cross-team learning, reducing the loss of tacit knowledge during staff transfers (a chronic problem in transferable civil services).
- **Enterprise collaboration tools**: adoption of platforms akin to Microsoft Teams/Slack within government departments increasingly supports asynchronous, cross-hierarchical communication that bypasses the traditional note-sheet chain.

NOTE — risks accompanying this shift: increased **cyber-security vulnerability**, the **digital divide** excluding citizens without connectivity/literacy from participation, and algorithmic opacity in automated decision systems all require parallel investment in digital governance safeguards.

Synthesis: ICT thus simultaneously operationalises **New Public Governance's** citizen co-production principle (external) and the **Joined-Up/Whole-of-Government** approach's internal integration principle (internal) — the same technological infrastructure serving both purposes.

CONCLUSION

New communication technology has become the **connective infrastructure** of contemporary administration — simultaneously democratising the state's external face and dissolving its internal silos — marking a genuine paradigm shift toward **networked, participative governance**, provided the accompanying risks of exclusion and opacity are actively managed.

Q7. (a) The advent of Comparative Public Administration not only widened the knowledge of Public Administration, but also contributed to developing its understanding in a cross-cultural and cross-national framework. Examine. [10+10=20]

ANS.

STRUCTURE

1. INTRODUCTION: Start with the origin of Comparative Public Administration (CPA)
2. BODY: Explain how CPA widened knowledge with a table of key scholars, then its cross-cultural/cross-national contribution, with limitations
3. CONCLUSION: End with CPA's legacy in today's globalised administration

INTRODUCTION

Comparative Public Administration (CPA) emerged after World War II, propelled by **decolonisation, the Cold War's technical-assistance programmes, and the Comparative Administration Group (CAG)** under the American Society for Public Administration (1960s), led by **Fred Riggs**, to study administration systematically beyond the Anglo-American model that had until then dominated the discipline.

BODY

Widening the knowledge of Public Administration

- Broke the **parochialism** of classical PA, which was largely based on American/British experience (Wilson, Gulick, Willoughby) and implicitly assumed its findings were universally valid.
- Introduced **empirical, inductive, nomothetic** (generalising) methodology, in contrast to earlier normative/prescriptive approaches that simply prescribed "best practice" without testing it across contexts.
- Brought attention to variables like **culture, political system, and level of socio-economic development** as determinants of administrative behaviour — beyond mere structural/legal design.

Key CPA scholars and their contributions

Scholar	Contribution
Fred Riggs	Prismatic-Sala ecological model; founded the Comparative Administration Group
Ferrel Heady	Structural-institutional comparison of bureaucracies across regime types
Gabriel Almond	Structural-functionalism applied to political/administrative systems
Dwight Waldo	Critiqued CPA's over-theorisation while endorsing its cross-national ambition
Edward Weidner	Coined "development administration" as an offshoot sub-field

Cross-cultural and cross-national contribution

- Enabled systematic comparison of administrative systems across **developed vs. developing** nations, revealing how socio-cultural "ecology" (Riggs) shapes bureaucratic behaviour — e.g., formalism, nepotism and overlapping in transitional/prismatic societies, versus differentiated, merit-based structures in diffracted (developed) societies.
- Facilitated **policy transfer and diffusion studies** — understanding why administrative reforms (e.g., New Public Management) succeed in some national contexts (UK, New Zealand) and falter or mutate in others (many developing economies), because institutional and cultural pre-conditions differ.

- Enabled **development administration** as a distinct sub-field (Edward Weidner, Fred Riggs), focused specifically on administration's proactive role in nation-building, planned economic development and social transformation in newly independent states — a marked departure from the earlier, narrower "housekeeping" conception of administration.
- Provided an early conceptual and methodological foundation for evaluating today's **international/transnational governance** structures (WTO, IMF, regional bodies), relevant to the globalisation-driven "transnationalization" of administration that later scholarship (Michael Moran, on "regulatory capitalism") built upon.
- Contributed **theoretical models** used well beyond their original scope: Riggs's Prismatic-Sala model, Heady's structural comparison, and Almond's structural-functionalism applied to administrative systems.

Limitations

- Criticised for being **excessively theoretical and jargon-laden** (Riggs's terminology in particular — "prismatic," "sala," "poly-normativism"), limiting practical, policy-relevant utility.
- Accused of **cultural/ethnocentric bias** — using Western "developed" administration as the implicit normative benchmark against which "developing" systems were judged deficient, an accusation later echoed in post-colonial critiques of development administration itself.
- Declined institutionally by the 1970s as the CAG lost Ford Foundation funding and US foreign-policy interest waned with the end of major decolonisation-era technical assistance, though its intellectual legacy persisted in comparative politics and international development studies.

CONCLUSION

CPA fundamentally **de-parochialised** Public Administration, embedding a cross-national, cross-cultural sensibility that underlies today's globalised governance studies, comparative civil-service reform research, and international administrative benchmarking (e.g., the World Bank's Worldwide Governance Indicators, OECD's public governance reviews) — a legacy that remains visible in contemporary comparative scholarship despite the sub-field's own institutional decline by the mid-1970s.

(b) Rationality in policy-making is a challenge, and its absence is a predicament for the policy process. Examine. [5+10=15]

ANS.

STRUCTURE

1. INTRODUCTION: Start with the rational-comprehensive model
2. BODY: Explain the ideal of rationality, challenges/bounded rationality with a models comparison table, and consequences of its absence
3. CONCLUSION: End with satisficing/incrementalism/mixed-scanning as pragmatic responses

INTRODUCTION

The **rational-comprehensive model** of policy-making envisions decision-makers identifying all goals, generating all possible alternatives, and selecting the option that maximises value through exhaustive cost-benefit comparison — an ideal that **Herbert Simon** and **Charles Lindblom** showed, both theoretically and empirically, is rarely achievable in the real administrative world.

BODY

Why rationality is a challenge

- **Bounded rationality (Herbert Simon)**: cognitive, informational and time limits prevent decision-makers from surveying all alternatives and their consequences; they instead "**satisfice**" — choosing the first option that meets a minimum acceptable threshold, rather than the theoretical optimum.

- **Value/goal conflicts**: policy problems involve multiple, often incommensurable, stakeholder values (equity vs. efficiency, growth vs. sustainability), making a single "rational" optimum conceptually elusive even with perfect information.
- **Information asymmetry and uncertainty**: incomplete or contested data, especially in complex "**wicked problems**" (Rittel and Webber — problems with no definitive formulation or stopping rule, such as poverty or climate change), fundamentally undermines comprehensive rational analysis.
- **Political constraints**: policy-making is embedded in bargaining, coalition-building and incrementalism (Lindblom's "**muddling through**"), not pure technical calculation — policy is as much a product of political feasibility as of analytical merit.
- **Time and resource pressures**: administrators often must decide under deadline and budget constraints fundamentally incompatible with exhaustive rational analysis.

A spectrum of decision-making models

Model	Proponent	Core idea
Rational-Comprehensive	Classical economics	Exhaustive search for the optimal alternative
Bounded Rationality/Satisficing	Herbert Simon	Cognitive limits force "good enough" choices
Disjointed Incrementalism	Charles Lindblom	Small, safe, marginal steps from the status quo ("muddling through")
Mixed Scanning	Amitai Etzioni	Combines broad rational scanning for fundamental decisions with incremental adjustment for details
Optimal Model	Yehezkel Dror	Blends rational-analytical methods with extra-rational judgment for mega-policy decisions

Consequences of the absence of rationality

- Leads to **ad hoc, reactive policy-making** — poor problem definition, weak implementation planning, and frequent policy reversal.
- Increases risk of **policy failure and resource misallocation**, as seen when schemes are launched without adequate feasibility/impact assessment or pilot-testing.
- Erodes **public trust** when policies appear arbitrary or captured by narrow interests — the Public Choice critique of "rent-seeking" policy capture by organised lobbies at the expense of diffuse public interest.
- Undermines **evidence-based governance**, weakening evaluation and course-correction capacity, since poorly-designed policy lacks clear, measurable objectives against which to assess outcomes.

Institutional responses/correctives

- **Simon's "satisficing"** and **Lindblom's "disjointed incrementalism"** offer realistic, bounded-rational alternatives to the unattainable comprehensive ideal.
- **Etzioni's "mixed scanning"** offers a practical middle path — broad rational review for fundamental/strategic choices, incrementalism for routine/operational details.
- **Yehezkel Dror's "optimal model"** explicitly blends rational-analytical methods with extra-rational judgment/intuition for high-stakes mega-decisions where data alone cannot resolve genuine uncertainty.
- Institutional mechanisms — NITI Aayog's evidence-based policy units, pre-legislative Regulatory Impact Assessment (RIA), and pilot/sandbox testing of schemes before nationwide rollout — help enhance (if never fully perfect) rationality in practice.

CONCLUSION

While perfect rationality remains an unattainable ideal in any real-world policy process, its **structured pursuit through evidence-based, participatory and incremental-but-disciplined processes** — rather than its abandonment — remains essential to reduce arbitrariness and improve the quality of the policy process.

(c) Deficit budgeting as a tool for stimulating economic development emerged with government investment and initiative. Is deficit budgeting still relevant in the era of liberal ideology? Justify your answer. [3+6+6=15]

ANS.

STRUCTURE
1. INTRODUCTION: Start with the Keynesian origin of deficit budgeting
2. BODY: Explain its developmental rationale, then examine relevance under liberal/market ideology with Indian fiscal data and counter-arguments
3. CONCLUSION: End with a "yes, but disciplined" verdict

INTRODUCTION

Deficit budgeting — government expenditure exceeding revenue, financed through borrowing — emerged from **John Maynard Keynes's** prescription (in *The General Theory*, 1936) of counter-cyclical state spending to stimulate aggregate demand during depressions, later adapted by newly independent developing states as a tool for planned, investment-led growth.

BODY

Original developmental rationale

- Enabled **capital formation** in infrastructure, heavy industry and social sectors where private investment was inadequate or unwilling to bear long gestation periods — India's **Second and Third Five-Year Plans** (Mahalanobis strategy) used planned deficit financing to build a public-sector-led industrial base.
- Supported **counter-cyclical stabilisation** — deficit spending during recessions to boost aggregate demand and employment when private investment collapses, the classic Keynesian "**multiplier effect**" logic.
- Financed public goods with long gestation but high social returns — irrigation, power generation, primary education, and public health — which private capital typically under-provides.

Relevance in the era of liberal ideology

Arguments for continued relevance:

- **Market failures persist even in liberalised economies**: infrastructure, public health and climate-transition investments still require state-led deficit financing — India's post-COVID fiscal strategy deliberately shifted toward **capital-expenditure-driven fiscal deficit** (rather than revenue-deficit spending) to crowd-in private investment via the multiplier.
- **Counter-cyclical necessity persists**: even the most liberal, market-oriented economies relied on massive deficit spending during crises — the 2008 Global Financial Crisis stimulus packages across the US/EU, and India's COVID-19 relief packages (Atmanirbhar Bharat) financed substantially through higher borrowing.
- **Human capital and equity investment**: liberal markets alone chronically underprovide in health/education (positive externality goods); deficit-financed public investment corrects this, a rationale consonant with Amartya Sen's capability approach.

Arguments questioning relevance:

- Liberal/neo-liberal ideology emphasises **fiscal discipline** — India's **FRBM Act, 2003** (as amended, targeting a fiscal deficit glide-path toward 4.5% of GDP by 2025-26) mandates deficit limits to avoid crowding out private investment and to control inflation/debt sustainability.

- Excessive deficits risk a **debt-trap and macroeconomic instability** (rising interest burden consuming an ever-larger share of revenue), directly contradicting the market-efficiency logic that underpinned the LPG reforms.
- Global capital markets — credit-rating agencies (Moody's, S&P), sovereign bond markets — now exert real-time discipline on government borrowing, constraining unrestrained deficit use far more than in the pre-1991, closed-economy era.
- **Ricardian equivalence** critique (Robert Barro): rational economic agents may anticipate future taxation to repay current debt and reduce present consumption accordingly, partially blunting the stimulus effect of deficit spending.

CONCLUSION

Deficit budgeting remains **relevant but reformed** — no longer as an ideological tool of comprehensive state-led planning, but as a **calibrated, rule-bound counter-cyclical and capital-investment instrument** operating within fiscal responsibility frameworks like the FRBM Act — reflecting a mature synthesis of Keynesian pragmatism with liberal fiscal discipline, rather than either extreme in isolation.

Q8. (a) Financial integrity, compliance with laws and performance standards, and efficient, economical and effective service delivery performance are mandatory for every government. Discuss the existing practices in ensuring public financial accountability and also give suggestions to improve it. [20]

ANS.

STRUCTURE

1. INTRODUCTION: Start with the concept of public financial accountability
2. BODY: Discuss existing institutional/legal practices in detail with a table; then evaluate gaps; then give suggestions
3. CONCLUSION: End with accountability as the backbone of fiscal legitimacy

INTRODUCTION

Public financial accountability refers to the obligation of the executive to answer for the legality, propriety and effectiveness (the "**3 Es**" — Economy, Efficiency, Effectiveness, later expanded by some scholars to include a fourth "E" for Equity) of public spending — anchored constitutionally in India through Articles 148-151 (CAG), 265 (no tax without law), 266 (Consolidated Fund) and 267 (Contingency Fund).

BODY

Existing institutional and legal practices in India

Mechanism	Function
Comptroller and Auditor General (CAG)	Conducts financial, compliance and performance audits of Union/State accounts (Article 148); reports tabled in legislature
Public Accounts Committee (PAC)	Examines CAG reports; conventionally chaired by the Opposition since 1967, embodying legislative control over the executive purse
Estimates Committee	Scrutinises budgetary estimates for economy and efficiency
Committee on Public Undertakings (COPU)	Examines autonomous PSU performance and accounts
Appropriation & Finance Bills	Legal instruments through which Parliament authorises expenditure and taxation
Departmentally Related Standing Committees	Examine Demands for Grants ministry-wise before floor debate
FRBM Act, 2003	Mandates fiscal/revenue deficit targets and transparency via Medium-Term Fiscal Policy Statements
Outcome Budgeting (since 2005-06)	Links financial allocations to measurable physical/service outcomes, not mere input spending

PFMS (Public Financial Management System)	Real-time tracking of fund utilisation and Direct Benefit Transfers down to the beneficiary level
GeM (Government e-Marketplace)	Transparent, competitive digital procurement reducing discretion-based leakage
Internal audit / Chief Controller of Accounts	Ministry-level internal financial control before external CAG audit
RTI Act, 2005	Enables citizen-level scrutiny of public expenditure and decision-making

Additional institutional layers: the **Fifteenth Finance Commission** has increasingly linked grants to states with fiscal-accountability performance criteria; the **GASAB (Government Accounting Standards Advisory Board)** works toward accrual-based, internationally comparable public accounts; and India's periodic **Public Expenditure and Financial Accountability (PEFA)** assessments benchmark the system against global standards.

Gaps in existing practices

- CAG audit is largely **post-facto** (after money is spent), limiting scope for real-time corrective action — as seen in high-profile audit paragraphs (2G spectrum allocation, Commonwealth Games 2010) that surfaced only years after the underlying decisions.
- **Weak follow-up** on PAC recommendations; Action Taken Reports (ATRs) from ministries are often significantly delayed.
- **Off-budget financing** and extra-budgetary resources (e.g., borrowing routed through PSUs/special-purpose vehicles) historically reduced transparency of the government's true fiscal position — partially corrected only from the 2021-22 Budget onward.
- **Limited technical capacity** of legislative committees to conduct rigorous scrutiny of increasingly complex financial/fiscal data.
- **State-level accountability institutions** (State AG offices, state PACs) are often comparatively weaker in staffing and technical capacity than their Union-level counterparts.
- **Delayed audit-report tabling** in several state legislatures undermines timely legislative accountability.

Suggestions for improvement

- Strengthen **concurrent/real-time audit** using AI-based data analytics on live PFMS transaction data, rather than relying solely on retrospective annual audit.
- Institutionalise **strict statutory timelines** for ministries to submit Action Taken Reports on CAG/PAC findings, with automatic escalation for non-compliance.
- Expand **outcome and zero-based budgeting** across all ministries and schemes, not applied selectively.
- Enhance **fiscal transparency** by consistently bringing all off-budget borrowings within FRBM reporting.
- Build **legislative committee capacity** through dedicated, professionally-staffed budget research units — akin to the US Congressional Budget Office or the UK's Office for Budget Responsibility.
- Strengthen **social audit** mechanisms (as pioneered under MGNREGA) for genuine last-mile expenditure accountability at the grassroots.
- Improve India's ranking on the **Open Budget Survey** through more granular, citizen-facing budget transparency (citizen budgets, participatory budgeting pilots).
- Extend accrual-based accounting (moving beyond pure cash-basis government accounting) to give a truer picture of assets, liabilities and long-term fiscal sustainability.

CONCLUSION

Public financial accountability is the **fulcrum of democratic fiscal legitimacy**; while India's audit-legislative architecture (CAG-PAC-legislature) is robust in constitutional design, its practical effectiveness now hinges on making it **real-time, technology-enabled and citizen-inclusive** rather than a purely retrospective, insider exercise.

(b) "Modernization of public services has become an unavoidable priority of governments worldwide." Discuss the key global trends driving the modernization of public services in the light of the above statement. [7+8=15]

ANS.

STRUCTURE

1. INTRODUCTION: Start with the rationale for public-service modernization
2. BODY: Discuss key global trends driving modernization with international and Indian examples
3. CONCLUSION: End with modernization as continuous, not one-time, reform

INTRODUCTION

Rising citizen expectations shaped by private-sector digital experience, tightening fiscal constraints, and rapid technological change have together made the **modernization of public services** — improving accessibility, efficiency, transparency and responsiveness — an unavoidable governance priority across both developed and developing nations, a trend the OECD terms the move toward "**Digital Era Governance**."

BODY

Key global trends driving modernization

- **Digital governance and e-government**: one-stop citizen portals (UK's GOV.UK, Estonia's near-total e-Residency/e-governance ecosystem, India's UMANG) consolidating thousands of services onto unified, mobile-first platforms.
- **GovTech ecosystems**: Singapore's GovTech agency and the UK's Government Digital Service (GDS) exemplify dedicated institutional bodies driving whole-of-government digital transformation rather than piecemeal departmental digitisation.
- **Data-driven and AI-enabled governance**: predictive analytics for service planning, AI chatbots for routine citizen queries, and algorithmic fraud detection in welfare/benefit delivery.
- **Robotic Process Automation (RPA) and blockchain**: automating repetitive back-office processes, and piloting blockchain for tamper-proof land records and supply-chain verification.
- **Whole-of-Government/Joined-Up Government**: integrated service delivery breaking departmental silos (Perri 6) — e.g., India's PM GatiShakti, single-window industrial clearance systems.
- **Citizen-centricity and co-production**: New Public Governance's emphasis on citizens as co-producers, not passive recipients — participatory budgeting, citizen charters, and citizen-experience (CX) design principles borrowed from private-sector service design.
- **Open Government and transparency**: open-data portals, RTI-type transparency laws, and real-time public dashboards building trust and enabling third-party accountability (civil society, media, researchers).
- **Outcome-based and agile management**: shifting from input/rule-compliance to outcome measurement; agile, iterative programme design using GovTech "sandbox" and pilot-testing approaches before nationwide rollout.
- **Public-Private-People Partnerships (4Ps)**: leveraging private-sector efficiency and civil-society reach in service delivery (India's Aadhaar-enabled Direct Benefit Transfer ecosystem, built on the JAM trinity).
- **Sustainability and SDG/ESG integration**: aligning public-service delivery with the UN Sustainable Development Goals (notably SDG 16 on effective, accountable institutions) and climate-resilience goals.
- **Post-pandemic resilience focus**: COVID-19 sharply accelerated demand for remote, contactless and crisis-resilient service delivery — telemedicine, e-learning, and digital welfare disbursal moved from experimental to mainstream almost overnight.

Illustrative India examples: Digital India Mission, DigiLocker (digital document verification), e-Courts Mission (judicial digitisation), and Common Service Centres extending modernization to rural, last-mile citizens who lack individual digital access.

CONCLUSION

These trends collectively signal a global shift from the traditional, rule-bound bureaucratic service model toward a **digitally-enabled, citizen-centric, outcome-driven** paradigm — making modernization not a one-time technology project but a **continuous, institutionally embedded governance imperative** that governments worldwide can no longer treat as optional.

(c) PERT provides a sophisticated framework for managing temporal uncertainties in large-scale projects. Evaluate the strategic utility and inherent limitations of this technique in complex environments. [5+5+5=15]

ANS.

STRUCTURE

1. INTRODUCTION: Define PERT and its origin
2. BODY: Explain mechanics with a PERT-vs-CPM comparison, strategic utility, and limitations with real project examples
3. CONCLUSION: End with PERT as valuable but not sufficient alone

INTRODUCTION

PERT (Programme Evaluation and Review Technique), developed by the **US Navy in 1958** in collaboration with Booz Allen Hamilton and Lockheed for the **Polaris submarine-missile programme**, is a network-based project-management technique designed to handle **time uncertainty** in large, non-repetitive projects through probabilistic time estimation — a close cousin of the near-simultaneously developed **Critical Path Method (CPM)**.

BODY

Mechanics

- Represents a project as a **network of events and activities** (using an activity-on-arrow or activity-on-node diagram), identifying the **critical path** — the longest sequence of dependent activities that determines the minimum possible project duration; any delay on this path directly delays the whole project.
- Uses **three time estimates** per activity — Optimistic (O), Most Likely (M), Pessimistic (P) — combined via the formula: **Expected time (Te) = (O + 4M + P) / 6**, based on an assumed **beta probability distribution**, allowing calculation of variance and the probability of completing the project by a given target date.

PERT vs. CPM (a useful distinction)

Basis	PERT	CPM
Time estimates	Probabilistic (three estimates)	Deterministic (single estimate)
Primary focus	Time/uncertainty management	Time-cost trade-off
Best suited for	Unique, R&D-type, uncertain projects	Repetitive, well-understood construction/engineering projects
Origin	US Navy (Polaris programme, 1958)	DuPont/Remington Rand (chemical plant maintenance, 1957)

Strategic utility

- Enables **realistic scheduling** under genuine uncertainty, unlike simpler deterministic techniques (e.g., basic Gantt charts, which do not model activity interdependencies well).
- Identifies the **critical path**, allowing managers to focus monitoring, expediting effort and resource allocation precisely on the activities that directly affect overall project completion time.
- Facilitates **risk assessment**: probability estimates help decision-makers gauge the likelihood of delays and build contingency buffers into the schedule.
- Useful for **large, complex, one-time projects** — infrastructure (metro-rail construction, dam-building), defence procurement, aerospace/ISRO mission planning, and R&D programmes — where activity durations are inherently uncertain and non-repetitive.
- Supports **inter-agency coordination** by visually mapping dependencies among multiple stakeholders/contractors — valuable in India's large public infrastructure projects (e.g., Delhi Metro construction phases) involving numerous agencies and contractors.

Inherent limitations

- **Subjectivity of time estimates**: optimistic/pessimistic/most-likely values often rely on expert judgment, introducing systematic bias (typically underestimation, as project managers tend toward optimism).
- **Assumes activity independence**: does not adequately capture resource constraints or interdependencies between activities competing for the same limited resources (labour, equipment) at the same time.
- **Complexity in large networks**: becomes unwieldy and difficult to manually update for projects with thousands of activities without specialised project-management software.
- **Focus on time, not cost**: standard PERT does not integrate cost trade-offs as robustly as CPM's time-cost crashing analysis, though PERT/Cost hybrid variants have since been developed.
- **Poor fit for repetitive/routine projects**: better suited to unique, non-repetitive projects than standardised, well-understood operations where deterministic scheduling (CPM/Gantt) suffices and is simpler to apply.
- **Underestimation bias**: empirical studies of large infrastructure projects worldwide (echoed in India's own experience of metro and highway project delays) consistently show actual completion times exceeding PERT estimates, since the three-point estimate poorly captures rare but high-impact ("black swan") risks like litigation, land acquisition disputes or regulatory delay.

CONCLUSION

PERT remains a **powerful strategic tool for scheduling and risk management** in complex, uncertain projects, but its probabilistic elegance must be supplemented with **resource-constrained scheduling, cost-integration (via CPM), and adaptive, contingency-based risk management** to be fully effective in the messy reality of large-scale, multi-stakeholder complex environments.